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1

Introduction
In 1964, Gary Becker noted the important role of on-the-job training
in Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special
Reference to Education by observing that:
Theories of firm behavior, no matter how they differ in other
respects, almost invariably ignore the effect of the productive pro
cess itself on worker productivity. This is not to say that no one
recognizes that productivity is affected by the job itself; but the
recognition has not been formalized, incorporated into economic
analysis, and its implications worked out.... Many workers
increase their productivity by learning new skills and perfecting
old ones while on the job. Presumably, future productivity can be
improved only at a cost, for otherwise there would be an unlimited
demand for training (1964, p. 8).

In the decades following Decker©s classic text, researchers have
made substantial progress in achieving Becker©s goal of fully incorpo
rating the role of on-the-job training into economic analysis.
Researchers now widely accept that there are two key aspects of
training. First, there is the recognition that on-the-job training is an
important example of an "investment" in human capital. 1 Like any
investment, there are initial costs. For on-the-job training, these costs
include the time devoted by the worker and co-workers to learning
skills that increase productivity plus the costs of any equipment and
material required to teach these skills. Like any investment, the returns
to these expenditures occur in future periods. For on-the-job training,
these future returns are measured by the increased productivity of the
worker during subsequent periods of employment.
The second key aspect of on-the-job training is the distinction
between "general" and "specific" on-the-job training, a distinction
emphasized by Becker in his early works. While all training increases
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the productivity of the worker at the firm providing the training, gen
eral training also increases the productivity of the worker at firms other
than the one providing the training. For example, a secretary who
learns the use of a standard word-processing program or a doctor who
interns at a specific hospital both receive general training, as these
skills are transferable to other workplaces. On the other hand, specific
on-the-job training increases the productivity of the worker at the firm
providing the training, but not at other firms. Resources spent orienting
new employees to the practices of their new employer, or teaching
employees how to contribute to a unique assembly process or work
team, are examples of specific training.
Chapter 2 presents the standard theoretical framework for assessing
the impact of on-the-job training on productivity, wages, and turnover.
This sets the stage for our investigation in subsequent chapters of the
magnitude and effects of on-the-job training, an investigation that
focuses on three employer-based surveys of the training received by
newly hired workers. We start by considering two questions: Exactly
how much training do employers provide their workers? Who receives
this training? Chapters 3 and 4 address these two issues: the extent of
training and the characteristics of the recipients of on-the-job training.
Our focus is on the extent of training provided to new workers during
their first three months of employment. We find that a substantial
amount of on-the-job training takes place at the beginning of a job, that
most of this training is informal training, and that participation in this
training depends on such variables as an individual©s level of education
and experience.
The findings reported in chapters 3 and 4 rely solely on employerbased surveys. This raises the issue of whether the patterns of on-thejob training reported by employers are similar to workers© perception
of the extent of training. One way to examine this is to identify a par
ticular position and compare the employer©s response concerning the
training involved with the responses of the worker who is the recipient
of this training. An analysis of such a "matched" survey is the subject
of chapter 5. We find substantial measurement error in the training
variables, and also that firms tend to report more training than workers.
But there appears to be no systematic variation in reporting errors
based on firm or worker characteristics, and aggregate reported mea
sures of the incidence of training are similar.
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The theory of on-the-job training developed in chapter 2 involves
several key predictions concerning the effect of training on the starting
wage and on wage and productivity growth. Chapter 6 investigates the
evidence supporting such predictions. We find that training does
increase wage and productivity growth as anticipated, but there appears
little evidence that training substantially reduces the starting wage as
predicted.
Chapter 7 investigates evidence consistent with the possibility that
there is a matching of positions with more training to more "able" indi
viduals. To do so, we examine employer recruiting activities. Here, we
find evidence of a systematic attempt by employers through their hiring
activities to link high training positions to higher-ability workers. In
short, employers do spend substantially more time searching for a new
employee if the position to be filled involves greater training. These
findings provide a rationale for our failure in chapter 6 to detect a
strong, inverse relationship between the level of training and the start
ing wage. Chapter 8 summarizes all of our findings and offers some
policy recommendations.
NOTE
1. Human capital investments have been classified as ". . . activities that influence the future
money and psychic income by increasing the resources in people" (Becker 1964, p. 1). Human
capital investments include not only schooling but also on-the-job training, migration, medical
care, and searching for information about wages and prices. All these activities are engaged in at
some cost and yield future returns, often in the form of higher wages.

CHAPTER

On-the-Job Training
as an Investment in Human Capital
A 1992 survey by the Small Business Administration indicates that
workers© starting wages in 1992 increased by 10 cents for each addi
tional month of formal education. This finding is consistent with an
extensive literature documenting the fact that firms pay higher wages
to workers with greater formal education, consistent with the assump
tion that such workers are more productive. It is not clear, however, to
what extent formal education can be viewed as an investment in human
capital that directly increases a worker©s productivity. An alternative
view is that formal education acts as a signal that more productive
workers, because they can acquire additional formal education at a
lower cost, do so to signal their higher productivity to employers. In
this view, increased formal education does not increase the inherent
productivity of workers, but it does reveal those workers who are more
able.
It is not our intent to discern the relative importance of formal edu
cation as a human capital investment versus formal education as a sig
nal of ability. Rather, we seek to focus on a different, less-studied type
of human capital investment on-the-job training. The potential
impact of on-the-job training on worker productivity can be substan
tial. For instance, the SBA survey of employers that we later analyze
extensively indicates that if an employer spends an additional month
providing on-the-job training to a particular worker, that worker©s
hourly wage will rise by 6.5 cents. This 6.5 cent figure likely underesti
mates the actual increase in worker productivity that can be attributed
to on-the-job training. The reason for this is that part of the return to
on-the-job training is reaped by the employer as higher profits, as pro
ductivity increases by more than the wage paid.
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The extent of on-the-job training varies widely across different
occupations and industries. What patterns in terms of differences in
wage and productivity growth, as well as hiring activity and turnover,
should we expect to see across positions? To answer this question, we
introduce the standard theory of the effects of on-the-job training, fol
lowing our presentation of a simple training model. In doing so, we
introduce the important distinction between "general" and "specific"
on-the-job training. We also explore the implications of training for
turnover.
On-the-job training is but one approach to explaining why wages
grow with job tenure. This chapter reviews other theories that provide
alternative explanations. The job-matching/learning approaches sug
gest that wage growth reflects the revelation of information concerning
the productivity of particular workers assigned to particular tasks, not
on-the-job training that increases productivity. The incentive-based
thesis suggests that the higher wages paid to long-term employees indi
cates a long-term contract that incorporates appropriate incentives to
minimize shirking by newly hired workers. The final section of this
chapter provides an overview of the available evidence concerning the
major predictions of on-the-job training theory.

A Simple Model of On-the-job Training
When a worker is hired, there is a match between a particular posi
tion and a particular worker. Firms© positions differ with respect to a
variety of factors including the extent of on-the-job training required,
formal educational requirements, the capability of the employer to
monitor workers© effort, and the safety or attractiveness of the work
place. Workers also vary widely with respect to such factors as innate
ability, formal education attainment, and the propensity for future turn
over.
To focus on the role played by on-the-job training, let us consider a
simple situation in which a worker is hired by a firm for two periods.
The worker comes to the firm with a level of general human capital
acquired through formal education E and a level of ability denoted by
the Greek letter a. A worker with no training but with education E and
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ability a has productivity in the first, or beginning, period of work
denoted by the term p(E, a, 0), where the zero in this expression indi
cates that the worker has received no training by the current employer
in prior periods. Naturally, increases in formal education or ability
make the worker more productive. In terms of first derivatives of the
productivity function, this means that dpIdE > 0 and dpi da > 0.
During the first period, the employer provides the total training to
the worker denoted by the vector T. The training provided take two
forms. General training, denoted by Tg, is training that increases the
worker©s productivity not only at the firm providing the training, but
also at other firms. Specific training, denoted by 7^, is training that
increases the worker©s productivity only at the firm providing the train
ing. Thus, the training vector T = (Tg, Ts). Training increases the pro
ductivity of the worker at that firm in the future. In our simple example,
the future is the second period. Thus, a worker with ability a and edu
cation level E who has received general training Tg and specific train
ing Ts at the firm will have a productivity in the period "after" training
given by:
(2.1)

fa = p(E,cc,T)

where dp/dT > 0. We assume that increased ability a not only increases
worker productivity, but also affects the return to training. In particular,
it is assumed that cPpldTda > 0. In words, the return to increased train
ing is greater for more able workers (workers with a higher a).
Training increases future productivity, but it comes at a cost. Other
wise, as Becker notes, "there would be an unlimited demand for train
ing." (1964, p. 9) One way of introducing costs of training is to view
part of the output of a worker being consumed by the training activity.
That is, output produced for sale is reduced as the worker takes time
out to learn how to increase productivity by observing others. Training
costs also include the lost output of co-workers and managers who take
the time to show the new worker techniques for improving productiv
ity. 1 Let c(E, a, T) denote the total training costs in terms of lost output
that the employer incurs during the first period to provide training T to
an individual with formal education E and ability a.2 Naturally, dc/dT
is greater than zero, such that there are greater costs to increased train-
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ing. The net productivity of a beginning worker during the training
period is thus given by:

(2.2)

fb =p(E,a,0,0)-c(E,a,T).

If there were no training provided (T - (Tg, Ts) - (0, 0)), then train
ing costs are zero i.e., c(E, a, 0, 0) = 0.
As expressions (2.1) and (2.2) indicate, with no training the net pro
ductivity of the worker during the first and second periods of employ
ment would be identical. If the worker receives some training (i.e., Tg >
0 or Ts > 0), then the productivity of this worker after training (fa) is
higher than his or her net productivity during the first period (fb) for
two reasons. First, there is the productivity enhancement of training in
that p(E, a,T)> p(E, a, 0, 0) if Tg > 0 and/or Ts > 0. Second, there is
the cost of training c(E, a, T) in terms of the reduced contribution to
output of the worker during training along with reduced output by coworkers.
Let wb denote the "beginning" wage paid the worker during the first
period and wa denote the wage paid a worker during the second period
of employment, "after" training. Let q denote the probability a worker
quits the employer at the end of the first period of employment. With
probability 1 - q, the worker remains at the employer for a second
period of employment. Then the employer©s expected net present value
to hiring a worker and providing training levels Tg and Ts during the
first period of employment, NPV, is given by:
(2.3)

NPV =fb - Wb + $(\-q)(fa - Wa)

where ft is the discount factor (1 > ft > 0). The second term in expres
sion (2.3) indicates that with probability 1 -q, the worker does not quit,
and the firm reaps the net return/ - wa from the trained worker during
the second period of employment.
We start by comparing the wages paid beginning and trained work
ers. Competition across employers in the form of the creation or
destruction of various positions means that, in equilibrium, all three
types of positions will have zero net present value to employers. Set-
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ting NPV, as defined by expression (2.3), equal to zero, wages satisfy
the following zero profit condition:
(2.4)

wb + p(l-q)wa =fb + $(l-q)fa .

Substituting (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.4), and noting that total training,
r, is equal to the vector of general and specific training, (Tg, Ts), the
zero profit condition implies the following two-period wage function
for newly hired workers:

(2.5) wb + p (\-q) wa =p(E, a, 0, 0)- c(E, a, Tg, Ts)
+ P(\-q)p(E> a,Tg,Ts).
The next two conditions place restrictions on the wage paid to
trained workers. The first condition, a result of competition among
employers for trained workers, requires that employers pay an aftertraining wage wa at least as great as the trained worker©s potential con
tribution to output at other firms.3 Otherwise, such workers will be bid
away. As the potential contribution of workers at alternative employers
depends on the extent of general, but not specific, training, we thus
have the following expression for the wage paid to workers after the
training period:

(2.6) wa >p(E, a,Tg,Q).
Condition (2.6) indicates that competitive forces provide a lower
bound to the wage an employer pays a trained worker.
There are other forces that impose an upper bound on the after-train
ing wage wa. Specifically, the employer will have an incentive to unilaterally dismiss a trained worker if the wage paid the trained worker in
the second period exceeds his or her productivity. Such moral hazard
considerations on the part employers imply that an incentive-compati
ble wage agreement will require a second period wage that does not
exceed the worker productivity. That is, we have the following condi
tions concerning the wage paid a trained worker:

(2.7) wa <p(E,a,TK,Ts).

10 On-the-Job Training as an Investment in Human Capital

The danger of an employer paying a wage in the second period below
that previously agreed upon is not considered. It is assumed that the
potential for the worker to sabotage production in retaliation against
such actions is a sufficient deterrent.
By invoking conditions (2.5) - (2.7), we can identify reasons for dif
ferences in wages across various positions that differ solely in the
extent and type of training. For instance, let w0 denote the per-period
wage for a worker in a position that offers no training and wag denote
the wage paid a worker after receiving general training Tg but no spe
cific training. Conditions (2.6) and (2.7) imply that w0 will exactly
equal the worker©s productivity in the position, pa(E, a, 0, 0), while wag
will exactly equal pa( E, a, Tg, 0). Thus, the difference in the secondperiod wage paid to workers of identical ability a and education E
across these two positions is:

(2.8) wag -w0 = p(E, a, Tg, 0) - p(E, a, 0, 0) = r(E, a, T8) > 0
where r(E, a, Tg) is the gross return in terms of increased productivity
from an investment in general training Tg by a worker with ability a
and formal education E.
If the worker reaps the entire return to general training, then from
the zero profit condition (2.5) it follows that the worker must bear the
entire cost of general training. In other words, the first period wage of
workers who receive general training, wbg, is reduced by the cost of
providing the training. That is,

(2.9) w0 -wbg = c(E, a,Tg)>0
where c(E, a, Tg) is the total cost in terms of lost output from an invest
ment in general training Tg by a worker of ability a with education E.
Equations (2.8) and (2.9) illustrate the well-known prediction that
workers reap all the returns to general training and bear all the costs of
such training. What is not indicated is whether the return to general
training, fully captured by workers through higher wages after training,
more than compensates workers for the costs in terms of the reduced
wages received during the training period. That is, we have not yet
placed any restrictions on the net gain to an individual investing in the
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level of general training Tg. For an individual of ability a with formal
education level E, the net value to such an investment is:

(2.10)

Vg(E, a, Tg) = p r(E, a, Tg) - c(E, a, Tg).

Clearly there are differences across workers in terms of ability a and
differences across positions in terms of training requirements. Assum
ing that Vg is increasing in ability, it follows that workers will be sorted
across positions according to ability, with the higher ability workers
assigned to positions with increased training.4 An equilibrium in which
some positions offer general training while others do not then requires
that there exist a marginal worker with level of ability amg and formal
education Emg who will be just indifferent between the two positions.
For such a worker:

(2.11)

Vg(Emg, amg, Ts) = p r(Emg, amg, Tg) - c(Emg, amg, Tg) = 0.

For this worker, the fact that the present value of the return to general
training exactly matches the cost of such training implies that the twoperiod return to accepting a position with general training Tg is identi
cal to a position that offers no training.
With regard to specific training, the restrictions on the wage paid to
trained workers as represented by conditions (2.6) and (2.7) do not, by
themselves, determine who bears the costs of, or reaps the return to,
specific training. For the moment, let us assume that workers reap a
constant fraction 8 (1 > 8> 0) of the total return to specific training in
the form a higher wage after training. If the worker receives the frac
tion S of the return to specific training, then the difference between the
wage was paid to a worker after receiving only specific training Ts and
the wage w0 paid a worker with no training is:
(2.12) was -w0 = 6 \p(E, a,0, Ts)-p(E, a, 0,0)] = 8 r(E, a; Ts) > 0 .
As with general training, the zero profit condition across positions
that vary in training implies that if a worker reaps some of the return to
specific training, the worker must bear some of the costs in terms of a
reduction in the beginning wage. From equation (2.12) and the zero
profit condition (2.5), for workers who receive the fraction 8 of the
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return to specific training, the cost of training in terms of a lower wage
equals:

(2.13) w0 - wbs = c(E, a. Ts) - (1-6) p (\-q) r(E, a, Ts).
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) illustrate the well-known point that if
workers receive a greater fraction of the return to specific training (a
higher 8), they will bear a greater cost in terms of a reduction in the
starting wage. Naturally, for a given 8 < 1, both a lower quit rate q or
greater return to specific training r(E, a, Ts) will reduce the training
costs borne by the worker as each change increases a firm©s reward to
providing the training. This reflects the fact that the overall net return
to specific training, given by:
(2.14)

VS(E, a,Ts,q)l = (\-q) r(a, E, Ts) - c(a, E, Ts)

depends inversely on the quit rate.

Traditional Predicted Effects of Training on Wages,
Productivity, and Turnover
Below we summarize the above discussion of on-the-job general
and specific training with respect to the commonly cited implications
for wages and productivity. We then turn to the implications of specific
training for turnover. With respect to the effect of general and specific
training on the pattern of wages, we have the following two proposi
tions.
Proposition 1: Comparing a position that offers general on-the-job
training with one that offers no training, if workers of similar ability
and level of formal education were to be employed in both positions,
then the following predictions hold:
The wage paid after training to a worker in the position offering the
general training would be higher to reflect the increased productiv
ity of the trained worker at the employer offering the training as
well as at other employers (see condition (2.8)).
The starting wage for a worker at the position that offers the train-
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ing would be lower to reflect the cost of training (see condition
(2.9)).
The growth in wages and productivity for a worker at the position
offering general training would exceed that of a worker at the posi
tion not offering such training (see conditions (2.8) and (2.9)).
The growth in wages and productivity for a worker who starts in a
position offering general training would be identical whether the
worker quits after training to work for another employer or
remains with the employer (see conditions (2.6) and (2.7)). Thus,
controlling for the effect of work experience on wage and produc
tivity growth, there would be no additional effect on wages and
productivity growth for workers who have a longer tenure at a par
ticular firm.
Proposition 2: Comparing a position that offers specific on-the-job
training with one that offers no training, if workers of similar ability,
level of formal education, and quit propensity were to be employed
in both positions, then the following predictions hold:
The wage paid to workers after training would be higher to reflect
the increased productivity of the trained worker at the employer
offering the training (see condition (2.12)). The extent of the
increase will depend directly on the sharing rule for total returns
(8) and total return to the investment (see condition (2.12)).
The starting wage for a worker at the position that offers specific
training would be reduced if the worker (a) reaps a greater share 6
of the return to such training, or (b) has a higher quit propensity q
(see condition (2.13)).
The growth in wages and productivity for a worker who starts in a
position offering specific training would be lower if the worker
quits after training to work for another employer. The lower growth
occurs because the worker forfeits his or her share of the return to
the investment in specific capital. Thus, controlling for the effect of
work experience on wage and productivity growth, specific train
ing suggests an additional effect on wages and productivity growth
for workers with a longer tenure at a particular firm.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the potential wage profiles for individuals with
no training, with a given amount of training that is all general, and with
the identical level of training that is specific. For specific training, it is
assumed that the worker and firm share both the cost to and return from
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the training. This explains the less steep wage profile for the specific
training compared to an identical level of general training. Either type
of training, however, provides a rationale for an upward sloping wage
profile.
Figure 2.1 Effect of Training on Wage Profiles

Wages

General Training

Specific Training
No Training

Tenure at Firm

Wage Equations Implied by the On-the Job Training Model

Propositions 1 and 2 suggest the estimation of the following wage
equations for beginning and trained workers: 5
(2.15)

In (wb) = b0 -bl In Tg -b2 In Ts + b3 In a + b4 In E-b5 q + e

and

(2.16)

In (vvf) = eQ + e\ In Tg + e2 In Ts + e3 In a + e4 In E - e5 q + e

where b, , et > 0, i = 0, ... , 5. Propositions 1 and 2 imply that, control
ling for individuals© levels of ability (a), formal education (£), and quit
propensities (q), a cross section of beginning workers© wages should
reveal the pattern of lower starting wages at positions with more train-
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ing, with a greater negative impact on the starting wage for general
training, as workers bear the entire cost of such training (i.e., bl > b2).6
Conversely, a cross section of trained workers© wages should reveal the
pattern of higher wages at positions that offer more training, again with
general training having a greater impact (i.e., el > e^).
Often measures of differences in training across positions are not
directly available. One alternative approach to test the theory of on-thejob training, an approach that circumvents this lack of data, uses data
on the lengths of time a worker has been in the labor market and with a
particular employer as proxies for the extent of general and specific
training. The argument is that, as training takes place over time, the
extent of general training should be directly correlated with the length
of time an individual has been in the labor force, or what is generally
referred to as his or her length of work "experience." Similarly, with
regard to specific training, a greater length of time a worker has
remained at a particular employer, or what is generally referred to as
his or her "tenure" at an employer, is interpreted as indicative of a
worker who has acquired greater specific training. As we discuss later
in this chapter, these proxies have been used to test for the predicted
returns to training.
The Implications of Specific Training for Turnover

A unique aspect of specific training as an investment in human cap
ital is that, for such an investment to pay off, an employer and
employee must continue in their employment relationship. Equation
(2.14) illustrates this by noting that the net return to specific training,
Vs, increases with a reduction in the quit propensity. In a more general
model, not only the propensity of workers to quit but also the propen
sity of employers to terminate the employment relationship through a
unilateral discharge influences the net return to specific training. Such
turnover, whether initiated by employer or employee, imposes costs on
the other party when the costs and returns to specific training are
shared (1 > 6 > 0). There are at least two ways to minimize the
adverse effects of turnover decisions on the joint return to specific
training: contract choice and the sorting of workers across positions
based on their quit propensities. We consider contract choice first.
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To minimize the adverse effects of turnover decisions, an optimal
employment contract will seek an arrangement in which the individu
als workers or employer who make turnover decisions after train
ing quit or discharge consider the entire lost return to specific
training arising from a termination of the employment relationship. For
instance, let©s say that the sole source of turnover is quit decisions by
workers who discover new, more attractive alternatives. If one were to
restrict the analysis to the appropriate sharing rule (i.e., optimal choice
of §), then the optimal sharing rule would be to set 8 equal to one. In
this case, the worker contemplating whether or not to quit would bear
all the costs, in terms of the forgone return to specific training, if the
decision were to quit.7
If one were to consider more flexible contractual forms, then the
optimal contract would specify that a worker who quits must compen
sate the employer for any lost return to specific training. Similarly, an
employer who discharges a worker must compensate the worker for
any lost return to specific training. Such payments are not uncommon.
For instance, the practice of granting severance pay to a dismissed
worker can be interpreted as a contingent terminal payment that forces
employers to compensate workers for lost returns to specific training.
Similarly, the fact that, if workers quit shortly after receiving training,
they give up future pension payments or paid vacations, illustrates ter
minal payment by workers to employers that compensates the
employer for the lost returns to specific training.
The above discussion leads to the following proposition concerning
the nature of contracts that arise at positions with specific on-the-job
training.
Proposition 3: Comparing a position that offers specific on-the-job
training with one that offers no training, if workers of similar ability
and level of education were to be employed in both positions, then
the following predictions hold:
If workers are to receive new information on the value of alterna
tives to continued employment, it is optimal for workers to bear at
least part of the cost and reap at least part of return to specific
training as higher posttraining wages. The outcome is a wage for
the experienced worker that exceeds that available from other
employers. As a consequence, the worker will be less likely to quit.
This result is strengthened if optimal contingent terminal payments
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(e.g., vested pension plans, paid vacation days based on seniority)
are considered.
If employers are to receive new information on the value of alter
natives to continued employment, it is optimal for employers to
bear at least part of the cost and thus reap at least part of the return
to specific training as posttraining wages below the productivity of
the worker. As a consequence, the employer will be less likely to
discharge the worker. This result of a "quasi-fixed" labor input is
strengthened if one considers optimal contingent terminal pay
ments (e.g., severance pay). 8
A second way to minimize the adverse effects of turnover decisions
on the joint return to specific training involves the sorting of workers
across positions based on their quit propensities. For instance, let©s pre
sume that the labor market is populated with two types of individuals.
Stayers (51) have a low-quit propensity, qs, while movers (M) have a
high-quit propensity, qM, with qM > qs. For positions that differ in the
extent of general training alone, this difference in quit propensities
would be irrelevant, as quit propensities do not affect the return to such
an investment.9 As the expression for the net return to specific training
indicates (expression (2.14)), however, individuals with a lower-quit
propensity will find such positions more attractive. To the extent that
the employer shares in the costs of and return to specific training,
employers as well will place a greater value on individuals with the
lower-quit propensity.
The fact that the joint gains to specific training are greater for work
ers with the lower-quit propensity implies a sorting of workers. To see
why, let©s assume that there are two types of positions, those that
require no specific training and those that require substantial specific
training. Further, let us assume that employment contracts are initially
allocated randomly across the two types of workers (those with highquit propensity qM and those with low-quit propensity qs). Given such
an allocation, the wage profiles of the two types of positions are such
that expected wages and profits are identical across the two positions
for the mean quit propensity, with qM > q > qs. In this case, the stayers
would prefer to be located in positions with specific training, as they
would be more likely to reap a return to the training in the second
period that takes the form of a higher wage. Conversely, the movers
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would prefer the positions with no specific training. Similarly, employ
ers filling the positions that require specific training would prefer the
stayers, as they would then be more likely to reap their portion of the
return to specific training. Search and screening activities by both
workers and employers to induce such a sorting of workers provide us
with the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Comparing a position that offers specific on-the-job
training with one that offers no training, the sorting of workers of
similar ability and level of formal education but differing quit pro
pensities provides the following predictions:
Positions with specific on-the-job training would be populated
with individuals who have a lower inherent propensity to quit. As a
consequence, we would observe less turnover (quits) in positions
that require more specific training.
Workers with low-quit propensities would on average be more pro
ductive in the labor force (e.g., they would be equally productive in
positions requiring no specific training but more productive in
positions with specific training). As a consequence, their compen
sation should be greater than that of high-quit propensity individu
als.
The importance of the above propositions is suggested by Lazear
and Rosen (1988), Kuhn (1993), and Barron, Black, and Loewenstein
(1993). These papers, among others, consider the sorting of women
into jobs with low turnover costs (e.g., positions with low specific
training) that can arise if turnover rates are inherently higher for
females than males. If women have a weaker attachment to the labor
force, then as proposition 4 indicates, efficiency, and hence labor mar
ket equilibrium, requires that women be assigned to jobs in which turn
over is less costly. Becker (1985) suggests that this sorting of women
into such jobs that offer less training may reflect explicit decisions by
women to take such positions because of their specialization in home
production and weaker labor force attachment. Along similar lines,
O©Neill (1985) argues that part of the gender wage gap is created by
women©s preferences for part-time work and flexible work schedules.
Thus, the traditional model of on-the-job training provides
predictions concerning the starting wage, wage growth, turnover, and
even gender differences in the labor markets. At this point, however, it
is worth noting the informational assumptions necessary for this
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model. First, both firms and workers must be able to agree on beforetraining productivity (fb) and after-training productivity (fa ).
Obviously, firms have an incentive to understate the productivity of a
worker before the receipt of training so as to lower the starting wage.
In addition, both firms and workers must agree on what are the costs of
training (our <;( ) function). Unfortunately for the parties, there is no
market that will efficiently provide a price quote for the training
services. Again, firms would appear to have an incentive to overstate
the cost of training to lower the starting wage.
Perhaps more important, workers and firms must agree on what
training is general and hence should be funded by workers, and what
training is specific, for which the firms and workers should share the
investment. Clearly, firms would like to describe all the training as gen
eral training, and workers would like to specify all the training as spe
cific. The division of training between specific and general may not be
as obvious as it first seems. Much training may be specific to an indus
try, and if that industry©s employment is declining, should we count it
as general training? When the market for trained workers is thin, it
becomes difficult to determine what fraction of the training is truly
general. In addition, because the gains to specific training are a func
tion of the likelihood of job turnover, workers and firms must agree to
the probability of job turnover. Finally, because labor contracts seldom
explicitly determine the wage profile, workers and firms generally
agree to an "implicit contract." Such implicit contracts inherently can
not rely on third-party enforcement mechanisms to insure that both
parties honor their commitments and hence are often difficult to
enforce.

Other Models of Compensation, Productivity, and Turnover
On-the-job training models provide important insights into patterns
of wages, productivity, and turnover. An investment in training today
raises a worker©s future productivity and consequently his or her future
compensation. As we have seen, since the initial contributions of
Becker (1962) and Oi (1962), economists have drawn a key distinction
between general training, which has value at alternative firms, and spe-
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cific training, which has value only at the firm offering the training.
There are, however, alternative interpretations of the observed wage
patterns that are predicted by on-the-job training. This section briefly
considers two such alternatives: learning/job matching models and
incentive-based compensation models. As we examine the extent and
impact of on-the-job training, we must keep in mind the role these the
ories could play. Otherwise, we may incorrectly attribute wage growth
or productivity growth to on-the-job training when such growth actu
ally reflects these other phenomena.
Learning/Job Matching Models

The human capital literature stresses the productivity-enhancing
effects of on-the-job training. As this training is acquired during the
first period of employment, it is predicted that productivity and wages
will be directly correlated with experience. It has been suggested that
other activities unrelated to traditional human capital investment also
occur during the first period of employment and imply similar out
comes. Specifically, employers gather information concerning a new
workers© ability during the initial period of employment. Similarly,
workers gather information concerning the nonpecuniary benefits of an
employer. As discussed below, the acquisition of information can affect
wage growth and task assignment. The key assumption of these learn
ing/job matching models is that information on the value of a match
between an employer and new hire increased over time rather than pro
ductivity growth due to training. Below we consider three types of
information that can be acquired over time.
The first type of information acquisition is known as the "learning
model." In such models, the employer acquires information on the true
ability of the worker. Those who are identified as high ability are
rewarded by an increase in wage, for the employer seeks to reduce the
likelihood of turnover by such individuals. Thus, the wages of some
workers will rise over time as these workers are identified as the higher
ability workers. Others will experience a decline in wages. This predic
tion is distinct from human capital theory. For human capital theory,
wages do not fall with tenure; zero training implies identical wages
across time, while positive training implies rising wages. In contrast, if
information revelation on ability occurs during the first period of a
worker©s employment, then wages can fall for those workers revealed
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to be below average. In fact, Farber and Gibbons (1991) find that real
wage declines do occur. They estimate that as many as 20 percent of
workers experience a real wage decline with experience on the job.
The "job matching" literature focuses on a second type of informa
tion acquisition. Unlike the learning model, the information acquired
does not reveal the productivity of the worker at other firms. Rather,
each employer regards all prospective employees as identical ex ante.
In other words, the realized value of a match between any given worker
with any given employer can be viewed as a random variable drawn
from a common distribution. In some of the models (e.g., Johnson
(1978), Viscusi (1979^, Lippman and McCall (1981), and Holmlund
and Lang (1985)), the realized value depends on information the
worker gathers during the first period of employment about working
conditions and other non-pecuniary aspects of the employment rela
tionship. In other models, e.g., Jovanovic (1979b), the realized value of
a match between a firm and a worker is the discovered productivity of
the worker. If the additional information suggests that the joint value to
the match is a good one, the worker remains at the firm. If the realized
joint value includes in part a good draw in terms of productivity, the
worker who remains with the firm will receive a higher wage, for only
the more productive matches continue.
A third type of information acquisition by employers during the ini
tial period of employment concerns the tasks for which the new
employee has a comparative advantage (that is, the tasks for which the
new employee is the low-cost producer). As discussed by Barron and
Loewenstein (1985), such information will allow the employer to effi
ciently assign workers across tasks. The ability to assign workers effi
ciently is valued by employers as it reduces production costs. Thus,
employers will pay workers whose abilities they have identified higher
wages to discourage turnover. Here it is possible that all identified
workers will receive higher wages, as each could be equally capable at
the task for which they have a now-identified comparative advantage.
Incentive-based Compensation Models

There are numerous examples of incentive-based compensation
models. A key feature of such models is that employers cannot readily
identify an employee©s work effort. For example, there might not be a

22

On-the-Job Training as an Investment in Human Capital

clear link between observable current output and the worker©s effort,
which is not directly observable. If it takes time to discover the extent
of shirking by a worker, then an optimal compensation scheme would
delay payment until it is revealed that the worker provided appropriate
effort. If it turned out that the worker had shirked, termination of the
employment agreement would deny the worker these anticipated large
payments toward the end of his or her tenure at the firm. This could
create a powerful incentive for workers to provide substantial work
effort during the early periods of employment. Lazear (1979) describes
this incentive-based compensation scheme as follows:
By deferring payment a firm may induce a worker to perform at a
higher level of effort. Both firm and worker may prefer this high
wage/high effort combination to a lower wage/lower effort path
that results from a payment scheme that creates incentives to
shirk. Thus, it may pay the firm and worker to set up a scheme
such that the worker is paid less than his marginal product when
he is young and more than his marginal product when he is old to
compensation (p. 1264).

There are several pieces of evidence that suggest that incentivebased compensation models can complement training models in pro
viding an explanation for wages rising with tenure at a particular
employer. First, as Lazear notes, they are consistent with the institution
of mandatory retirement, as older workers lack incentives to provide
work effort and are paid a wage above their marginal product as a
reward for providing substantial work effort in their youth. Second, as
noted by Lazear and Moore (1984), the age-earning profile is less steep
for self-employed workers, and these are the workers for whom the
problems in inducing the appropriate level of effort do not exist.

Evidence Concerning the Standard Predictions
of On-the-job Training
Tests of the predictions of the theory underlying on-the-job training
have typically taken one of two approaches, depending on the avail
ability of data. The first, and more common, approach is adopted when
direct measures of on-the-job training are not available. As discussed

On-the-Job Training

23

above, by making the assumption that the extent of general on-the-job
training varies directly with the time in the labor force (labor market
experience) and that the extent of specific on-the-job training varies
directly with time on the job (job tenure), economists have relied on
measures of labor market experience and job tenure to proxy for onthe-job training. The second approach to testing the theory of on-thejob training relies on explicit measures of training.
Inferring Training from Wage Data

In his path-breaking research, Mincer (1974) established the stan
dard specification for the effect of on-the-job training earnings over the
life-cycle. Mincer assumed that on-the-job training investment was
directly related to work experience, and suggested that individual (log)
earnings appeared to be a quadratic function of experience. 10 This rea
soning leads to the following specification for the typical wage equa
tion that includes both a worker©s labor market experience and job
tenure:
(2.17)

In (w) = (3 x + <|), (exp) + <j> 2 (exp)2 + YI (ten) + y2 (ten)2 + e

where x is a vector of control variables that includes measures of
worker demographics and formal education, exp is the worker©s total
labor market experience, ten is the worker©s tenure at the firm, £ is the
error term, and j3, <j)©s, and /s are parameters to be estimated. 11
We may estimate equation (2.17) using standard regression analysis
and claim that the <j)©s provide a measure of the returns to general
human capital while the y©s provide some evidence about the returns to
specific training. To see why, consider the experiment of two workers
who have just completed their first year in the labor market: John and
Carol. John has just left his previous employer, so while his experience
is one year (exp = 1), his tenure at his current employer is zero (ten =
0). Thus, John©s expected log wage is:
(2.18)

£(ln(w)) = pjc + (|) 1 + (|)2
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because John now has one year of labor market experience, but his ten
ure at his current employer is zero. In contrast, Carol©s expected wage is:
(2.19)

£(ln(w)) = p;t + (|> 1 + (|> 2 + y.+Y2

because she has both one year of experience (exp =1) and one year of
tenure (ten =1).
If jobs offer general on-the-job training, both John and Carol will
earn more after they have spent one year in the labor market (that is, 0,
+ 02 > 0)- In addition, if jobs offer firm-specific training and if workers
reap at least a portion of the returns to that specific training, Carol will
earn an additional premium for her tenure at the firm (y, + y2 > 0).
Because John has left his previous employer, any firm-specific skills
that he may have picked up no longer increase his productivity and
hence no longer have any impact on his wage. By examining the differ
ence in the returns to Carol©s labor market experience and John©s labor
market experience, we can identify the increase in wages due to firmspecific training. By examining the difference in John©s wage to a
worker without any previous experience (or if available, comparing
John©s wage a year ago to his wage today), we can identify the increase
in wages from general human capital. 12
The above approach to estimating the impact of on-the-job training
has a long history. Although the approach is simplistic, the data seem
to support many of its implications. First, literally hundreds of studies
find that wages increase with labor market experience, as one would
expect if on-the-job training increases worker productivity and the
extent of on-the-job training is directly related to the span of time in
the labor force. Second, the literature also finds substantial increases in
earnings when job tenure increases, suggesting that the increase in
worker productivity from specific training is also, at least partly,
reflected in the wages paid. Moreover, as the theory suggests, dimin
ishing returns to experience and tenure with respect to their impact on
wages is typically found.
Holzer (1990a, 1990b), however, cites recent evidence of mixed
support for OJT theory©s claim that increased worker experience and
tenure raises wages by increasing worker productivity. 13 One may
question whether the finding that wages are significantly correlated
with experience and tenure measures of on-the-job training is a true
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test of on-the-job training theory. There is, we believe, a sample selec
tion problem. This notion, which dates back in economics to Roy
(1951), emphasizes the non-experimental nature of most economic
data. 14 Consider the experiment with John and Carol that we described
above. Our interpretation is valid if John©s decision to leave his
employer were a random event. In economics, however, it is often
thought that agents© decisions are not random; they instead are the out
come of rational agents attempting to maximize their utilities subject to
the appropriate constraints. John may be unmotivated and may find it
difficult to hold a job while Carol may be a highly motivated, loyal
employee. Unfortunately, most data sets do not provide researchers
with the necessary data to measure such differences. One way to model
such unobservable characteristics is to assume they are a part of the
error term, or

(2.20)

ejt = T|J + «jt

where £jt is the error term for the jth worker (in our example, John or
Carol) and t is the time period. The term rjj represents the individual©s
"fixed effect," because it does not change over time while Ujt is the
standard error term that varies each period. If we replace the error term
in equation (2.17) with this more detailed error term, we can easily see
some of the statistical problems that this selection problem generates.
If the worker©s 77 is correlated with his or her tenure and labor market
experience, OLS provides biased and inconsistent estimates of the
parameters (j)©s and y©s. For instance, suppose that r\ measures the
worker©s motivation and suppose that more motivated workers are
more productive (hence earn higher wages), more likely to stay at the
current employer, and more likely to remain in the labor market. In this
case, the (|)©s and y©s will be upwardly biased; we will be mistakenly
ascribing the returns of the worker©s motivation to training.
We can avoid this problem if we have panel data that provide
repeated observations on the wage of individual workers. For instance,
one strategy would be to focus on the difference in wages between two
years, or from equation (2.17):
(2.21)

A(ln (w)) = (3 AJC + <j), A(exp) + <j> 2 A(exp)2 + y, A(ten)
+ y2 A(ten)2 + Au
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where the A refers to the difference of the variable between time t and
(f-1). Equation (2.21) is independent of the 7]©s because we have
removed them by "differencing" the data. If a variable does not change
over time, we cannot identify the corresponding parameter.
Estimation of such fixed-effect models does eliminate the potential
bias previously identified, but such estimation is clearly impossible in
cross-sectional data. Fortunately for the human capital model, panel
data sets have confirmed the presence of large experience and tenure
affects on wages. As our discussion of the matching literature in the
previous section suggests, however, fixed-effect models may not be
sufficient to assure a clean test of on-the-job theory. To see why, con
sider a slight generalization of equation (2.20):
(2.22)

Ej^rij + cpjj + Mjt

where (p^ is a match-specific error term between thejth worker and the
ith firm. 15
As the matching literature suggests, workers can differ in their pro
ductivities because of idiosyncratic differences in the matches among
workers and the firms. For instance, a worker may complement the
unique skills of existing workers, or, conversely, a worker may not get
along with current employees. The presence of this added match-spe
cific effect, however, creates a major problem in the estimation of the
returns to tenure. If a worker is well matched (has a large 77,,), he or she
is more likely to remain at the firm. Thus, OLS estimation of equation
(2.21) will result in biased estimates of the /s because workers who
have remained with their current matches have higher <p©s than workers
who leave. Moreover, as Jovanovic emphasizes, we might expect the
value of <p to be learned over time, which further complicates the esti
mation. While there have been numerous studies that attempt to control
for these matching considerations, their results remain controversial.
See Garen (1988) for a review of that literature. 16
While the job-matching argument does provide a challenge to the
on-the-job training model in the interpretation of the returns to tenure,
the job matching model does not challenge the interpretation of the
returns to experience. The large return to labor market experience
would appear to be good evidence of the returns to on-the-job training,
but the relative importance of firm-specific training would appear very
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much in doubt. Moreover, we are unable to test the prediction that onthe-job training lowers the starting wage from this indirect measure of
training. Clearly, a direct measure of training would be useful.
Evidence from Direct Measures of Training

Until recently, one of the key difficulties in testing on-the-job train
ing theory has been the lack of explicit information on training activi
ties. As Brown (1990) observes, "obtaining information on the extent
of training of the workforce is complicated both by conceptual prob
lems and by difficulty in actually measuring those aspects of training
that seem relatively well-defined" (p. 98). There now exist data sets
that offer a variety of direct measures of various types of on-the-job
training.
Lynch (1992), Levine (1993), and Brown (1989) consider whether
the observed positive correlation between wages and tenure can be
interpreted as the return to on-the-job training. With regard to this
issue, the results are mixed. If measures of training are included in
wage equations, such measures (a) have no effect on the estimated
returns to tenure according to Lynch, (b) have some effect on the
returns attributable to tenure according to Levine, or (c) account for
almost all the returns to tenure according to Brown. With regard to the
predicted negative effect of training on turnover, Mincer (1988) reports
that training and turnover are indeed inversely related. In contrast,
however, Levine (1993) finds no evidence that establishments with
high levels of training have low levels of turnover.
There appears to be more agreement concerning the impact of train
ing on productivity and wage growth. For instance, Mincer (1989b)
reports that the "range of estimates (on the rate of return to training)
based on several data sets generally exceeds the magnitude of rates of
return usually observed for schooling investments." (p. 20) Holzer
(1990b) and Bartel (1992) find that training increases performance as
well as wage growth. Booth (1993) also establishes that some types of
employer- provided training affect earnings, although training is gener
ally found to be greater and more portable across jobs for men than
women.
Differences that do exist in the above analysis of the effects of onthe-job training can be attributed to at least two factors. One is that the
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various studies cited differ substantially in the measures of on-the-job
training. Some training measures derive from worker surveys, other
from surveys of firms. Some studies represent a national survey, while
others focus on a single large firm. Some studies focus on formal train
ing measures, while others include informal training activity as well. A
second factor that can explain differences in results across studies is
the importance of confounding hypotheses. For instance, Kaestner and
Solnick (1992) suggest that the upward-sloping wage/tenure profiles
attributed to on-the-job training-induced productivity differences may
instead reflect the deferred payment scheme suggested by Lazear
(1979, 1981). Simon and Warner (1992) view their analysis of the rela
tionship among wages, experience, and job tenure as support for
Jovanovic©s job-matching model, not the on-the-job training model.
Finally, Barren, Black, and Loewenstein (1989) suggest that the
matching of high ability workers to positions with high training can
bias the estimated impact of training on wages.
In light of the above discussion, a key contribution of the chapters to
follow will be to provide thorough analyses of the various effects of
on-the-job training that (a) rely on a common set of on-the-job training
measures across data sets, and (b) attempt to control for other hypothe
ses that can confound estimations of the predicted effects of on-the-job
training.
NOTES
1. Training costs can be broadly defined to include the "hiring costs" associated with resources
devoted to interviewing and screening potential new employees, as well as losses due to the posi
tion being vacant during this hiring process.
2. The training cost function includes the worker©s formal education and ability, as either
could influence the cost of additional training.
3. Our discussion ignores any "search" costs associated with workers locating alternative
employers. In addition, our analysis also assumes that other employers know at zero cost the
extent of general training received by a worker.
4. The increase in the return to training for more able individuals reflects our prior assumption
1hatd 2p/dTgda>Q.
5. The term "In" stands for the natural logarithm of the variable.
6. As we discuss in more detail below, estimation of these two wage equations is not as clearcut as it may first appear. Difficulties arise from the assumption that ability affects the return to
training. For instance, this assumption suggests that higher ability individuals will be matched to
positions with greater training, such that differences in measured training be closely related to dif
ferences in worker ability. The estimated coefficient on training may then capture not only the
return to training but also compensation for increased ability. If for some reason workers of differ-
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ent ability are assigned to positions with the same amount of training, so that training and ability
are not perfectly correlated, other issues arise. For instance, the assumption that the return to train
ing depends on ability then suggests the inclusion of an ability/training interaction to capture the
effect of ability on marginal return to training.
7. Hashimoto (1981) considers this problems.
8. The view that specific training can result in labor being a "quasi-fixed" factor of production
was first emphasized by Oi (1962), who coined this term.
9. This statement assumes that a difference in the quit propensity of two workers simply
reflects a difference in the likelihood a worker changes employers. However, the outcome of some
quits is that the worker exits the labor market. If a higher-quit propensity reflects a reduced likeli
hood of continued participation in the labor force, then the return to general training, which is
reaped only by those who remain in the labor force, would be lower for those with a higher-quit
propensity.
10. The quadratic form allows for decreasing returns to experience, indicated by a negative
coefficient on the squared term. Recently, Murphy and Welch (1992) show that a quadratic speci
fication tends to understate wage growth early in workers© careers. While they recommend the use
of quadratic specifications, we will for convenience of exposition continue to use the quadratic
specification.
11. In cross-sectional studies, Mincer suggested that researchers use age minus years of
schooling minus six as a proxy for experience, with the six subtracted to account for the first six
years of life when the individual is not in school and with schooling subtracted to reflect that the
individual is (presumably) and working full time when enrolled in school.
12. Our informal presentation of this material belies the considerable theoretical underpin
nings of the wage equations that labor economists estimate. See Mincer (1974) for a rigorous jus
tification of the standard wage equations.
13. For instance, Hanushek and Quigley (1985), in probing the relationship between wage
growth and investments in on-the-job training, find that the restrictions imposed on wage growth
by OJT are not supported for substantial portions of the labor force.
14. Roy was concerned with worker©s nonrandom selections of jobs and the implications for
the distributing of wages.
15. As in Willis and Rosen (1979), this also could be a match-specific parameter between the
jth worker and the ith job.
16. Lazear (1979, 1981) also notes that presence of hours restrictions and mandatory retire
ment provisions seems inconsistent with the basic human capital model. He argues that upwardly
sloped wage profiles result, at least in part, from incentive contracts that firms design to avoid hav
ing workers shirk.

CHAPTER

Measures of On-the-Job Training
For many years, economists seeking to test the theory of on-the-job
training presented in chapter 2 have relied on proxy variables such as
job tenure and labor force experience to measure the extent of on-thejob-specific and general training. In the past fifteen years, however,
data sets with direct measures of training from both employees and
employers have become available. In this chapter, we focus on
employer-provided data. The first section introduces two employer
training surveys. We then compare the employer-provided data of the
1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) and 1992 Small
Business Administration (SBA) surveys with employee-provided data
from other surveys.

Employer Survey Questions on Training
This section analyzes two of the three data sources used in this
book: the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey and the
1992 Small Business Administration survey. The third data set, the
1993 Upjohn Institute Survey, is considered separately in chapter 5, as
this data set asked both employers and employees about the training
activities of newly hired workers. We start with a brief description of
the training questions contained in the 1982 EOPP and 1992 SBA sur
veys.
The 1982 EOPP Survey
In 1980, the Department of Labor funded an extensive survey of
employers to study the labor market effects of the Employment Oppor
tunity Pilot Projects. This 1980 EOPP survey interviewed employers at
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23 sites across the country; approximately 5,700 employers were
involved in the survey. In 1982, the National Institute of Education and
the National Center for Research in Vocational Education funded a fol
low-up survey of the employers who participated in the original 1980
EOPP survey. For the second wave, 70 percent of the original respon
dents completed surveys. The 1982 EOPP data set improved on the
1980 EOPP survey by obtaining more detailed information on the
training activities of the most recently hired employee.
Researchers have used the 1982 EOPP data set extensively (e.g.,
Barren, Black, and Loewenstein 1987; Bishop 1990; Holzer 1990a,
1990b; and Holzer, Katz, and Krueger 1991). One key advantage of the
survey is that it asked establishments detailed questions about the onthe-job training provided to the last worker hired at the establishment.
In particular, the survey asked employers the following sequence of
three questions:
During the first three months of work, what was the total number
of hours spent on formal training, such as self-paced learning pro
grams or training done by specially trained personnel?
During the first three months of work, what was the total number
of hours management and line supervisors spent away from other
activities giving informal individualized training or extra supervi
sion?
During the first three months of work, what was the total number
of hours co-workers who are not supervisors spent away from
their normal work giving informal individualized training or extra
supervision?

In a different section of the questionnaire, the employer was asked:
During the first three months of work, how many total hours does
the average new employee spend in training activity in which he
or she is watching other people rather than doing it himself or her
self?

Answers to the above four questions provide information concerning
four types of training. Answers to the first three questions provide the
employer©s measure of the number of hours of formal training, of
informal training that management provided, and of informal training
that nonmanagerial co-workers provided to the newly hired worker in
the first three months of employment. The fourth question sought to
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measure the number of hours during the first three months that the
worker spent watching others in order to learn how to do the job. A
final training question asked by the survey, similar to the worker-based
Panel Study of Income Dynamics measure of training, was:
How many weeks does it take a new employee hired for (name©s)
type of position to become fully trained and qualified if he or she
has no previous experience in this job, but has the necessary
school-provided training?

Because it asks respondents to calibrate their responses to workers
without any previous experience, this question provides an indication
of the total human capital that the job requires from nonschooling
sources. As such, it is a distinct concept from the actual training
received on the job. For example, workers with considerable previous
experience may become fully trained and qualified much more quickly
than this response indicates. Because of this distinction, we refer to the
answer to this question as the total human capital required for the job
that the worker holds. This question allows us to control for differences
in the requirements or complexity of jobs across workers in the EOPP
and SBA surveys. 1
The 1992 SBA Survey

In 1992, the Small Business Administration funded a survey to
examine training at large and small firms. Survey Sampling, Inc. of
Fairfield, Connecticut constructed the sample of businesses for this
survey. Survey Sampling drew a stratified random sample of 3,600
businesses from the Comprehensive Business Database, oversampling
large establishments to ensure statistically meaningful comparisons
between large and small firms.2 The authors designed the survey and
the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Kentucky con
ducted the survey in the summer of 1992. 3
While based on the survey methodology of the EOPP data, the SBAfunded survey had several innovations. First, unlike the EOPP data set,
the SBA data set did not oversample low-income workers, nor was it
targeted only at sites where new government programs were planned.
The survey also differed from the EOPP data in that the questions con
cerning the total hours of training over the first three months of
employment were divided into separate questions concerning the aver-
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age number of hours of training per week and the number of weeks of
training. This approach allowed us to discover to what extent training
was complete by the end of the first three months of employment.
Finally, in addition to the EOPP©s four measures of training (formal
training programs offered by the firm on site, informal training by the
worker©s supervisor, informal training by co-workers, and time that the
worker spent watching others perform tasks during the first three
months), the SBA survey added a fifth measure, the number of hours
spent at off-site formal training programs during the first three months
of employment.
To check how the set of completed SBA surveys compares to the ini
tial stratified national sample, we estimated a probit equation with the
dependent variable equal to one if the establishment was in the sample,
and zero otherwise. For independent variables, we used a set of onedigit industry dummies, Census region, a dummy variable indicating
whether the establishment was located in a Metropolitan Statistical
Area, and a vector of establishment-size variables. 4 Establishments
from SIC code 7 (a portion of the service industry [10.2 percent in
sample versus 16.6 percent universe]) and SIC code 5 (retail trade
[30.8 percent versus 33.0 percent]) are somewhat underrepresented in
our sample. Similarly, there are too few establishments from the North
east Census region (13.7 percent versus 17.4 percent), and there are too
few urban establishments (77.6 percent versus 85.1 percent). In addi
tion, the probability of inclusion in our sample monotonically increases
with the size of the establishment. However, the differences are not
large, and one can conclude that the sample of firms that completed the
survey is generally representative of the underlying national population
of firms.

Employer Measures of On-the-job Training
Table 3.1 reports the magnitude and incidence of training for the
two surveys. Figure 3.1 illustrates the differences in the means of the
various measures of training between the EOPP and SBA data sets.
Note that the overall means are quite similar. For the EOPP data, newly
hired workers receive about 142 hours of training in the first three
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months, with about 95 percent of all workers receiving some form of
training; for the SBA data, newly hired workers receive about 150
hours of training with 98 percent of all workers receiving some train
ing.5 For the individual training measures, the off-site formal training
(which is unique to the SBA) is a relatively minor form of training;
average newly hired workers receive about three hours of this training
while only about 7 percent of all workers receive this form of training.
Thus, if we subtract the three hours of off-site formal training from the
SBA mean, the two data sets indicate a remarkable degree of similarity.
Table 3.1 Means and Incidence Rates of Training Measures, 1992 SBA
Data and 1982 EOPP Data
SBA

EOPP

Total hours of training

149.9

141.9

Incidence rate
Hours of off-site formal training

0.978
3.4

0.948

Incidence rate
Hours of on-site formal training
Incidence rate
Hours of informal management training
Incidence rate
Hours of informal co-worker training
Incidence rate
Hours of watching others
Incidence rate
N

0.069
13.6

11.9

0.205

0.151

59.4

49.3

0.906

0.872

32.8

26.3

0.605
40.7

0.628
54.5

0.645
1,123

0.803
1,916

Within specific categories of training, table 3.1 reveals some differ
ences in the average level and incidence of training. For instance, inci
dence of formal training is higher in the SBA data than in the EOPP
data. In contrast, the EOPP reports more training by watching others
than does the SBA data. For the EOPP, the newly hired worker has an
average of about 54 hours with an incidence rate of 80 percent, but for
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the SB A data, the average number of hours is only about 41 hours with
an incidence rate of 65 percent.
Figure 3.1 EOPP and SBA Measures of Average Hours Spent in
On-the-job Training During First Three Months
150
SBA

EOPP

120
90
X

60

30

Total hours

of training

Hours of

Hours of

on-site formal informal
training
management
training

Hours of

informal
co-worker
training

Hours of

watching
others

A comparison of means and incidence rates, however, can be some
what deceiving. The length of training in the first three months can be a
very skewed variable, and the mean is somewhat sensitive to large
observations in the right tail of the distribution. Therefore, in table 3.2,
we provide the mean, and the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th
percentiles for each training measure conditional on the measure being
positive. In each case, the mean of the distribution is considerably
larger than the median of the distribution, indicating that the distribu
tions are skewed to the right.
A weakness of both the EOPP and SBA data is their reliance on
training received in the first three months of employment. We have just
seen the importance of the right-hand tails of the data in generating dif
ferences in unconditional means in training between the SBA and
EOPP data. To understand the significance of the three-month trunca
tion of training, table 3.3 lists, for each type of training, the probability
that a training spell lasts at least 12 weeks (both the unconditional

Table 3.2 Comparison of 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Training Measures
Formal Training

Informal Training
SBA

SBA
SBA
Percentile Off-site On- site

EOPP
SBA
EOPP
SBA
On-site Management Management Co-worker

EOPP
Watching
Co-worker
others

EOPP
Watching
others

5th

4

4

4

1

2

2

2

2

3

10th

4

6

4

4

3

4

4

5

25th

16

16

6
16

12

10

10

8

8

10

50th

30

35

40

30

30

21

20

24

32

75th

40

80

100

65

70

60

48

65

80

90th

120

180

200

160

120

120

100

160

160

95th

240

240

240

240

200

240

145

360

240

Mean

48.1

66.9

78.6

65.5

56.6

54.2

41.8

63.1

67.9

110

318

252

1,012

1,645

766

1,157

765

1,512

N

38 Measures of On-the-Job Training

probabilities and the more revealing probabilities conditional on
receiving the type of training) for only the SBA data. We cannot con
struct a similar table for the EOPP data because that set only contains
information on the total number of hours, not length, of training. We
choose 12 weeks because both 12 and 13 weeks are mass points. While
a three-month period contains 13 weeks, we thought many respondents
believed that period to contain 12 weeks. We refer to an incidence of
training that lasts at least 12 weeks as a truncated incidence, although it
is possible that the incidence would end exactly on the 12th week.
From table 3.3, we see that 29 percent of training spells are truncated at
three months. Conditional on receiving each type of training, the trun
cation rates are very high, with each measure having more than one in
five cases truncated. Thus, the three-month frame of reference used by
both the SBA and EOPP data appears to understate the training that
newly trained workers received.
Table 3.3 Rates of Training Spells Lasting at Least 12 Weeks,
1992 SBA Data
Overall rate

Conditional rate

Total training

0.291

0.298

Off-site training

0.016

0.230

On-site training

0.042

0.204

Informal management training

0.217

0.239

Informal co- worker training

0.157

0.259

Watching others

0.146

0.226

Training measure

Finally, in table 3.4 we compare the reported time it takes to become
fully trained and qualified. For the EOPP data, this measure of total
human capital has a mean of 20.2 weeks, but the median is only 6.75
weeks. The SBA data set reveals a similar mean for total human capital
of 22.2 weeks but a median of just 6 weeks. Again, both measures are
highly skewed to the right. In sum, the two distributions of total human
capital look very similar despite the ten-year difference in the time
periods.
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Another issue that could cloud comparisons between the 1982
EOPP data and the 1992 SBA data is the effect of the business cycle on
training. The EOPP survey was conducted in the first half of 1982 just
prior to the trough of the cycle in November 1982. The SBA survey
was conducted in the summer of 1992, just over a year past the trough
of the cycle in March 1991. The training data for the last worker hired
precedes the date of the survey by at least 3 months by construction.
Thus, much of the EOPP training data precedes the 1982 trough of the
cycle by several months, and much of the SBA data is very close to the
1991 trough. It could be that training decisions of firms are different at
the trough of the cycle from those before or after it. If so, comparisons
made between the SBA and EOPP data could be affected. Unfortu
nately, the EOPP and SBA cannot be used to provide evidence on this
question. However, tabulations by James Spletzer using the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) provide evidence on the inci
dence of formal training over the cycle that had its trough in 1991.
Spletzer finds that the incidence of training is the lowest in 1991 at the
trough of the cycle. Using a probit model, the probability of receiving
training in 1990, one year before the trough, is only slightly higher. 6
This suggests that any contamination from business cycle effects is
likely to be small when comparing the EOPP and SBA data.
Table 3.4 Length of Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified,
1992 SBA Data and 1982 EOPP Data
Percentile

SBA

EOPP

.55

1

10th

1

1

25th

2.25

2.8

50th

6

6.75

75th

24

22.1

90th

52

52

95th

104

94

Unconditional mean

22.2

20.2

Fraction nonzero

.991

0.969

1,193

1,921

5th

N
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In other words, the EOPP and SBA were both conducted close
enough to the trough of a business cycle to avoid any contamination
from business cycle effects. However, comparisons between the EOPP,
SBA and surveys conducted further into an expansion or at the peak of
the cycle may be affected. The Spletzer results run counter to the argu
ment that as firms stockpile their most capable workers during a down
turn, they increase their training activities. Of course, Spletzer©s results
are for the incidence of training and suggest that firms do not train
more extensively during economic downturns, but they may train some
workers more intensively. However, if his results hold for the provision
of training in general, then the EOPP and SBA surveys would underpredict the incidence of training at other points in the business cycle.
Overall, the 1982 EOPP data and the 1992 SBA data give very simi
lar answers on the provision of training. In some respects, these simi
larities of the data sets surprised us. The 1980s was a decade of
fundamental change in the distribution of wages in the U. S. economy. 7
During that time, the distribution of wages became much more dis
persed, and little overall growth in real wages occurred. For some
groups in particular, those below the median earnings of the econ
omy there was a decline in real wages. For others, especially workers
in the upper quintile of the earnings distribution, there was a substan
tial increase in real wages for high-wage workers. Given the apparent
importance of on-the-job training in wage determination, one may
have anticipated a similar increase in the dispersion of on-the-job train
ing. Comparing these two data sources, however, we find only limited
evidence of such an increase in the dispersion of on-the-job training.
The SBA data appear to have a somewhat greater dispersion for man
agement training and co-worker training, and have a somewhat greater
incidence of formal training than the EOPP data, although the differ
ences are not substantial. One must bear in mind, however, that both
data sets are truncated at the first three months of employment and may
hide some important changes in the distribution of on-the-job training.
Further, the sample for the EOPP data is not nationally representative.

On-the-Job Training 41

Worker Measures of On-the-job Training
Another approach to measuring on-the-job training asks employees
about their training experiences. Obviously, most data will not have a
collection of newly hired workers, so worker surveys will include a
considerable number of workers with a significant amount of tenure. If
these workers receive less training than newly hired workers, and if
workers are asked about their training activities over a relatively short
period of time, very low incidence rates for training are likely to occur.
As a result, surveys of workers tend to ask very general training ques
tions; however, one still finds very low incidence rates of training from
worker surveys.
The first commonly used data on training was the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), which in 1976 asked a question similar to
the EOPP and SBA question about the time to become fully trained
and qualified. The PSID asked:
On a job like yours, how long would it take the average new per
son to become fully trained and qualified?

Duncan and Hoffman (1978, 1979) were the first to analyze these data;
they note that the instrument used the phrase "the average new person"
rather than "you" in order to "minimize reported training differences
due to skills or experience unique to the respondent" (1979, p. 596).
This wording, however, creates a potential difference between the
frames of reference of the PSID data and the EOPP and SBA data.
Namely, the PSID does not explicitly tell the respondent to assume that
the new person has no previous experience, while both the EOPP and
SBA do explicitly ask the respondent to make this assumption. 8 Keep
ing this potential difference in mind, Duncan and Hoffman report that
the mean response to this question was 1.66 years, or about 86.32
weeks. The PSID sample, however, contains many individuals with a
great deal of tenure at their employers. Black, Garen, and Loewenstein
(1988) report that there is a very strong concave relationship between
tenure at the firm and the length of time to become fully trained and
qualified; therefore, we should not be surprised that the PSID mean is
so much larger than the EOPP and SBA means.
The National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972
(NLSHS72) provides a more detailed set of questions concerning train-
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ing. Altonji and Spletzer (1991) provide an excellent description and
analysis of these data. In 1986, the survey asked for the number of
weeks and the number of hours per week of four different forms of
training in the worker©s current job or last job held by the worker.
These forms of training included employer-provided formal training
(which Altonji and Spletzer suggest corresponds to the SBA on-site
formal training), informal training, off-site training, and any tuition or
financial aid that the employer offered to employees attending an edu
cational institution. The sample of workers is limited to individuals
who graduated from high school. The training questions ask about any
training received at any time on the last job, and some workers may
have considerable tenure at the job.
Altonji and Spletzer report that 45.7 percent of workers receive
some employer provided training that is, some formal, informal, or
off-site training. For the individual training measures, 27.8 percent of
all workers report that they received formal on-site training. This figure
is somewhat higher than the 20.4 percent reported in the SBA data and
the 15.1 percent reported by the EOPP data. The mean hours of formal
training is 52.7 hours, but unlike the SBA and EOPP data, the
NLSHS72 data is truncated at 93 weeks of training, so the means are
not directly comparable. The mean duration of formal training, condi
tional on receiving this type of training, is 10.9 weeks, and more than a
quarter of the sample has a duration lasting 12 weeks or longer, which
is somewhat higher than the SBA figure of 20.4 percent. Given that
these workers are more educated than workers in the two other data
sets and given also that many of them have considerable tenure on the
job, these differences do not appear to be overly large.
The informal training, however, has a much lower incidence (19.7
percent) than the other two data sets. In contrast, the incidence rates of
informal training by management in both the EOPP and the SBA data
are more than 85 percent. Thus, it would appear that the incidence of
informal training is underreported in the NLSHS72 data. In our view,
this finding is not particularly surprising. Formal training is probably
much easier to remember than informal training, especially after sev
eral years have elapsed. Moreover, the worker may not recognize as
"real" training much of the informal training that occurs. A newly hired
worker may not consider asking a co-worker for assistance or some
advice to be training, but the employer may count this as training,
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especially if it detracts from the performance of the co-workers. The
mean number of hours of this type of training is 45.8 hours. The mean
conditional on receiving informal training, however, is 233 hours, and
half the sample reports the training lasting at least 20 weeks. To us, this
seems to indicate that workers are more likely to remember the very
long spells of informal training. As SBA data indicates that most spells
of informal training last less than 12 weeks, this may account for the
relatively low incidence rate of informal training in the NLSHS72 data.
Another large difference between the NLSHS72 and the SBA data
lies in the incidence rate of off-site training. For the NLSHS72, Altonji
and Spletzer report an incidence rate of 20.0 percent, whereas the SBA
data indicates only a 6.9 percent incidence rate. While some of this dif
ference may be explained by variances in the education levels of the
two samples, the disagreement is still too large. Off-site training often
involves a considerable expense because it may involve substantial
direct costs in fees or tuition, and because it may be necessary to send
the worker to a different location for training, incurring transportation,
food, and lodging expenses. Firms and workers may wish to ensure a
beneficial employment match before incurring such costs. Thus, we
might anticipate that the off-site training incidence is somewhat higher
for more senior workers because the likelihood of a separation declines
with the worker©s tenure. The mean hours of training, conditional on
receiving this type of training, is 101.3 hours, which is considerably
larger than the SBA©s conditional mean of 48 hours.
Finally, Altonji and Spletzer note that the incidence of a worker tak
ing advantage of tuition plans is 9.4 percent, with a mean of 18.2
hours. The mean conditional on an incidence of this type of training is
193 hours with a mean duration of 27 weeks. This suggests that formal
schooling continues to be a rather important part of the training pro
grams of many firms. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993) report a similar
rate for the CPS data (13.6 percent).
A comparison of the incidence rates and hours of training measures
from the NLSHS72, EOPP, and SBA data provides four interesting
observations. First, there is somewhat more formal training among
workers as a whole than among a sample of newly hired workers. Sec
ond, this difference for off-site formal training is even more pro
nounced than for on-site formal training. These two observations
suggest that formal training is more prevalent for workers with some
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tenure than for newly hired workers. Third, there are many incidences
of on-site formal training and informal training that last longer than 12
weeks, which suggests that the EOPP and the SBA three-month frame
may understate the training that newly hired workers received. Fourth,
employees seem to understate the incidence of informal training, with
workers more likely to remember particularly long spells of informal
training. Given the prevalence of informal training that we find in the
EOPP and SBA data, this suggests that relying on surveys of workers
will lead to an understatement of the importance of informal on-the-job
training.
To examine further the differences in formal training programs, we
consider the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which is a survey
of over 12,500 youths ranging in age from 14 to 22 years in 1979.
Lynch (1992), Veum (1993), and Bartel and Sicherman (1993) provide
analysis of this data set for different time periods. Concentrating on
data from 1979 to 1985, Lynch focuses on a sample of workers who
did not complete college and who received formal on-the-job training
lasting at least four weeks. These limitations result in a sample of
3,064 workers. The four-week length of a training spell is a sampling
feature of the early NLSY training measures. Lynch reports that only
4.2 percent of the workers in her sample had this type of on-the-job
training, but that the average length of this type of training was 31
weeks. In contrast, in the SBA data 38 percent of all training inci
dences lasted at least four weeks so the incidence rate of formal train
ing programs lasting at least four weeks is about 7.8 percent (20.5
percent of all workers receive any on-site formal training and 38.0 per
cent of these incidences last at least four weeks). Given that Lynch
excludes college graduates from her sample and that, as we shall later
see, college graduates are more likely to receive formal training pro
grams, these two incidence rates appear very similar. This suggests that
her conditional mean for formal training spells is a reasonable estimate
of the conditional mean, although it is a bit low because it excludes
college graduates. Lynch©s results suggest that the distribution of time
in formal on-the-job training spells has extremely thin but very long
tails. By focusing on the training received in the first three months, sur
veys such as the SBA survey and the EOPP survey cut off that long tail,
which may cause researchers to underestimate the training that newly
hired workers receive.
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As to the importance of the three-month truncation, we may use
Lynch©s estimate of the conditional mean to infer what the SBA mea
sure of training would have been without the truncation. For the SBA
data, our unweighted mean weeks of training, conditional on receiving
formal training, is 4.1 weeks. We may separate this mean by
(.3.1)

E(x) = Pr(x < 3 weeks) E(x I x < 3 weeks) + Pr(x > 3 weeks)
E(x \x>3 weeks).

The mean number of weeks of on-site training conditional on the num
ber of weeks being less than or equal to 3 weeks is 1.51 weeks with
0.6541 of the spells being less than 4 weeks. Using Lynch©s conditional
mean estimate of 31 weeks, the estimated untruncated mean number of
weeks of on-site formal training is about 11.7 weeks, suggesting that
both the NLSY and the SBA and EOPP truncations lead to a very
biased estimate of the sample mean. The NLSHS72 data has a mean
weeks of formal training of 10.9 weeks, but this measure is truncated at
93 weeks.9
Veum (1993) uses data for the period between the 1986 and 1990
surveys of the NLSY. For these years, the data no longer require that
the training spell last four weeks, and it is interesting that Veum reports
that about 18.4 percent of all workers reported some company-pro
vided training, which we interpret to be formal on-site training. This
estimate is reasonably consistent with the estimates of other data, espe
cially when the differences in samples are considered (the other inci
dence estimates were 20.4 percent from the SBA, 15.1 percent from
the EOPP, and 27.8 percent from the NLSHS72). Given Veum©s means,
we may calculate that the mean number of hours, conditional on
receiving some company training, is approximately 135 hours, which
is considerably larger than the truncated EOPP (78 hours) and the SBA
(67 hours) data, but is smaller than the corresponding estimate from the
NLSHS72 (190 hours). Veum©s measure is for all incidences of formal
training that occurred between 1986 and 1990.
Using data from 1988 to 1990, Bartel and Sicherman (1993) report
that the incidence of formal training was 12.1 percent with a condi
tional mean of 260 hours, which is considerably larger than the mean
reported by Veum and larger than the mean from the NLSHS72 data
(190 hours). Bartel and Sicherman report on annual data, which partly
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explains their lower incidence rates for the total training received over
a four-year period. We are still unclear why Veum©s estimates of the
hours trained are so much smaller than Bartel and Sicherman©s esti
mates.
The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides cross-sectional esti
mates of the incidence of training that workers received before or on
their current job both in 1983 and 1991. Lillard and Tan (1992) and
Pergamit and Shack-Marquez (1987) analyze the 1983 data. The CPS
on-the-job training data may be divided into formal and informal train
ing programs. Lillard and Tan report that 11.7 percent of men needed
formal (what they call "company") training on their previous job to
obtain their current job, and 11.6 percent of men needed formal train
ing while on their current job. If we combine those two estimates, we
obtain an incidence rate of approximately 23 percent, although clearly
we may have some double counting. Pergamit and Shack-Marquez
(1987) report that 30 percent of their sample, which differs from Lil
lard and Tan©s sample, received training both before and during their
current jobs. Thus, a back-of-the-envelope calculation to correct for the
double counting suggests an incidence rate of about 20 percent. For
women, the sum of the two training measures was 20.6 percent and fell
to 18 percent when we corrected for double counting.
If one takes the more conservative estimates of training on the cur
rent job 13.1 percent for women and 11.6 percent for men we do
see a lower incidence rate than data from the other samples. It is impor
tant to keep in mind, however, that the CPS sample is representative of
all workers in the economy. Previous data sets discussed thus far have
not sampled all workers, and this variation may account for some of
the differences in the data sets. Most important, unlike the EOPP and
SBA data, the CPS is not a sample of newly hired workers, who receive
most of the training among all workers. Using a different CPS sample,
Pergamit and Shack-Marquez report that the incidence rate of formal
training on the current job is 14.2 percent.
For informal on-the-job training, Lillard and Tan report that 15.1
percent of men and women received informal training on their current
job, and 30.8 percent of the men and 26.0 percent of the women said
they received training on their previous job that was necessary to
obtain their current job. Thus, the incidence rates from the CPS are
well below the incidence rates of the SBA and EOPP data. This again
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may reflect the fact that workers are less likely to remember incidences
of informal training.
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993), using the 1991 CPS data, also
report an extremely low incidence rate of informal training 16.3 per
cent. While this figure is somewhat higher than the 1983 CPS esti
mates, it is much lower than the employer-reported estimates from the
SBA and the EOPP data. Indeed, the estimate is quite similar to the
19.7 percent figure Altonji and Spletzer (1991) obtained from the
NLSHS72. Therefore, the CPS data also seem to suggest that workers
may underreport the incidence rate of informal training.
In contrast, Loewenstein and Spletzer report an incidence of 17.2
percent for formal training, which is reasonably similar to the
employer-reported incidence rates in the EOPP and SBA data (15.1
percent and 20.5 percent, respectively), and the employee-reported
incidence rates from the NLSY and NLSHS72 (12.1 percent to 18.4
percent and 27.8 percent, respectively). While the 1983 CPS data gives
somewhat lower incidence rates, and the NLSHS72 shows slightly
higher incidence rates, employee- and employer-reported incidence
rates appear reasonably similar for formal training. Moreover, compar
ing the 1982 EOPP survey and 1992 SBA survey of employers, and
comparing the 1983 CPS and the 1991 CPS of employees, there is
some modest evidence of an increase in formal training. For the
employer surveys, training increased from 15 to 20 percent, and for the
employee surveys, training increased from 12 to 17 percent. 10
The 1991 CPS data also reported the duration of the training that the
worker received. Loewenstein and Spletzer report that the mean dura
tion of formal training, conditional on receiving formal training, is 9.6
weeks. This estimate approximates the NLSHS72 estimate of 10.9
weeks and the SBA estimate (adjusted for the truncation using Lynch©s
conditional mean) of 11.7 weeks. Thus, measures of the duration and
the incidence rates of formal training appear similar.
Finally, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in
1984 provides another data source to measure training. But because the
incidence rates are extremely small, we are suspicious of the data.
Flynn (1993) and Haber (1988) report that the SIPP survey asked in
1984, "did [you] receive training designed to help [you] find a job,
improve job skills or learn a new job?" Although this appears to be a
very broad question encompassing formal and informal job training as
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well as vocational and technical schooling, Haber estimates that only
23 percent of workers in his sample had ever received any training, and
only 9.4 percent of all workers had ever received on-the-job training. In
our view, these estimates are much too low and indicate that the SIPP
data missed a great deal of training.

Conclusions
We conclude with the following five observations concerning
employee- and employer-reported measures of training.
1. Employee- and employer-based data sets appear to provide simi
lar estimates of the incidence of on-site formal training, and there
is at least some evidence that the measures of the duration of
training estimates are not dissimilar.
2. The EOPP and SBA data, which measure training only for the
first three months of employment, appear to understate training
substantially. Evidence from the SBA and NLSHS72 studies sug
gests that the difference matters for both formal and informal
training. Similarly, the early NLSY estimate that only measures
formal training programs of at least four weeks in length also
appears to miss a great deal of the formal training.
3. A comparison of the SBA and NLSHS72 data suggests that the
incidence of off-site training may increase with the worker©s ten
ure.
4. Comparing the EOPP and SBA data with the PSID data, there is
some evidence that employees may understate (relative to
employers) the length of time to become fully trained and quali
fied.
5. The incidence rates for informal training reported by employees
are dramatically below the incidence rates for informal training
reported by employers.
There is one caveat: Our examination of the means of various train
ing measures from different surveys may not provide a good indication
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of how precisely we are measuring training. Even if employees and
employers provide estimates of training that have identical means,
there may be considerable measurement error in the reports of both
employers and employees. If the measurement error is completely ran
dom, the means may be quite similar, but the training measures them
selves are very inaccurate.
NOTES
1. Part of these differences may also reflect the fact that the skills required of more complex
jobs are more complementary with physical capital such as computers or with high-performance
workplace transformations.
2. The sample was stratified by establishment size in the following manner: 1,250 establish
ments with 0-19 employees, 1,250 establishments with 20-99 employees, 550 establishments with
100-499 employees, and 550 establishments with 500 or more employees. We excluded Agricul
ture, Forestry, and Fisheries (SIC 0-99) and Public Administration (SIC 900 and above). Except
for these exclusions, we sampled establishments randomly within each size stratum, providing a
representative distribution by industry and region.
3. We first sent a letter to each establishment describing the survey. SRC attempted to track
down establishments with undeliverable letters using directory assistance and attempted to contact
each of the 3,600 establishments for a telephone interview. Of the original sample of 3,600 estab
lishments, 2,561 were eligible to complete an interview. The 1,039 ineligible establishments were
out of business, had disconnected phones, did not answer in any of 15 attempts, could not be
reached because of Hurricane Andrew, had other miscellaneous problems, or had no employees.
We had 1,288 establishments complete the survey. The 1,273 noncompletions consisted of refus
als, those who reported that answering surveys was against company policy, those who stated that
the appropriate person was repeatedly unavailable, and those who rescheduled the interview six or
more times.
4. The breakdowns for firm size were 1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19 employees, 20-49
employees, 50-99 employees, 100-199 employees, 200-499 employees, and 500 or more employ
ees.
5. To enhance comparability of the samples, EOPP and SBA sample weights are used in the
training computations reported in this chapter. The SBA weights account for the stratification by
establishment size and the oversampling of large firms. The EOPP weights account for the oversampling of smaller, single establishments firms within each target metropolitan area.
6. Relative to the reference year of 1993, the 1991 coefficient is -.0303 (t = 4.53) and the 1990
coefficient is -.0306 (t = 4.44). We thank James Spletzer for kindly providing these estimates.
7. See Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) or the special issues of the Quarterly Journal of Eco
nomics (February 1992) for references.
8. See Sicherman (1990) for a discussion of this point and related issues concerning the PSID
training measure.
9. The reader should keep in mind, of course, that combining these two estimates makes
heroic distributional assumptions, but we believe that it does indicate a very important limitation
of both data sets. The NLSY misses a majority of the spells of formal training, and the SBA and
EOPP data truncate the very long spells of training that are an important determinant of total
training.
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10. In a remarkably thorough study of all forms of training, Lillard and Tan (1992) also report
incidence rates from the National Longitudinal Surveys of young men and mature men, which
were conducted in various years ranging from 1967 to 1982. They report that the incidence of for
mal training in a two-year period for young men is 10.4 percent and for mature men, 5.6 percent.
It is difficult, however, to directly compare these data with either the CPS or employer-provided
data.

CHAPTER

Who Receives On-the-Job Training?
With the development of data sets containing explicit measures of
on-the-job training, economists have been able to identify the recipi
ents of on-the-job training. Because of the importance of on-the-job
training in determining wages, this question is of considerable interest.
According to traditional on-the-job training models developed in chap
ter 2, workers with jobs that offer little or no training should not antici
pate large increases in wages, since work experience does little to
increase their stock of human capital. If workers with different per
sonal characteristics differ in their access to on-the-job training, wage
differences across workers may be attributed, in part, to these differ
ences in access.
This chapter examines the recipients of on-the-job training from the
perspective of two employer-reported data sets: the 1982 Employment
Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) survey and the 1992 Small Business
Administration (SBA) survey. Both data sets contain two types of
training measures. The first measure is the actual number of hours of
training that newly hired workers received in the first three months of
employment. The second measure, one that indicates the total human
capital of a particular job, is the length of time it would take the worker
to become fully trained and qualified if that worker had no previous
experience on the job. While these data are limited to newly hired
workers, evidence presented in chapter 3 suggests that many current
data sets that rely on employee reports of training appear to exclude
significant amounts of on-the-job training. In contrast, the SBA and
EOPP surveys offer us a reasonably detailed account of the training
that newly hired workers received at two points in time that are ten
years apart.
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Variations in the Level of Training
In approaching the issue of which employees have access to on-thejob training, we proceed in stages. In the first part of this section, we
consider the simple gross differences in various levels of training by
workers who differ in their level of education, work experience, size of
employer, and gender. The second part of this section provides a more
comprehensive examination of who has access to training. The results
presented there establish the statistically significant links between vari
ous characteristics of individuals and their level of training, with other
factors being equal. The next section examines the incidence of five
types of training: off- site formal training, on-site formal training,
informal management training, informal co-worker training, and train
ing by watching others. To understand the importance of the truncation
of our training measure at the first three months of employment, the
final section of this chapter examines the likelihood that each type of
training may continue after the first three months.
Differences by Education, Experience, Gender, and Employer Size

Not surprisingly, we find that those characteristics that are highly
correlated with wages are also correlated with access to on-the-job
training. For instance, in both the 1982 EOPP and the 1992 SB A data
sets, we find that highly educated workers receive more on-the-job
training. In figure 4.1, we depict the mean level of training for college
and high school graduates from the SBA data. College graduates
receive over one hundred more hours of on-the-job training in the first
three months of employment than do high school graduates, or nearly
68 percent more training. Thus, employers of more educated workers
provide them with more on-the-job training.
Figure 4.1 Hours of Training in the First Three Months of Employment,
1992 SBA Data
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The difference between college and high school graduates is even
more dramatic when we look at the time required to become fully
trained and qualified. In figure 4.2, we depict the means for the time to
become fully trained for college and high school graduates. On the
average, college graduates occupy jobs that required about 95 percent
more time to become fully trained, with college graduates taking
nearly 37 weeks to become fully trained and high school graduates
only 19 weeks.
Figure 4.2 Number of Weeks to Become Fully Trained and Qualified,
1992 SBA Data
College grducte"
Hl^i school g-cducte

35

40
Weeks

Thus, college graduates obtain jobs that are more complex and pro
vide more on-the-job training than do those with only a high school
education.
Another important determinant of wages is a worker©s labor market
experience. In figure 4.3, we depict the average training received by
workers with three levels of experience: those with no previous experi
ence, those with less than a year of experience, and those with more
than a year of experience. Workers with no previous experience
received the lowest level of training, only about 164 hours. In contrast,
workers with less than a year of experience received nearly 198 hours
of training. Workers with more than a year of experience received only
about 178 hours of training. These figures suggest that workers with
significant experience may require less training because some of the
skills that these workers learn at one employer can be transferred to
their new jobs.
The relationship between labor market experience and the time to
become fully trained and qualified seems to confirm the suggestion that
skills are transferable across jobs. In figure 4.4, we depict the means of
time to become fully trained by level of experience. Unlike hours of
training, the total human capital required for a job increases as the
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worker develops more experience. In other words, workers with more
experience are hired into more complex jobs that require more total
human capital. For workers without any experience, it takes just over
16 weeks to become fully trained, but for a worker with less than a year
of experience, the training takes just over 23 weeks. Workers with
more than a year of experience occupy jobs that require nearly 29
weeks to become fully trained. Thus, firms tend to hire workers with
more experience to fill complex jobs. But as a result of their experience
in previous jobs, these workers may require less training than workers
filling jobs that require less total human capital.
Figure 4.3 Hours of Training in the First Three Months of Employment
by Experience Level, 1992 SBA Data
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Figure 4.4 Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified by Experience
Level, 1992 SBA Data
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Labor economists have also found that workers employed in large
establishments tend to receive higher wages than similar workers in
small establishments (e.g., Barron, Black, and Loewenstein 1987;
Holtmann and Idson 1991). Similarly, both the EOPP and SBA data
indicate that workers in large establishments receive more training than
workers in small establishments. In figure 4.5, for the SBA data we
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depict the mean hours of training by four categories for the size of
establishment: those establishments with less than 25 employees, those
with 25 to 99 employees, those with 100 to 249 employees, and those
with 250 or more employees. Workers in establishments with fewer
than 25 employees received about 154 hours of training in the first
three months of employment, while workers in establishments with
250 or more employees received over 220 hours of training. Thus,
workers in the largest category of establishments received 42 percent
more training than workers in the smallest category. Interestingly, nei
ther the EOPP nor the SBA data reveal any significant difference in the
time to become fully trained by size of establishment. Of course, larger
establishments are training their workforces more intensively in the
first three months than smaller establishments, so these large employ
ers presumably are providing their workforces a greater stock of
human capital.
Figure 4.5 Hours of Training in the First Three Months of Employment
by Establishment Size, 1992 SBA Data
250 or more employees
100 to 249 employees
25 to 99 employees
Fewer than 25 employees
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There remain very significant racial and gender differences in the
wage structure across the United States economy, and one might antic
ipate that there would exist very substantial differences in the access to
on-the-job training as well. Surprisingly, both the EOPP and SBA data
provide little evidence that women receive significantly fewer hours of
training in the first three months of employment than men. Unfortu
nately, the EOPP data contain no controls for the employee©s race, but
the SBA data do not indicate significant racial differences in hours of
training in the first three months. In contrast, figure 4.6 shows that
there are significant racial and gender differences in the time to
become fully trained and qualified. Blacks occupy jobs that take about
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9 weeks to become fully trained and qualified, nonblack women
occupy jobs that take about 17 weeks to become fully trained, and nonblack men occupy jobs that take over 35 weeks to become fully trained
and qualified. Given these differences, it is surprising that we find no
significant differences in the hours of training in the first three months
of employment, although we do find some evidence that limiting train
ing to the first three months of employment might be partially respon
sible for not finding any gender differences. Because our measures of
training are limited to the first three months, it is possible that men will
obtain more total training if they are more likely than women to have
training last beyond our three-month horizon.
Figure 4.6 Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified by Race and
Gender, 1992 SBA Data
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Statistical Patterns Regarding Access to On-the-Job Training

The differences in training identified above still appear when we
control for other factors with the use of regression analysis. In what
follows, we analyze variations in on-the-job training in a more system
atic fashion. For both the EOPP and the SBA data, we begin by esti
mating the total hours of training in the first three months of
employment. For the EOPP data, the training measure is the sum of
formal training, informal management training, co-worker training,
and watching others. For the SBA data, we use the same four catego
ries, and we add the number of hours of off-site training, although the
results change little if we exclude this measure.
For independent variables in the SBA data, we use the worker©s age,
a vector of dummy variables indicating whether or not the worker is a
high school dropout, whether or not the worker attended but did not
graduate from college, and whether or not the worker has at least a
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four-year college degree. In both the EOPP and SBA surveys, employ
ers were asked the number of years of labor market experience that an
employee had in a job that the employer felt "had some application to
the worker©s current position." We interpret this measure as "relevant
experience." Because the data rejected the use of a simple gender
dummy used in conjunction with the white-nonwhite dummy, we also
initially separated our sample into the following categories: black
male; black female; white female; white male; nonwhite, nonblack
male; and nonwhite, nonblack female. After some initial specification
checks, we found we could combine the workers into four groups:
black males, black females, nonblack females, and nonblack males.
We also included dummy variables indicating whether or not the
worker is a union member, the number of workers at the establishment
where the new employee works, and the number of employees at other
sites. For the EOPP data, we attempted to use the same independent
variables that we used for the SBA data, but data limitations forced us
to use a specification that differed in three ways. First, the EOPP sur
vey did not ask about the worker©s race, so we used a simple gender
dummy. Second, the EOPP did not have a measure of the number of
employees at other sites, so we excluded this measure. Finally, the
EOPP measure of unionization is the proportion of the workforce that
is organized rather than a simple dummy variable. Also, for both data
sets, we used hours worked occasionally as a control variable.
To obtain our samples, we excluded any worker who had a missing
training measure or a missing value for any independent variable.
These exclusions resulted in a sample of 888 workers for the SBA data.
In addition, for the EOPP we excluded temporary or seasonal workers,
which resulted in a sample of 1,473 workers. Table 4.1 reports
unweighted means for both samples. We can immediately see the dif
ferences in the two data sets© sampling strategies. Workers in the EOPP
data, which oversampled low-income workers, were about two years
younger than workers in the SBA data and had about 0.9 less years rel
evant experience. More dramatic differences appear in educational
attainment. For instance, only about 10 percent of the EOPP sample
have a college degree or above, whereas over 25 percent of the SBA
sample have a college degree. The SBA data, which oversampled large
firms, has a mean establishment size of about 182 workers, compared
to the EOPP©s average of about 72 workers.
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Table 4.1 Means for the 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Data

Variable
Total hours of training
Time to become fully trained
Worker©s age
Worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker is a high school graduate
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is a black
Worker is a female
Worker is a nonblack female
Union
Hours worked
Number of employees at establishment
Number of employees at other sites
Incidence of off-site formal training
Hours of off-site formal training
Incidence of on-site formal training
Hours of on-site formal training
Incidence of informal management training
Hours of informal management training
Incidence of informal co- worker training
Hours of co-worker training
Incidence of training by watching others
Hours of training by watching others
N

SBA
177.8
24.0
29.3
3.4
0.075
0.384
0.283
0.258
0.088

EOPP
143.7
22.3
27.1
2.5
0.107
0.588
0.205
0.101
0.464

0.483
0.084
36.7
181.9
1197.8
0.107
6.2
0.301
25.2
0.920
62.1
0.695
40.6
0.688
43.6
888

0.094
38.0
71.7

0.127
9.8
0.873
49.8
0.625
27.3
0.810
56.8
1,471

After some initial specification checks, we decided to use a double
logarithm specification. To avoid taking the logarithm of zero, we
added one to each employee©s experience, training measure, and our
measure of time to become fully trained and qualified. Columns (1)
and (3) of table 4.2 report the estimates for the SBA and EOPP data,
respectively. We initially used a tobit procedure to estimate the equa
tions because 11 observations in the SBA data and 64 observations in
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Table 4.2 Total Hours of Training for the 1992 SBA
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s
relevant experience
Worker is a high school
dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female

SBA
(1)
4.446*
(7.62)
-0.132
(0.72)
-0.104
(1.65)
0.031
(0.20)
-0.089
(0.82)
0.460*
(3.97)
-0.214
(1.16)
-0.143
(1.59)

SBA
(2)
1.932*
(2.65)
-0.165
(0.92)
-0.136*
(2.18)
0.150
(0.93)
-0.036
(0.33)
0.440*
(3.89)
-0.154
(0.88)
-0.039
(0.43)

Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of
employees at the
establishment
Logarithm of number of
employees at other
establishments
Logarithm of hours worked
R2
N

0.085
(0.60)
0.125*
(4.70)

0.072
(0.51)
0.099*
(3.77)

0.031*
(2.39)

0.033*
(2.69)

~

0.751*
(5.47)
0.132
888

0.095
888

EOPP
(3)
5.093*
(10.10)
-0.356*
(2.24)
-0.108
(1.90)
-0.434*
(3.40)
0.264*
(2.89)
0.513*
(3.62)

EOPP
(4)
2.169*
(2.94)
-0.355*
(2.27)
-0.147*
(2.59)
-0.280*
(2.12)
0.286*
(3.16)
0.504*
(3.58)

0.019
(0.25)
-0.151
(0.96)
0.092*
(3.40)

0.122
(1.61)
-0.146
(0.92)
0.081*
(3.04)

--

"

-

0.808*
(5.19)
0.063
1,471

0.045
1,471

NOTE: Absolute values ot f-statistics, calculated using robust standard errors, are in parentheses.
Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Ordinary least squares esti
mates are reported.
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the EOPP data are truncated at zero. The Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimates, however, are very similar, which is not surprising
given the low incidence of truncation. Because OLS parameters are
easier to interpret than tobit parameters, we present the OLS estimates
in table 4.2. To guard against any possible heteroskedasticity, we report
^-statistics calculated using Huber©s (1967) and White©s (1980) robust
standard errors. Despite the dissimilarities in the sample and the speci
fication, the basic estimates appear similar except for the education
profiles. In both data sets, large establishments provide more training.
Both coefficients are statistically significant and similar in magnitude.
A 10 percent increase in the size of the establishment increases the
quantity of training by about 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent.
The differences in the education profiles are intriguing. The EOPP
estimates show a strong relationship between education and training:
Workers with more education receive more training. In the SBA data,
however, there appears no significant relationship between education
and training except for workers with college degrees. One might be
tempted to ascribe this difference to a change in the pattern of training
between 1992 and 1982, but using data from the 1991 Current Popula
tion Survey (CPS), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993) find patterns in
their educational coefficients that are similar to the patterns we find in
the EOPP. In addition, as we shall see, the "time to become fully
trained and qualified" variable is strongly correlated with education.
Thus, the lack of a relationship between training and education at
lower levels of education may be a sample anomaly rather than a
change in the pattern of training. Both data sets agree, however, that
college-educated workers receive much more training than high school
graduates. From the EOPP data, we estimate that college graduates
receive 56 percent more training; from the SBA data, we estimate they
receive 60 percent more training. 1
Neither data set shows any statistically significant differences in the
acquisition of on-the-job training by gender, race, or union status. In
the SBA data, the race and gender coefficients are substantial; the point
estimates indicate that black workers receive roughly 26 percent less
training than nonblack males, while nonblack females receive roughly
17 percent less training than nonblack males, although the coefficients
are imprecisely estimated. The EOPP data indicate a statistically sig
nificant negative relationship between age and training while the SBA
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does not, although the coefficient in the SBA data is insignificantly
negative. Also, the SBA data indicate that firms with more off-site
employees provide more training to these employees, although the
magnitude of the coefficient is about one-third the size of the coeffi
cient for the size of the establishment.
In columns (2) and (4), we include hours of work as a control to
explore the relationship between hours worked and training. In both
data sets, employees who work longer hours receive more training, and
both coefficients are statistically significant and similar in magnitudes.
A 10 percent increase in the number of hours worked increases the
amount of training about 7.5 percent to 8.1 percent. These estimates,
however, should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. Hours of
work are clearly the result of a decision made between the firm and the
worker. If a position requires a more highly trained worker, both firm
and worker have an incentive to increase the hours of work for that
position.
We use a similar specification to examine the determination of the
number of months to become fully trained and qualified, or what we
refer to as "the total human capital" of the job. OLS estimates for the
total human capital measures from the SBA and EOPP data are pre
sented in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.3. We again use a double log
specification, and we add one to each observation to avoid taking the
logarithm of zero. In the SBA data, 12 observations are censored at
zero, and in the EOPP data, 38 observations are truncated at zero. We
initially used a tobit procedure to estimate the parameters, but because
the OLS estimates were quite similar and easier to interpret, we report
them. We again calculate the /-statistics using the robust standard
errors suggested by Huber (1967) and White (1980).
Interestingly, the coefficients on experience are both positive and
significant in both data sets, and their magnitudes are similar. Unlike
the training equations, the coefficients on the education dummies
exhibit the same pattern in the two data sets: the total human capital of
the job appears to be increasing in the worker©s education. While the
coefficient for some college experience from the SBA data is about a
sixth the size of the corresponding coefficient from the EOPP data, the
coefficients on high school dropouts and college graduates are of simi
lar magnitudes in both data sets. The coefficient on establishment size
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is negative and significant for the EOPP data, but is positive and not
significant in the SBA data.
Unlike the training equations, the gender and race dummies indicate
a difference in the job©s total human capital by race and gender. For the
EOPP data, women occupy jobs that require about 36 percent less time
to become fully trained and qualified. In the SBA data, the race con
trols make for even more dramatic differences. Blacks occupy jobs that
take about 58 percent less time, and nonblack women occupy jobs that
take about 46 percent less time to become fully trained and qualified
than nonblack males.2 Thus, although there is no statistically signifi
cant evidence that minority workers receive less training than nonblack
males or that women receive less training than men in the first three
months of employment, there is considerable evidence that black
workers and nonblack women occupy jobs with a good deal less total
human capital than nonblack men.
Columns (2) and (4) of table 4.3 include hours of work as a control
in the model specification. The inclusion of the hours variable reduces
somewhat the coefficients for blacks, nonblack women, and women,
but the coefficients remain highly significant. Thus, the fact that
women work fewer hours than men explains only a small portion of the
gender difference in the total human capital of jobs.
The use of these two different training measures, total hours of
training in the first three months and the time to become fully trained
and qualified, gives two pictures of the workers© access to on-the-job
training. There may be differences in the type of training that we mask
in our use of hours of training. For instance, if we think of training dif
fering in quality, we might expect that blacks and nonblack women are
systematically sorted into jobs that provide low-quality training, while
nonblack males have access to jobs with high-quality training. An
obvious limitation of the hours of on-the-job training measure is that it
includes only the training received in the first three months of employ
ment. As we saw in chapter 3, data from the NLSHS72 and NLSY sug
gest that the distributions of training spells have extremely long tails.
Moreover, by focusing on the training received in the first three
months, data sets, such as the SBA and EOPP surveys cut off that long
tail, which may cause us to miss racial and gender differences in train
ing when using the hours of training measures. 3
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Table 4.3 Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified for the 1992 SBA
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s
relevant experience
Worker is a high school
dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of
employees at the
establishment
Logarithm of number of employ
ees at other
establishments

SBA
(1)
1.176*
(2.41)
0.289*
(1.99)

SBA
(2)
-2.708
(4.97)
0.239
(1.73)

EOPP
(3)
3.032
(7.26)
-0.207
(1.59)

EOPP
(4)
1.757
(3.24)
-0.206*
(1.67)

0.222*
(4.10)

0.174*
(3.45)

0.197*
(4.17)

0.133*
(2.91)

-0.432*
(3.34)
0.038
(0.39)
0.525*
(4.80)
-0.804*
(6.18)
-0.570*
(6.69)
-

-0.248*
(2.06)
0.120
(1.29)
0.494*
(4.87)
-0.712*
(5.87)
-0.409*
(4.99)

-0.446*
(4.01)
0.189*
(2.35)
0.476*
(4.16)

-0.194
(1-79)
0.225*
(2.91)
0.463*
(4.24)

-0.139
(0.84)

-0.159
(0.97)

-0.422*
(6.66)
0.169
(1.19)

-0.253*
(4.09)
0.179
(1-28)

0.029
(1.22)

-0.012
(0.51)

-0.049*
(2.26)

-0.066*
(3.12)

0.008
(0.68)
~

0.075

1.323*
(13.08)
0.141

1,471

1,471

R2

0.162

0.012
(1.06)
1.160*
(11.65)
0.271

N

888

888

Logarithm of hours worked

-

NOTE: Absolute values ot ^-statistics, calculated using robust standard errors, are in parentheses.
Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Ordinary least squares esti
mates are reported.
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With the SBA data, however, we can control for this truncation at
three months because we know not only the total hours of training but
also the number of weeks of training. If we were to assume that the
random error term in the training equation was drawn from a particular
distribution, we could estimate the training equation accounting for the
truncation. For instance, if we assume that the error term was normally
distributed, we could use a censored regression model. Unfortunately,
the prevailing wisdom is that such estimates are somewhat susceptible
to misspecification (see Greene, 1993).
Rather than risk misspecification of the distribution of the error
term, we estimate a Cox model, which is based on the Lehmann alter
native of nonparametric statistics. The essential idea of nonparametric
statistics is to allow researchers to make inferences without having to
make assumptions about the distribution of random variables. For
instance, letting T denote our training measure, the regressions
reported in table 4.2 and 4.3 assume a model of the form
(4.1)

r = *P + e

where e is normally distributed with mean zero and variance o2, X is a
vector of covariates, and ft is a vector of parameters that we wish to
estimate. If the assumption about the distribution of e is true, the ordi
nary least squares is the most efficient estimator of the parameters fi
available. The nonparametric statistician asks the question, "How do
you know that e is normally distributed?" A truthful answer is often
that such an assumption is convenient.
Of course, ordinary least squares estimation may still be justified as
a method of moments estimator, with the caveat that tests of hypothe
ses are still going to require some additional assumptions about the
second moment of the distribution. Cox (1972) recognized, however,
that by focusing only on the rank of the dependent variable, parameters
could be estimated and hypotheses tested without having to specify a
distribution of the stochastic variable. Moreover, the Cox model easily
handles the truncation of the dependent variable, a limitation that is rel
evant to both the EOPP and SBA data.
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For the Cox model, the cumulative distribution function for the ith
worker is expressed as
(4.2)

F(Tpi

where F(-) is what is commonly referred to as the "baseline" cumula
tive distribution function and a, is an "index" function for the ith
worker. If the term a^ < 1, then the ith worker is more likely to have a
short training spell, and if a^ > 1 the worker is more likely to have a
long training spell. (By definition, the "baseline" cumulative distribu
tion function corresponds to the distribution of training spells for the
person with ai =1.) Using this approach, we must only specify the
functional form of a-v or
(4.3)

a-expHQp).

The Cox model, by focusing on the ranks of the dependent variable,
allows the researcher to estimate ft without specifying distribution of
the dependent variable.4 Thus, the Cox model affords two advantages
of standard parametric estimates such as those we presented in tables
4.2 and 4.3. First, the Cox model does not require researchers to spec
ify the distribution of the random variable. Second, the model allows
researchers to account for the truncation of the dependent variable.
This approach is a fundamental departure from standard parametric
estimation where we generally assume a probability distribution func
tion of the form
(4.4)
In contrast, the Cox model has the probability density function:
(4.5)

J(Th Xj) =

where f(T{) is the derivative of F(Ti). Thus, while the standard paramet
ric estimators assume that the independent variables affect only the
mean of the distribution of training, the Cox model assumes that the
independent variables affect the entire distribution of training spells.
As a result, we cannot compare the two approaches and determine
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which approach better fits the data. The Cox model, however, does pro
vide an important specification check on the results that we present in
tables 4.2 and 4.3. It allows us to assess the robustness of our results
with respect to the truncation of the training measures at three months
and to evaluate our assumptions about the distribution of the error
terms.
In table 4.4, we present the results from the Cox model. The results
are generally consistent with those reported in table 4.2, with a couple
of notable exceptions. First, the coefficient on the logarithm of
employees at other sites is not significant. Second, the coefficient on
nonblack females is negative and statistically significant, indicating
that nonblack women received significantly less training than nonblack
males. The coefficient on black workers, while not statistically signifi
cant, is about the same magnitude as the coefficient on nonblack
females. Moreover, the lack of significance on the black coefficient is
not a robust result. In Barren, Berger, and Black (1994), we report
results using a slightly different specification and a larger sample size
where the coefficient on black workers is negative and significant in a
Cox model.5 Using the EOPP data, Barron, Black and Loewenstein
(1993) report that while women were placed in less complex jobs, they
did not receive less training than males; in tables 4.2 and 4.3, we
obtained similar results. In our view, these results should be viewed
with suspicion. When we do not account for the truncation of training
at three months, we obtain a similar result for the SBA data; therefore,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that nonblack females receive the same
quantity of training as nonblack males. Accounting for the truncation
of training, however, reverses this result.6 This suggests that research
ers should be extremely careful when viewing racial and gender differ
ences with truncated data.
One final finding of interest concerns the considerable change in the
distribution of wages in the time between the EOPP and SBA samples.
Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990); Katz and Murphy (1992);
Becker (1992); and Berger (1992) document an increase in the returns
to higher education during the 1980s. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)
show that in the 1970s and 1980s wages become much more disperse,
with low-wage workers experiencing a fall in real wages while workers
from the upper end of the distribution saw a growth in real wages.
Given these fundamental changes in the distribution of wages, one
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might anticipate that changes in the distribution of on-the-job training
are responsible for some of the changes in the distribution of wages.
Surprisingly, we find little evidence for this hypothesis. The EOPP and
SBA data sets provide reasonably consistent answers to the question of
who receives training despite the ten-year difference in the age of the
surveys. Thus, researchers will have to look beyond differences in
training at least training in the first three months of employment to
explain the dramatic increase in earnings inequality.
Table 4.4 Total Hours of Training for the 1992 SBA Data, Cox Model
Independent variables
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N_______________

SBA
-0.021
(0.13)
-0.050
(0.93)
-0.118
(0.75)
-0.106
(1.09)
0.478*
(4.24)
-0.222
(1.50)
-0.203*
(2.33)
0.108
(0.69)
0.060*
(2.40)
0.011
(0.87)
59.75

__

NOTE:. Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an * are sig
nificant at the 5 percent level.
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In the next section, we explore the determination of the incidence of
training. This exercise will allow us to compare our results to many
studies where the measures of training are binary (e.g., 1983 CPS
data). In addition, it will allow us to examine differences in the inci
dence of each type of training.

Variations in the Incidence of Training
The incidence of training is inherently a dichotomous variable.
Workers either receive a certain type of training or they do not. Because
the incidence of training is a binary variable, we employ a logit proce
dure. In table 4.5, we present the logit estimates for the probability of
receiving off-site formal training. The coefficient from a logit model
may be interpreted as the rate of change in the logarithm of the ratio of
probability that the variable is one, which we denote P, divided by the
probability the variable is equal to zero, which we denote (1 - P). The
logarithm of the ratio of these two probabilities is often referred to as
the "log odds© ratio." To convert this coefficient to a derivative of the
probability, it is necessary to multiply the coefficient by P(l - P).
About the sample mean, this can be easily done by referring to the mean
incidence rates in table 4.1. For instance, evaluated about the mean, a
worker with a college degree increases the probability of off-site train
ing by about 0.122 [1.272 x 0.107(1 - 0.107)], or a worker with a col
lege degree more than doubles the probability of receiving off-site
training. The relationship among training, the size of the establishment,
and the number of workers at other sites provides some insights into
training decisions. Larger establishments tend to be less likely to pro
vide off-site training to their employees, although the coefficient is not
quite significant at the 10-percent level. In contrast, the larger the num
ber of employees at other sites, the more likely the firm will offer offsite formal training, perhaps sending their newly hired workers to other
company sites.
Table 4.6 presents logit estimates for the probability of receiving onsite formal training for the SBA and EOPP data. The two sets of esti
mates have some interesting similarities and dissimilarities. Both data
sets indicate that college graduates are more likely to receive on-site
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Table 4.5 Incidence of Off-Site Formal Training for the 1992 SBA Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N

SBA
-2.055
(1.27)
-0.200
(0.40)
-0.067
(0.44)
-0.424
(0.66)
0.426
(1.37)
1.272*
(4.46)
-0.529
(1.02)
0.064
(0.28)
0.760*
(2.23)
-0.106
(1.56)
0.108*
(3.16)
43.21
888

NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an * are signif
icant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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Table 4.6 Incidence of On-Site Formal Training for the 1992 SBA and
1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female

SBA
-2.059*
(1.97)
-0.017
(0.05)
-0.195
(1.85)
0.523
(1.72)
0.062
(0.31)
0.639*
(3.21)
0.181
(0.63)
0.250
(1.52)

Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N

0.686*
(2.64)
0.170*
(3.64)
0.107*
(4.56)
94.52
888

EOPP
-1.997
(1.88)
-0.163
(0.49)
-0.012
(0.11)
-0.321
(1.03)
0.541*
(2.87)
0.617*
(2.56)

-0.070
(0.44)
-0.190
(0.61)
0.160*
(3.04)

25.58
1,471

NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses, Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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formal training than are high school graduates the differential is
about 0.13 for the SBA and about 0.07 for the EOPP. Similarly, larger
establishments are more likely to offer formal training; a doubling of
the establishment size increases the probability of training by 0.036 for
the SBA data and by 0.018 for the EOPP data.
The EOPP data indicate, however, that those workers who attended
but did not complete college have about the same probability of under
going formal training as college graduates; indeed, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the two groups have the same incidence of training. In
contrast, the SBA data indicate that college graduates do have a higher
incidence of training than high school graduates. Similarly, for the
SBA data, we cannot reject the hypothesis that high school dropouts
have the same incidence of on-site formal training as college gradu
ates, but for the EOPP data, that hypothesis is easily rejected.
For the SBA data, we find that union members are more likely to
receive on-site formal training than nonunion members; the differential
is about 0.14. In contrast, in the EOPP data, firms with unions appear
to be no more likely to offer on-site formal training than firms without
unions. Thus, for the SBA data, union members appear to receive more
off-site and on-site formal training. This result contrasts with the find
ings of Mincer (1983), who uses the 1978 PSID data; Barren, Feuss,
and Loewenstein (1987), who use the 1982 EOPP data; and Lillard and
Tan (1992), who use the 1983 CPS data. All of these studies find that
union members receive less training than nonunion workers. Lynch
(1992) and Veum (1993), using data from two different time periods of
the NLSY, report that union members are more likely to receive formal
training. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993), using 1991 CPS data,
report that, in a parsimonious specification that includes only race,
gender, marital status, and education controls, union members are
more likely to receive training than nonunion members, but the coeffi
cient on union membership becomes insignificant yet still positive
once controls for experience and tenure are included.
There are at least two potential explanations for the differences in
these findings. First, differences in the sampling strategies might pro
vide one rationale. Both the SBA and the NLSY have younger samples
than the CPS or the PSID, although the EOPP is somewhat younger
than the SBA sample. This suggests that younger union members are
more likely to receive formal training than young nonunion members,
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but this difference dissipates over time and eventually reverses itself.
Given that union workers have lower turnover probabilities than non
union members, there is less reason to delay training among union
members than among nonunion members.
Changes in the union sector in the last decade may provide another
explanation. With the importance of international trade in the United
States economy, there has been a rapid reduction in the domestic man
ufacturing sector of the economy, as other countries have assumed
many semiskilled manufacturing jobs previously performed in the
United States. A corresponding decrease in union membership has
accompanied this trend. Given the United States© relatively advanced
educational system and given that on-the-job training and education
appear to be positively correlated, it may be that the United States©
comparative advantage lies in jobs that require workers to obtain sig
nificant amounts of on-the-job training. If competitive pressures have
eliminated the low-training union jobs, the difference between the
1982 EOPP data and the 1992 SBA data may indicate that there has
been a structural shift in the economy.
With informal management training, it is important to remember
that the incidence is quite high about 92 percent for the SBA data and
about 87 percent for the EOPP data. There are, therefore, few workers
whom managers do not informally train. Table 4.7 presents the logit
estimates for the probability of obtaining informal manager training for
the SBA and EOPP data. Not surprisingly, we cannot reject the hypoth
esis that all the coefficients are insignificant for the SBA data. For the
EOPP data, only two coefficients are significant. Workers with more
experience are less likely to receive training, and larger establishments
are more likely to offer this type of training.
For informal co-worker training, both the SBA and the EOPP data
indicate that larger establishments are more likely to offer co-worker
training. Table 4.8 presents the logit estimates for the two data sets.
Evaluated at the sample means, a 100 percent increase in the size of the
establishment increases the probability of co-worker training by 0.056
for the SBA data and 0.058 for the EOPP data. This finding probably
reflects the fact that larger establishments are more likely to have a
worker performing similar tasks, which reduces the cost of co-worker
training. There are some minor differences in the two data sets. The
EOPP results suggest older workers are less likely to receive co-worker
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Table 4.7 Incidence of Informal Management Training for the 1992 SBA
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female

SBA

EOPP

2.454
(1.50)
0.058
(0.11)
-0.179
(1.09)
-0.577
(1.24)
-0.536
(1.77)
0.060
(0.17)
-0.087
(0.18)
-0.095
(0.36)

2.525*
(2.55)
-0.291
(0.94)
-0.262*
(2.54)
-0.101
(0.39)
0.191
(0.91)
-0.037
(0.14)

Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N

0.224
(0.41)
0.064
(0.80)
0.008
(0.21)
9.21
888

-0.043
(0.27)
-0.099
(0.30)
0.218*
(3.72)

30.93
1,471

NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses, Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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Table 4.8 Incidence of Informal Co-Worker Training for the 1992 SBA
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female

SBA
(1)
0.857
(0.87)
-0.323
(1.07)
-0.165
(1.70)
0.317
(1.02)
0.211
(1.13)
0.312
(1.54)
0.021
(0.07)
0.151
(0.94)

Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N

-0.253
(0.90)
0.265*
(5.21)
0.044
(1.79)
63.55
888

EOPP
(2)
2.313*
(3.31
-0.769*
(3.50)
0.055
(0-74)
0.006
(0.03)
0.080
(0.56)
-0.244
(1.31)

0.117
(1-04)
0.074
(0.32)
0.247*
(6.17)

72.77
1,471

NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses, Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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training, and the coefficient for the worker©s age is highly significant.
In the SBA, while the coefficient for the worker©s age is negative, it is
not significant. The coefficients for college-educated workers have the
opposite signs in the two data sets, although neither is significantly dif
ferent from zero.
Finally, both data sets again indicate a preference for "watching oth
ers" training among larger establishments. The logit estimates for the
SBA and EOPP data are given in table 4.9. Evaluated at the sample
means, a 100 percent increase in the size of the establishment increases
the likelihood of this type of training by 0.029 in the SBA data and
0.027 in the EOPP data. Again, there are some minor differences in the
two data sets. For the EOPP data, workers with more experience are
less likely to undergo training by "watching others," while the same
coefficient for the SBA data is negative but not significant. Similarly,
for the EOPP data, workers with some college education are more
likely to "watch others," while the same coefficient for the SBA data is
positive but not significant.
Taken together, the two data sets provide a reasonably similar
description of the incidence of the various types of training. Three
major themes run through these regressions. First, large firms have
higher rates of training incidence. These establishments tend to be
more likely to offer formal on-site training, informal co-worker train
ing, and training by watching others. Also, the EOPP data indicate that
larger establishments are more likely to offer informal management
training, and the SBA data indicate that firms with larger numbers of
employees at other sites were more likely to offer off-site formal train
ing. Second, both the SBA and EOPP data agree that college graduates
are more likely to receive formal training than are high school gradu
ates. And finally, the SBA data indicate that union members are more
likely to receive formal training, but the EOPP does not provide any
evidence of this differential.

Truncated Spells of Training
Because the SBA survey asked for the number of weeks of training
and the number of hours of training per week, we may also assess how
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Table 4.9 Incidence of Training by Watching Others for the 1992 SBA
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female

SBA
(1)

EOPP
(2)

1.026
(1.06)
-0.221
(0.74)
-0.115
(1.21)
0.158
(0.52)
0.191
(1.03)
-0.017
(0.08)
0.209
(0.73)
0.060
(0.39)

0.978
(1.12)
0.029
(0.11)
-0.282*
(3.10)
-0.051
(0.23)
0.396*
(2.11)
-0.271
(1.26)

Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N

-0.047
(0.17)
0.133*
(2.83)
0.022
(0.92)
20.24
888

0.253
(1.82)
-0.352
(1.36)
0.180*
(3.67)
-.
39.96
1,471

NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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many spells of training are truncated by the three-month time frame.
For the SBA data, we treat any spell lasting at least 12 weeks as trun
cated.7 Conditional on receiving each type of training, the rates of trun
cation are 0.19 for off-site formal training, 0.16 for on-site formal
training, 0.24 for informal management training, 0.26 for co-worker
training, and 0.19 for "watching others." We have seen in chapter 3 that
data from the NLSY and NLSHS72 indicate that many spells of formal
training last beyond three months. Also, while the NLSHS72 data had
an extremely low incidence rate of informal training, many spells of
informal training were longer than three months. The SBA data indi
cate that informal training spells are also likely to last at least 12
weeks.
In table 4.10, we present logit estimates of the probability for each
type of training that a training spell lasts at least 12 weeks. In column
(1), we list the estimates for the off-site formal training. Only one of
the coefficients is significant at the 5 percent level. Nonblack females
are less likely than nonblack males to have undergone off-site training
spells that last at least 12 weeks. Evaluated at the sample means, nonblack women©s probability is about 0.30 smaller than nonblack men©s.
Thus, the truncation of the training measure at three months hides the
gender differences in the off-site training variable. In column (2), we
present the estimates for on-site formal training, and again, only one
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Nonblack
females are less likely to have on-site training spells that last at least 12
weeks than are nonblack males. Evaluated at the sample means, nonblack women©s probability is about 0.12 lower than nonblack men©s.
Thus, for both formal training measures, nonblack women are less
likely to experience a long spell of formal training, and the truncation
of the training measures at three months hides the true gender differen
tial. We also note that while the coefficient on blacks in the on-site for
mal training equation is not statistically significant, it is much larger
than the nonblack female coefficient. Because there are only a limited
number of blacks in the sample, it is difficult to obtain a precise esti
mate of the coefficients, and the reader should not interpret the insig
nificance of the coefficient as strong evidence that blacks are as likely
as nonblack males to have long spells of on-site formal training.
Also in both formal training equations, it was necessary to eliminate
the high school dropouts because no high school dropout had a spell of

Table 4.10 Incidence of Training Spells Lasting at Least 12 Weeks for the 1992 SBA Data
On-site
Off-site
Informal
Informal
formal
formal
manager
co-worker
training
training
training
training
Independent variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Constant
4.560
0.645
-1.703
-0.718
(0.85)
(0.24)
(1.54)
(0.54)
Logarithm of worker©s age
-1.293
-0.018
0.263
-0.054
(0.75)
(0.02)
(0.77)
(0.37)
Logarithm of worker©s relevant
experience
0.499
0.311
-0.125
0.196
(1.20)
(1.30)
(1.13)
(1.54)
Worker is high school dropout
-0.257
0.008
(0.72)
(0.02)
Worker has some college
-1.185
-0.486
-0.520
0.010
(1.24)
(2.25)
(0.94)
(0.04)
Worker is college graduate
-0.308
0.605*
0.352
0.852*
(0.41)
(2.98)
(0.87)
(3.60)
Worker is black
1.395
-1.126
-0.489
-0.201
(1.04)
(1.44)
(1.38)
(0.55)
-1.928*
-0.866*
Worker is nonblack female
-0.242
-0.224
(2.64)
(1.39)
(2.30)
(1.14)
Union
1.249
0.445
0.189
0.397
(1.58)
(0.66)
(0.95)
(1.24)

Train by
watching
others
(5)
1.974
(1.37)
0.234
(0.53)
-0.022
(0.16)
-0.073
(0.16)
-0.029
(0.10)
1.061*
(4.04)
-0.350
(0.82)
-0.256
(1.17)
-0.234
(0.59)

Logarithm of number of employees at
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at
other establishments
Chi-squared statistic
N

-0.292
(1.47)
-0.111
(1.17)
21.77
92

-0.164
(1.65)
-0.034
(0.64)
18.98
244

-0.019
(0.38)
-0.006
(0.24)
30.58
817

-0.028
(0.47)
-0.026
(0.90)
25.95
617

-0.106
(1.63)
0.002
(0.05)
26.14
611

NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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training lasting at least 12 weeks. As such, dropping out of high school
perfectly predicts that the training spell is not truncated. The estimation
procedure cannot determine a coefficient, and so it is necessary to drop
the observations. In the case of off-site formal training, we exclude
only three cases, and we should not overemphasize this exclusion. In
the case of on-site formal training, however, we exclude 23 cases,
which makes it highly likely that dropouts are less likely to have long
spells of training. Given that dropouts have revealed an aversion to or a
lack of aptitude for formal schooling, it is not surprising that they pos
sess jobs that do not require long spells of formal training.
Column (3) presents the logit estimates for the probability of under
going a spell of formal management training lasting at least 12 weeks.
Two coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. Workers who
attended but did not graduate from college are less likely to have a long
spell of informal management training than are high school graduates.
At the sample mean, a high school graduate has a 0.096 higher proba
bility of having a truncated spell of informal management training than
a worker with some college education. This finding further demon
strates that the SBA sample of workers with some college education is
somewhat anomalous because almost all other studies have found that
training increases with education. Workers with college degrees, on the
other hand, are more likely to have a truncated spell of informal man
agement training. Evaluated at the sample mean, college-educated
workers have about a 0.112 higher probability of undergoing a spell of
informal management training that lasts at least 12 weeks than do high
school graduates.
In columns (4) and (5) of table 4.10, we present the logit estimates
for the co-worker training and "watching others" equations. In both
equations, only one coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level: col
lege graduates have a greater chance than high school graduates of
undergoing a training spell that lasts at least 12 weeks. Evaluated at the
sample means, the college graduates have a 0.164 greater probability
of undergoing a training spell that lasts at least 12 weeks for both train
ing measures than do high school graduates. Thus, for each type of
informal training, college graduates have a significantly higher proba
bility of undergoing a spell lasting at least 12 weeks than do high
school graduates. This suggests that the 43 percent differential in the
number of hours of total training between college graduates and gradu-
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ates of only high school understates the true differentials in the training
experiences of newly hired employees.
Thus, the three-month sampling frame of the EOPP data and the
SBA data appears to have two major consequences. First, the sampling
frame may hide a gender differential in formal training measures. Nonblack women are significantly less likely to have formal training spells
that last at least 12 weeks than are nonblack men. Second, the sampling
frame also understates the training differential that college graduates
receive; college graduates are significantly more likely to have infor
mal training spells that last at least 12 weeks than are high school grad
uates.

Conclusions

There are four conclusions that emerge from both the EOPP and
SBA data. First, college graduates receive much more training than
high school graduates. Even after controlling for other factors, college
graduates receive between 56 to 60 percent more training than high
school graduates in the first three months of employment. Moreover,
analysis of the SBA data suggests that this difference is understated
because college graduates are more likely to have their training spells
continue past three months. When labor economists estimate the
returns to college education without controls for on-the-job training,
perhaps some of the presumed return to college education may be a
return to the greater quantities of on-the-job training.
Second, when hiring workers for more complex jobs, firms appar
ently hire workers with greater prior relevant work experience for a
couple of reasons. First, firms may find it more expensive to train
workers themselves than to hire experienced workers. This would be
especially true for positions in which the worker was expected to
"learn by doing," or learn by actually performing the task at hand. Sec
ond, by hiring experienced workers, firms may reduce the risk that they
have hired a worker who is incapable of doing the job. As we shall see
in chapter 7, firms spend much more time evaluating workers when hir
ing for jobs with more training and greater total human capital.
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Third, we find evidence that large establishments offer more train
ing, which might explain some of the wage premium earned by work
ers at these larger sites. We find that a 10 percent increase in the size of
the establishment increases the hours of training in the first three
months of employment by about 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent. Larger
establishments are also more likely to offer on-site formal training than
are smaller establishments, and using the SBA data, we find some evi
dence that employees of large firms who work at small sites are more
likely to undergo off-site training, as they presumably receive training
at larger sites within the firm.
Finally, both data sets indicate substantial gender difference in the
time to become fully trained and qualified, and the SBA data indicate a
substantial racial difference in the time to become fully trained. Even
after we control for other factors, blacks hold jobs that require about 60
percent less time to become trained and qualified while nonblack
women occupy jobs that require between 36 and 46 percent less time
than the jobs of nonblack males. Interestingly, we find that the trunca
tion in the hours of training may hide gender differences in hours of
training; women are significantly less likely than men to have spells of
formal training that last longer than three months.
NOTES
1. We use the adjustment that Kennedy (1991) develops, where the differential g is approxi
mated by g = exp[$ - 0.5 VAR $ ) ] - 1.
2. Again, we sue the adjustment that Kennedy (1991) develops to estimate the differential.
3. The time to become fully trained, however, also suffers from some biases. The time variable
does not measure the intensity of training, and the intensity of training may vary by the type of
job. Moreover, certain jobs may require very little training, but workers may take a great deal of
time to master fully the tasks that the job requires; they may learn by actually doing the job. Other
jobs may require workers to be continuously in training while becoming fully trained and quali
fied, thus, two workers may take the same time to be fully qualified but may have much different
training experiences. Because of these limitations, we interpret the "time to become fully trained"
variable as a measure of a job©s total human capital rather than as a measure of on-the-job train
ing. As wel shall see in chapter 6, the evidence from wage growth equations supports this view:
wage growth is more highly correlated with total hours of training than the time to become fully
trained and qualified.
4. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) for details of the estimation procedure.
5. Given the similarity in magnitude, the reader may wonder if the two groups should be
pooled. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on black and nonblack female work
ers are the same. If we do pool these two groups, the coefficient is negative and significant with a
z-statistic of-2.43.
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6. As in the OLS case, controlling for hours reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on nonblack female workers and eliminates its statistical significance. When controlling for hours, the
coefficient is -0.121 with az-statistic of-1.38.
7. Although there are 13 weeks in a three-month period, there was an unusually large fre
quency of responses at 12 weeks, indicating that many respondents used a 12-week horizon.

CHAPTER J_____________

How Well Do We Measure
On-the-Job Training?
The Upjohn Institute Survey
In previous chapters, we examined different employer and employee
measures of training and studied who receives training. This chapter
addresses the issue of how well training is measured. In particular, we
examine the causes and consequences of errors in the measurement of
training. Several studies in the last few years have considered this
issue, but most have examined the impact of measurement error on the
estimation of wage equations; none has analyzed measurement errors
in training, or the effects of training measurement errors on the esti
mated returns to training in wage equations. Consequently, economists
are lacking information on how accurately training can be measured
and on the consequences of the mismeasurement of training.
To examine measurement error issues, we designed and imple
mented a new survey that matches employer and employee responses
to training questions. This survey permitted analysis not only of errors
in the measurement of training, but also wages, productivity, and other
commonly used variables in labor economics. This new data set allows
us to address several questions: How accurate are measures of on-thejob training? Do employers© and employees© responses to identical
questions concerning on-the-job-training differ? If answers to these
common questions do differ, who reports more training? Do firm and
worker responses to formal training questions show more agreement
than responses to informal training questions?
The Upjohn Institute commissioned this new survey, which we con
ducted in spring 1993. Approximately 300 firms and workers partici
pated in the survey. Each firm was asked about its last worker hired,
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and we conducted interviews with both the firm and the worker. Mea
surement error is more apparent for some variables than others. Figure
5.1 shows the scatterplot of firm and worker starting wages.
Workers and firms agree for the most part on the rate of pay at the
start of employment. In fact, the correlation between worker and firm
reports is 0.974. The level of agreement between the worker and the
firm is somewhat lower for hours worked per week and months of rele
vant experience prior to employment. The scatterplots for these vari
ables are shown in figures 5.2 and 5.3. The correlation between worker
and firm reports for hours worked is 0.769 and 0.727 for months of rel
evant experience. Firms and workers disagree to an even greater extent
about the amount of training provided. Figure 5.4 shows the scatterplot
of worker and firm reports of total hours of training provided in the
first four weeks of employment. The correlation coefficient is 0.475.
Firms report 25 percent more hours of training on average than do
workers, although firms and workers report similar incidence rates.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first examine previous measure
ment error studies in labor economics and then describe our new data
set. The results of the survey are then discussed, beginning with the
correlations between employer and employee responses for a number
of variables considered in previous studies. We then turn to an analysis
of the measurement of on-the-job training. Finally, we examine the
determinants of training and the correlates of differences in employerand employee-reported training.

Previous Validation Studies in Labor Economics
A number of papers have considered the issue of reporting errors.
Mellow and Sider (1983) use an employer-employee matched supple
ment taken from the 1977 January Current Population Survey (CPS)
and the first wave (1980) of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project
(EOPP). While there is a fair amount of disagreement between
employers and employees on industry and occupation, it appears to
have little effect on cross-section wage structure. Further, the structure
of wages is independent of whether employer- or employee-reported
wages are used.
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Figure 5.1 Firm- and Worker-Reported Wages
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Figure 5.3 Firm- and Worker-Reported Experience
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Figure 5.4 Firm- and Worker-Reported Training
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Greenberg and Halsey (1983) investigate the effects of reporting
error in the Seattle and Denver income maintenance experiments by
comparing employer reports with respondent self-reports. Previous
studies based on respondent self-reports find appreciable reductions in
work efforts by those eligible for experimental income maintenance
payments. Using employer-reported data, they find that the reductions
in the work effort of husbands, wives, and young workers who are not
heads of households are much smaller than the self-reported data
would imply. The estimates for female heads appear to be unaffected
by reporting error.
Freeman (1984) examines differences in reporting union status
between worker and firm reports. He uses the 1977 January CPS
employer-employee matched data as well as the 1979 May CPS regular
survey and the pension supplement. Assuming differences between
employer and worker reports are the result of measurement error, he
argues that such error may negate the value of using longitudinal data
to estimate union wage effects because the measurement error biases
the union wage effects downward.
Duncan and Hill (1985) use a unique set of data from a single manu
facturing company that provides unprecedented detail on the work his
tory of employees. They compare administrative records with
information obtained from a sample of workers as a validation exercise
for the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They report estimates
of wage equations that include schooling and tenure using both worker
and firm reports. They find a bias of 30 percent in the estimated return
to tenure due to the correlation between measurement error and tenure.
In related work, Lillard, Smith, and Welch (1986) examine measure
ment error induced by the Census Bureau imputation procedure used to
fill in missing observations in the CPS. They find that the Census
imputation procedure severely understates income in some occupa
tions. Because the evidence suggests that nonreporting is tied to
income, the imputation procedure also probably causes an understate
ment of average income.
Bound and Krueger (1991) use matched CPS-Social Security data to
examine the prevalence of measurement error. They find that measure
ment error in panel data is not as significant as previously thought
because positive serial correlation and mean reversion of the measure
ment error increase the reliability of panel earnings data.
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Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990, 1994) also use the
matched CPS-Social Security data and a later wave of the PSID valida
tion survey. They find annual earnings to be fairly reliably estimated.
Hourly earnings estimates are quite unreliable, however, because hours
worked are imprecisely reported. Rodgers, Brown, and Duncan (1993)
also examine errors in survey reports of earnings, hours worked, and
hourly wages using the two waves of the PSID validation study. They
find that measures of hourly earnings are "distressingly unreliable,"
arguing their findings suggest the importance of measurement error.

A New Validation Survey
None of the studies described in the previous section considers
errors in reporting on-the-job training, or the effects of reporting errors
on the estimated returns to training. Our survey, conducted in the
spring of 1993, obtained evidence on this question from employers and
employees. A major focus of the survey (hereafter referred to as the
Upjohn Institute survey) was to provide worker-firm comparisons of
on-the-job training measures. Because the intensity of on-the-job train
ing is likely to be highest for newly hired workers, we decided to target
those workers, similar to the EOPP and SBA surveys. We asked both
firms and their last worker hired a series of training questions based on
those used earlier in the EOPP and SBA surveys.
One of our major concerns centered on the accuracy of responses
given by employers and employees. We did not want employers or
employees to have to recall details of training that took place months or
even years prior to the interview. To minimize this problem, we twice
interviewed employers and employees about training, once after two
weeks of employment, and a second time after four weeks of employ
ment. This meant that we had to conduct interviews within narrow win
dows of time, within a couple days of the end of the second and fourth
week of employment.
Because of the survey design, we needed to contact firms that were
hiring at the time we conducted the survey. Given our experience with
the EOPP and SBA surveys, we were concerned that a number of
establishments, especially small ones, would be ineligible for the sur-
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vey simply because they were not hiring. Therefore, we eliminated
establishments with fewer than 100 workers from our sample universe
to increase the chances of locating suitable establishments.
We obtained a nationwide random sample of 5,000 establishments
with 100 or more employees from Survey Sampling, Inc. The survey
was conducted in 1993 by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the
University of Kentucky. Each of the 5,000 establishments was first
sent a letter describing the survey and the general nature of the training
questions. Telephone interviewing began on March 22, 1993 and was
completed on June 21, 1993. In the initial interview we asked back
ground information about the firm and the characteristics of the last
worker hired. If firms had not hired in the past ten days or were not
planning to hire soon, they were deemed ineligible for the survey and
dropped from the sample. 1
Once we had completed the initial firm interview, we asked to speak
with the worker. We then asked the worker a set of background ques
tions similar to what we had asked the firm. The second interview of
the employer and employee occurred after the employee had been with
the employer for two weeks. At that time, we asked both the worker
and the firm a set of questions about the training activities of the
worker during the first two weeks of employment. The last interview
occurred after the worker had been with the employer for four weeks.
This interview consisted of the same set of questions about training as
the second interview and concluded with a few questions about worker
productivity and promotion probabilities.
There were a couple of drawbacks to our survey design and sam
pling strategy. Restricting the original sample to establishments with
100 or more workers meant that the sample would not be nationally
representative of all establishments. Second, with three interviews for
both the firm and the worker, there was the potential of attrition bias.
While there was some attrition, it did not appear to be a significant
problem. Eighty-five percent of the worker-firm pairs that completed
the initial interview completed the entire set of interviews.
Given the level of commitment required from the firm and the
worker, we anticipated a much lower level of response than a typical
one-time interview would provide. From our initial sample of 5,000,
we did not attempt to contact 1,603 establishments due to budget con
siderations. The hiring restriction eliminated a number of firms imme-
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diately from the analysis. Out of the 3,397 establishments that we
attempted to contact, 1,359 reported that they were not hiring. Others
were ineligible to complete the survey due to a number of reasons: 229
had disconnected phones; in 111 establishments we only received
answering machines, busy signals, computer tones, or no answer in
repeated attempts; 60 establishments had gone out of business; we had
language communications problems with eight establishments; 76
establishments had moved or closed, and we could not obtain a new
address or verify closure. These exclusions left 1,554 establishments
eligible to complete the survey. Of these, 541 directly refused to partic
ipate, 241 said it was against company policy to answer a survey, 255
were unwilling to let an employee participate in a survey, and 212
repeatedly scheduled callbacks, which we took as an implicit refusal.
There were 258 completions of all six interviews, and 47 partial com
pletions. We only counted as a partial completion those cases in which
we completed at least one employer and one employee interview. The
response rate of partial and full completions was approximately 20 per
cent.
To compare our sample of completions with our original sample, we
obtained from Survey Sampling a few characteristics of each of the
establishments in our initial sample of 5,000. These included Standard
Industrial Code (SIC), Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) code, and
status, state, and establishment size code. We distinguished among four
establishment size categories: 100-249 employees, 250-499 employ
ees, 500-999 employees, and 1000 or more employees. To summarize
the representativeness of our sample, we estimated a probit model indi
cating a partial or full completion for a particular establishment. The
explanatory variables consisted of eight one-digit SIC industry dum
mies (The first two SIC codes were combined to avoid empty cell prob
lems), eight Census region dummies, three establishment size
dummies, and a MSA status dummy. This analysis indicated that there
were no significant differences at the 5 percent level in the industry and
establishment size composition of the completions and the original
sample. The sample of completions, however, was significantly more
likely to come from rural areas and from the Mountain and Pacific
Census regions than the overall sample of 5,000.
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Correlations Between Employer and Employee Reports and
Comparisons with the Results of Previous Studies
The survey provides us with two potentially inaccurate measures on
the same variable. Thus, for a continuous variable of interest x, such as
on-the-job training, we have the firm©s report
(5.1)

y{= X{ + i/i

where yf is the firm©s report for the ith worker, X; is the true value of the
variable for the ith worker, and \4 is a random error term. The survey
also provides the worker©s report
(5.2)

ri^Xi + u*

where yw{ is the ith worker©s report and «" is a random error term. We
assume that the two random error terms are uncorrelated with each
other and *,. We allow the distributions of the error terms to contain
mass points at zero, which would allow for the worker and firm mea
sures to agree with positive probability. We do not require that error
terms have zero mean, and so the measures may be biased. In such a
model, the correlation coefficient between the worker and firm reports
gives a type of signal-to-noise ratio; as the variance of the worker©s or
firm©s report increases, the correlation coefficient declines. In the limit
ing case of degenerate distributions for both the worker©s and firm©s
error terms, the correlation coefficient would be one.
We may subtract equation (5.2) from equation (5.1) to obtain
(5.3)

Ayz = y{ -ywt = i/i~ uwt = AM,-.

We may use a paired Mest to test the hypothesis that E(Au) = 0. Condi
tional on Ayi ^ 0, the Wilcoxon rank test examines the hypothesis that
the error terms from the firm©s and worker©s measures are drawn from
the same distribution, and similarly, the sign test examines if the
median of the distribution of differences is zero.
To summarize differences in employer and employee reports and to
facilitate comparisons of the Upjohn Institute data to other matched
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data sets, we present in table 5.1 a series of means, correlations, and
significance tests of differences between employer and employee
reports on a number of demographic, human capital, wage, fringe ben
efit, and productivity variables. For binary variables, in addition to the
employer and employee means and the correlation, we show the per
centage agreements and disagreements and the results of a test of
equality of means. For continuous variables, we show means, correla
tions, and the results of three tests of differences in the employer and
employee reports.
There is little disagreement between firm and worker race reports.
Only 2.73 percent of workers and firms disagree about whether or not
a worker is nonwhite and the correlation between the responses is over
0.9. We next consider employer and employee responses on whether
the worker is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The sim
ple correlation between the employer and employee responses is 0.689,
and the means are similar: employers report 10.5 percent of workers
are covered and employees report 9.7 percent. Because the distribu
tions are binomial, we use Fisher©s exact test to determine if the
reported rate of unionization is the same; the one-tail p-value from
Fisher©s test is 0.594, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that the rates
are the same. From the 1977 January CPS employee-employer match,
Mellow and Sider (1983) report that 7.1 percent of the employees dis
agree with their employers on their union status. Using a somewhat
smaller sample from the same data set, Freeman (1984) finds only 3.45
percent of the employees disagree with their employers on union sta
tus. In the Upjohn Institute survey, 5.65 percent of the employees dis
agree with their employer on collective bargaining coverage. Thus, the
Upjohn Institute data appears to compare favorably with the matched
1977 January CPS data about union coverage.
Variables 3 through 10 in table 5.1 show employer and employee
responses to a series of schooling completion questions. There is a fair
amount of disagreement between employers and employees, and it is
especially dramatic in some of the schooling categories. College atten
dance, in particular, shows a massive amount of disagreement. Almost
42 percent of the observations disagree on whether the worker attended
college! The correlation between the employer and employee©s reports
is only 0.186. Firms are almost twice as likely to report that the worker
has attended, when the worker says he or she did not attend, as are the

N
Wilcoxon-RankTest
(significance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
(two-tailed binomial test)
Paired f-test (significance level)

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p- value)

(continued)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(5)
G.E.D.
0.049
0.106
0.536
7.31%
92.69%
0.001
246
-

(2)
Union status
0.105
0.097
0.689
5.65%
94.35%
0.594
248
-

(6)
vocational
or technical
school
0.146
0.192
0.459
15.42%
84.58%
0.071
240
-

(4)
High school
diploma
0.905
0.864
0.588
8.71%
91.29%
0.022
264
-

(3)
High school
dropout
0.045
0.030
0.598
3.03%
96.97%
0.158
264
-

(1)
Nonwhite
status
0.206
0.210
0.917
2.73%
97.27%
0.706
257
-

Table 5.1 Correlation between Worker and Firm Responses

Table 5.1 (continued)

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N
Wilcoxon-Rank Test
(significance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
(two-tailed binomial test)
Paired Mest (significance level)

(7)
Attended
college
0.553
0.414
0.186
41,80%
58.20%
0.001
244
-

(8)
Earned
associate
degree
0.175
0.179
0.546
13.25%
86.75%
0.860
234
-

(9)
Earned
bachelor©s
degree
0.304
0.279
0.861
5.84%
94.16%
0.109
240
-

(10)
Attended
graduate
school
0.065
0.056
0.850
1.73%
98.27%
0.318
231
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(11)
Age
31.458
31.611
0.961
-

(12)
Relevant
experience
(in months)
5.284
6.954
0.727
-

218
0.40
(0.6868)
(N=115)
0.0150
(N=115)
-0.83
(0.4060)

248
-5.90
(0.0001)
(N=181)
0.0000
(N=181)
-5.35
(0.0000)

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p-value)
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test
(significance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)

(14)
(15)
Wage after two
(13)
Hours worked
years
Starting wage
36.98
10.00
8.95
38.50
10.84
8.84
0.769
0.828
0.974
210
1.06
(0.2845)
(N=86)
0.450
(N=86)
1.31
(0.1932)

153
-4.41
(0.0001)
(N=148)
0.0002
(N=148)
-3.36
(0.0010)

263
-4.73
(0.0001)
(N=113)
0.0000
(N=113)
-3.95
(0.0001)

(16)
Health
insurance
(initially)
0.385
0.486
0.590
21.01%
78.98%
0.0004
257

(17)
Health
insurance
(after two
years)
0.880
0.928
0.469
9.57%
90.43%
0.025
209

(18)
Paid
vacation
(initially)
0.331
0.350
0.247
33.84%
66.16%
0.597
263

-

-

-

-

-

(continued)

Table 5.1 (continued)

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test
Isignificance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)

(19)
Paid vacation
(after two
years)
0.192
0.916
0.490
7.98%
92.02%
0.828
263
-

(20)
(21)
(23)
Eligible for
Eligible for
(22)
Retirement
(24)
sick pay
sick pay (after Reitrement
plan (after Child/elderly
(initially)
two years) plan (initially) two years) care (initially)
0.395
0.756
0.289
0.730
0.086
0.472
0.831
0.362
0.772
0.113
0.294
0.428
0.312
0.327
0.298
35.08%
19.30%
30.60%
25.32%
12.67%
64.92%
80.70%
69.40%
74.68%
87.33%
0.0414
0.0064
0.0434
0.1973
0.258
248
254
232
237
221
-

-

-

-

-

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test
Isignificance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)

(27)
(25)
Life insurance
(26)
Child/elderly
care (after two Life insurance (after two
years)
(initially)
years)
0.841
0.448
0.162
0.841
0.556
0.281
0.508
0.516
0.252
13.18%
25.10%
26.87%
86.82%
74.90%
73.13%
1.0000
0.0007
0.0035
182
239
160
-

-

-

(28)
Disability
(initially)
0.433
0.585
0.283
37.33%
62.67%
0.0002
217
-

(20)
Disability
(after two
years)
0.725
0.812
0.206
28.75%
71.25%
0.0386
160
-

(30)
Profit sharing
(initially)
0.122
0.187
0.197
21.30%
78.70%
0.0318
230
-

-

-

(continued)

Table 5.1 (continued)

o
o

(31)
Profit sharing
(after two
years)
0.413
0.468
0.426
28.51%
71.49%
0.1124
235

(32)
Discounts
(initially)
0.517
0.492
0.468
26.66%
73.34%
0.4544
240

(33)
Discounts
(after two
years)
0.583
0.574
0.509
23.97%
76.03%
0.7935
242

Sign Test (significance level)

-

-

-

Paired f-test (significance level)

-

-

-

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of means (/?-value)
N
Wilcoxon-Rank Test
(significance level)

(34)
Productivity
in first two
(36)
weeks
(35)
Probability of
(relative to Productivity promotion
fully trained in second two within two
worker)
weeks
years
57.42
76.64
25.77
58.09
80.35
45.61
0.312
0.382
0.259
227
-0.55
(0.5845)
(N=205)
1.000
(N=205)
-0.35
(0.7293)

218
-2.57
(0.0101)
N=190)
0.0045)
(N=190)
-2.59
(0.0101)

211
-6.58
(0.0001)
(N=183)
0.0000
(N=183)
-7.13
(0.0000)
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workers to report attendance when the firm does not. Not only does this
discrepancy affect measurement of schooling completion levels, but it
may also have some effect on the estimated returns to schooling.
The employer and employee mean ages are almost identical. Work
ers report 31.61 years and firms report 31.46 years (Variable 11). The
correlation between the two is 0.961 (n=218). Interestingly, conditional
on disagreement, the sign test that the two variables have the same
median can be rejected at the 1.5 percent confidence level (n=115);
workers report that they are younger than firms believe. Thus, despite a
high correlation and virtually identical means, the sign test cautions us
against accepting the hypothesis that the two error terms have the same
median.
Variable 12 provides reports of relevant experience. Workers report
more relevant experience than do firms, and the correlation between
the reports is 0.727. While this variable also appears in the EOPP and
SBA surveys, it has not been included in household surveys. Given the
relatively high correlation between worker and firm reports of relevant
experience, this question may warrant inclusion in future household
surveys.
Variables 13 and 14 show the mean values and correlations reported
by employees and employers between the starting wages and predicted
wages after two years. The mean starting wages are almost identical,
and the correlation between the employer and employee reports is
0.974. This figure is significantly higher than the correlations reported
by Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990) and Rodgers, Brown,
and Duncan (1993) using the PSID validation survey. Rodgers, Brown,
and Duncan report a correlation for annual earnings of 0.792, and
0.601 and 0.456 for the previous pay period and the usual pay period,
respectively. Using a slightly different sample from the same data set,
Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990) find a correlation of
0.806 for annual earnings, and 0.456 and 0.461 for the last pay period
and the usual pay period.2 Perhaps employees and employers disagree
less when the worker has just begun employment. However, the corre
lation in the Upjohn Institute survey for the predicted wage in two
years is 0.828, which is still higher than that obtained using the PSID
validation survey. 3 The mean differences in starting wages also appear
small in the Upjohn Institute survey. Workers underreport wages by
$0.12, compared to figures of $0.63 and $0.66 reported by Duncan and
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Hill (1985) for the first wave of the PSID validation survey. The mean
differences for wages also appear to be in line with those obtained
from the 1977 January CPS by Mellow and Sider (1983). Workers
report higher predicted wages in two years by $0.84 when compared to
their employers in the Upjohn Institute data. These numbers, however,
do not represent actual wage data but rather predictions on the part of
employers and employees about what will occur in two years. Overall,
the differences in reported wages appear to be quite low in the Upjohn
Institute survey.
Variable 15 shows that workers report on average 1.5 more hours
worked (workers report 38.5 and firms report 37.0), and the correlation
between worker and employer measures is 0.769 (n=263). Conditional
on disagreement, a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis
that the two error terms are drawn from the same distribution with a zstatistic of 4.73 (n=113). Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990)
and Rodgers, Brown, and Duncan (1993) find that the log of hours dur
ing the previous pay period from administrative data and the log of
usual hours from employee measures are correlated between 0.60 and
0.64 using the PSID validation survey. When the Upjohn Institute
hours of work data are converted to logs, the correlation between
employer and employee measures is 0.61, essentially identical to the
correlation obtained from the PSID validation study. Mellow and Sider
(1983) report that the mean difference in the log of hours worked is
0.039. We find that workers overreport the log of hours worked by a
somewhat smaller amount (0.031).
Variables 16 through 33 show employer and employee reports of
various components of the fringe benefit package. The correlations
range from 0.197 for the initial provision of profit sharing to 0.59 for
initial eligibility for health insurance. Duncan and Hill (1985) report on
the level of agreement between employees and administrative records
on various components of the fringe benefit package. These differences
only come from employee errors and not employer errors because of
the use of administrative records in the PSID validation survey. On the
other hand, the Upjohn Institute survey contains disagreements result
ing from errors on the part of both employers and employees. In addi
tion, the PSID only surveyed a single manufacturing firm, where
workers are likely to have long tenure with the company, while the
Upjohn Institute surveyed newly hired workers. For these reasons,
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there is more agreement about fringe benefit provision in the PSID val
idation survey than in the Upjohn Institute survey.
Only 1 percent of the employees in the PSID validation study dis
agree with their employers on the provision of health insurance. On the
contrary, 21 percent of employees in the Upjohn Institute survey dis
agree about the provision of health insurance at the beginning of
employment and 9.6 percent disagree about health insurance provision
after two years. The level of agreement after two years is probably
more meaningful because many workers may be confused about when
health insurance coverage starts.
In the PSID validation survey, 9 percent of the employees disagree
with their employer about the provision of sick pay, and 10 percent dis
agree about life insurance. This compares to 35 percent and 30 percent
in the Upjohn Institute survey at the start of employment and 19 per
cent and 13 percent after two years. Only 1 percent and 3 percent of the
employees disagree with their employer about the provision of paid
vacation days and a retirement plan in the PSID validation survey,
while 34 percent and 31 percent disagree with their employer in the
Upjohn Institute survey at the beginning of employment and 8 percent
and 25 percent disagree after two years with the employer.
While there is a large amount of agreement between employers and
employees on well-measured variables such as age, race, gender, start
ing wages, and completion of a bachelor©s degree, there is less agree
ment on variables more difficult to measure, such as attendance of
college, and for variables about which the newly hired worker is not
likely to know, such as fringe benefits. As a whole, the responses we
received are more or less comparable with those found in the literature.
The Upjohn Institute survey also asked several more subjective
questions. For example, we asked the employer and new employee to
rate on a scale of 0 to 100 the employee©s productivity relative to a fully
trained worker in the first two weeks of employment and after the sec
ond two weeks of employment. Variable 34 shows the reported produc
tivity during the first two weeks, and Variable 35 shows the reported
productivity at the end of the second two weeks. The mean responses
for productivity during the first two weeks are almost identical, yet the
correlation is only 0.312. The correlation increases slightly to 0.382 for
the second two weeks, and workers report somewhat higher productiv
ity on average. Variable 36 shows that workers report a much higher
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probability of promotion in the first two years than do firms for typical
workers in the same position, and the correlation between responses is
0.259.

Measures of On-the-job Training
We now turn to table 5.2, in which we report the employer and
employee measures on training. For each type of training, we report
the firm mean, the worker mean, the correlation between the two mea
sures, the Wilcoxon signed rank test, the sign test, and the paired r-test.
In general, firms report more training than workers. Employers report
more on-site training (/-statistic of 2.32), informal management train
ing (/-statistic of 0.56), informal co-worker training (/-statistic of 3.06),
and "watching others" (/-statistic of 1.55). Workers report more off-site
training (/-statistic of 1.46). The Wilcoxon test, which does not require
the normality assumption of the f-test, indicates the only significant
differences are for on-site formal training and informal co-worker
training, although the sign test cannot reject the hypothesis that the
median of on-site formal training is the same for workers and firms. 4
While all the correlations are statistically significant, they are surpris
ingly low. The formal training measures have a correlation of about
0.4. Informal management training has a correlation of only 0.176. Coworker training and "watching others" have correlation coefficients of
0.379 and 0.287, respectively. When we aggregate the five different
variables into a single training measure, the correlation increases to
0.475. Firms report nearly 25 percent more training than workers (tstatistic of 2.72 and a Wilcoxon z-statistic of 2.73).
The Upjohn Institute data also contain PSID-like questions that
measure the time to become fully trained and qualified. Unlike the
PSID, however, we asked the firm and worker to evaluate how long it
would take a worker with no experience to become fully trained and
qualified, which is the same question asked by both the SBA and
EOPP data. Of course, workers are being asked to evaluate how long it
will take to become fully trained and qualified after only four weeks on
the job. The means of the two distributions are quite similar (/-statistic
of 0.44), and, indeed, the means are quite similar to those we reported

Table 5.2 Employer and Employee Measures of Hours of Training

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
N
Wilcoxon-Rank Test
(significance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)

Hours of
on-site
formal
training
9.31
6.06
0.398
248
1.98
(0.0475
(N=103)
0.1145
(N=103)
2.32
(0.0210)

Hours of Hours of Hours of Hours of
off-site
informal, informal, training by
formal managerial co-worker watching
training
training
training
others
1.64
24.48
26.90
26.31
2.45
20.54
25.56
19.67
0.287
0.457
0.176
0.379
251
219
216
209
-1.35
3.13
1.46
0.89
(0.1774)
(0.3709)
(0.0017)
(0.1433)
(N=192)
(N=38)
(N=211)
(N=186)
0.4177
0.0732
0.0048
0.2125
(N=192)
(N=186)
(N=38)
(N=211)
-1.46
3.06
1.55
0.56
(0.1465)
(0.0025)
(0.1266)
(0.5793)

Total
hours of
training
87.50
71.83
0.475
179
2.73
(0.0064)
(N=177)
0.0350
(N=177)
2.72
(0.0072)

Time to
become
fully
trained
(weeks)
18.88
20.99
0.172
222
2.48
(0.0131)
(N=208)
0.0313
(N=208)
-0.44
(0.6630)
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in the SB A and EOPP data in chapter 3. The employer and employee
responses, however, have a correlation of only 0.172, and, when we
test the hypothesis that the two are drawn from the same distribution,
the Wilcoxon z-statistics lead us to reject that hypothesis. Similarly, the
sign test rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions have the same
median. The difference between the nonparametric Wilcoxon and sign
tests and the parametric /-test suggests that there are several large outli
ers, and when we repeated the Mest with observations that differed by
less than 48 months, the /-test indicated that firms reported a longer
time to become fully trained and qualified (f-statistic of 2.90).
One may be tempted, given the differences in the correlations
among the formal and informal training measures, to conclude that we
measure formal training more accurately than informal training. This is
not the case. In table 5.3, we aggregate the training measures into a for
mal and informal training measure. The correlation coefficients are
very similar (0.419 for formal training and 0.408 for informal training).
While the difference between firm and worker mean measures is statis
tically significant for informal training and is not significant for formal
training at the 5-percent level, firms report 28.9 percent more formal
training and "only" report 19.3 percent more informal training. Thus,
this experiment does not offer much evidence for the belief that infor
mal training is more difficult to measure than formal training.
Table 5.3 Employer and Employee Measures of Hours of Formal and
Informal Training

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test
(significance level)
Sign Test
Significant Level
Paired Mest (significance level)

Hours of formal
training
10.66
8.30
0.41.9
245
1.10
(0.2713)
(N=106)
0.2065
(N=106)
1.55
(0.1220)

Hours of informal
training
77.44
64.67
0.408
184
2.65
(0.0081)
(N=182)
0.0451
(N=182)
2.34
(0.0206)

Table 5.4 Employer and Employee Measures of Training Incidence Rates

Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements that training
occurred
Percentage agreements that training did
not occur
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N

On-site
formal
training
0.310
0.270
0.318
28.23%

Off-site
formal
training
0.084
0.120
0.377
11.56%

14.92%

84.06%

85.39%

72.22%

70.81%

56.85%
0.2327
248

4.38%
0.0947
251

0.00%
0.0336
219

6.02%
0.4671
216

7.18%
0.0768
209

Management
training
0.954
0.900
-0.0731
14.61%

Co-worker
training
0.842
0.819
0.227
21.76%

Training by
watching
others
0.847
0.790
0.269
22.01%
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Because many survey instruments are concerned with the measure
ment of incidence rates of training, in table 5.4 we present statistics for
these rates. For each of the five training measures, we list the firm
mean, the worker mean, the correlation between the firm and worker
measures, the percentage of disagreements between the firm and
worker measures, the percentage of time that the firm and worker agree
that the worker received the training, and the /?-value for Fisher©s exact
test of the equality of means for binomial variables. It is important to
note that firms and workers agree that the incidence of informal train
ing is quite high. The lowest rate of agreement is for "watching oth
ers," and nearly 71 percent of the sample agree that the worker was
trained by watching others. These rates are similar to those reported in
chapter 3 for the EOPP and SBA data and offer further evidence that
the incidence rate of informal training is extremely high for new hires.
Indeed, there are no observations for which worker and firm agree that
the worker did not receive informal management training, and there are
only 13 observations that agree there is no informal co-worker training.
The means are similar for each of the five training incidence rates.
Thus, although not highly correlated, firm and worker measures give
very similar estimates of the incidence rates.

Determinants of Training and Reported Differences in Training

Our survey data suggest significant deviations in worker- and firmreported training measures. While we cannot examine measurement
error directly, we can examine the determinants of differences in
worker- and firm-reported training. In table 5.5, we regress the log of
the total hours of worker- and firm-reported training in the first four
weeks of employment and deviations in reported training on a series of
worker- and firm-reported variables. Columns 1 and 2 contain regres
sions explaining the amount of training, and columns 3 and 4 contain
regressions explaining differences in reported training. In column 1,
using firm-reported training and independent variables, there is some
evidence that high school dropouts receive less training than high
school graduates. In column 2, using worker-reported training and
independent variables, there are no significant determinants of train-

Table 5.5 Regression Explaining Levels of Training and Worker-Firm Differences in Reported Training
Levels of training
Ii dependent variables
log (age)
log (relevant experience)
High school dropout
Some college
College graduate
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is covered by collective bargaining
log (establishment size)

(Da
0.339
(1.01)
-0.130
(1-22)
-0.844
(1.98)
0.307
(1.45)
0.188
(0.786)
0.385
(1.31)
0.0030
(0.016)
-0.161
(0.628)
0.115
(1.66)

(2)b
0.117
(0.334)
-0.119
(1.18)
0.396
(0.719)
-0.023
(0.103)
-0.172
(0.689)
0.480
(1.70)
0.044
(0.251)
0.052
(0.194)
0.034
(0.483)

Worker-firm differences in training
(3)c
0.340
(0.781)
-0.016
(0.122)
0.189
(0.369)
-0.628
(2.39)
-0.682
(2.35)
0.111
(0.288)
0.167
(0.740)
-0.338
(1.10)
-0.084
(0.935)

(4)d
-0.340
(0.850)
0.127
(1.08)
0.377
(0.599)
-0.244
(0.941)
0.376
(1.27)
0.492
(1.450)
0.0087
(0.041)
0.121
(0.409)
0.048
(0.583)
(continued)

Table 5.5 (continued)
Independent variables
log (number of firm employees at other
establishments)

Levels of training
(2)b
(Da

Worker-firm differences in training

(3)c

(4)d
0.074
(1.02)
-0.500
(1.67)
2.28
(1.25)
0.081

R2

0.031
(0.501)
0.095
(0.348)
1.94
(1.37)
0.099

0.031
(0.488)
-0.019
(0.100)
3.463
(2.44)
0.036

0.0338
(0.446)
-0.272
(0.756)
0.314
(0.168)
0.110

N

152

206

128

log (hours worker per week)
Constant

157

a. The dependent variable is the log of total hours of firm-reporting training plus one. The independent variables are firm reports.
b. The dependent variable is the log of total hours of worker-reported training plus one. The independent variables are worker reports except for the log of
establishment size that was asked of firms.
c The dependent variable is the log of worker-reported training plus one minus the log of firm reported training plus one. The independent variables are
firm reports.
d. The dependent variable is the log of worker-reported training plus one minus the log of firm reported training plus one. The independent variables are
worker reports except the log of establishment size that was asked of firms.
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ing.5 These differ greatly from the SBA and EOPP training regressions
in chapter 4 in which prior experience, establishment size, and school
ing were all significantly related to the amount of training. One impor
tant difference is that the Upjohn Institute training measures include
only training in the first month and not in the first three months. In
addition, the Upjohn Institute sample sizes are much smaller, making it
more difficult to find significant relationships between training and
other variables.6
Columns 3 and 4 show the regressions explaining log differences in
worker- and firm-reported training. There is some evidence using firmreported characteristics that the difference between worker- and firmreported training is negatively related to the level of schooling. No
variables are significantly related to the difference in reported training
when worker-reported characteristics are used.
Given the lack of any significant correlates of differences in reported
training, it may be that the differences in employer- and employeereported training result largely from measurement error. Hours of train
ing may simply be difficult to estimate for the employee and the
employer. If measurement error is present, then estimated effects of
training on wages and productivity are biased toward zero (Greene
1993, p. 283).We investigate this issue further in chapter 6.

Conclusions
In this chapter we reported the results of a matched survey of
employers and employees in which both employers and employees
were interviewed three times over the course of a month. The survey
focused on training activities of the last worker hired but also sought to
obtain demographic information about the worker from both the firm
and the worker.
There is very little difference in the quality of demographic informa
tion about the worker obtained from the firm and the worker. For vari
ables such as race and age, the correlations between worker and firm
reports are over 0.9. Surprisingly, given that previous studies have
obtained much lower correlations for wages, the correlation between
worker- and firm-reported starting wages is 0.974. Lower levels of
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agreement between firm and worker reports are obtained for variables
such as hours worked and union status; however, the correlations are in
line with previous studies. The agreement of fringe benefits in the
Upjohn Institute data are somewhat below previous estimates, perhaps
because the Upjohn Institute survey focused on newly hired workers.
Correlations between worker and firm reports of training activities
are in general lower than most other variables. There are no significant
determinants of worker- or firm-reported total hours of training in the
first month, except perhaps that those with very low schooling levels
receive less training. Similarly, there are in general no significant deter
minants of differences in worker- and firm-reported hours of training in
the first month. A significant amount of measurement error in the
worker- and/or firm-reported training variables may in part explain
these findings.
There are some conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis in
this chapter about whether investigators should obtain information
from the firm or from the worker. For many variables, such as relevant
experience, the differences in the effects of firm-reported and workerreported variables are slight. Since the correlations for many variables
are fairly high, if firm information is unavailable, it should be obtained
from the worker. For example, questions about previous experience are
not often asked of the worker in household surveys, but the correlation
with firm-reported previous experience is quite high. Workers have
much more difficulty answering questions about specific elements of
the fringe benefits package. While the correlation between worker- and
firm-reported training is quite low, both are significantly related to pro
ductivity. It would be useful to have similar training and productivity
questions appear in future household surveys.
We believe our analysis offers several insights into the measurement
of on-the-job training. First, there is a great deal of measurement error
in attempts to gauge the quantity of on-the-job training. Even using the
aggregate measure of training, the correlation between worker and firm
measures is less than 0.5, which is much lower than other variables that
have been used in wage equations. Differences between firm and
worker reports, however, appear uncorrelated with any of the normal
variables used in wage equations. Second, firms report more training
(about 25 percent more) than do workers. Heckman and Smith (1993)
find evidence that workers underreport the incidence of training when
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comparing administrative and self-reported data for a group of Job
Training Partnership Act recipients. Given our data, however, we can
not determine whether this difference arises because workers underreport training or firms overreport training (or both).
Third, both firm and worker measures indicate a large amount of
informal training for newly hired workers. The incidence rate of each
type of informal training exceeded 75 percent, and the mean number of
hours for each type of informal training was 20 hours or more in the
first four weeks of employment for both worker and firm measures. In
contrast, formal training measures had relatively low incidence rates,
and the mean hours of formal training in the first four weeks of training
was about ten hours. This suggests that surveys such as the NLSY that
focus only on formal training spells are missing a majority of the spells
of training. Similarly, surveys such as the NLSHS72 and the CPS that
ask retrospective questions about the informal training also appear to
miss most of the spells of informal training.
Fourth, in surveys of newly hired workers, there is not much evi
dence that formal training is more accurately measured than informal
training. When one aggregates the five measures of training into a for
mal training measure and an informal training measure, the correla
tions between worker and firm measures are almost identical for
formal and informal training. Fifth, firm and worker measures of the
time to become fully trained and qualified, at least for our sample of
newly hired workers, have lower correlations than measures of train
ing. And finally, the agreement between worker and firm measures is
higher for the aggregate training measure than for any individual train
ing measures. This suggests that, where possible, researchers may be
better served using an aggregate measure than using each measure sep
arately.
Among the findings cited above, one of particular significance con
cerns the size and reliability of informal training measures relative to
formal training measures. The substantial magnitude of informal train
ing suggests that the focus of the federal government on formal train
ing may be misplaced. In fact, formal training, both as an activity to
measure (e.g., the 1993 Survey of Employer-Provided Training funded
by the Employment and Training Administration) and as an activity to
fund (e.g., tax incentives for training personnel, instructional materials,
and schools) appears less important than informal training. 7 If policy
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makers choose to subsidize formal training, they will ignore an over
whelming fraction of the training that workers receive. Moreover, as
we demonstrated in chapter 4, small firms are less likely to utilize for
mal training than their larger counterparts. A subsidy of formal training
programs, therefore, is an implicit decision to subsidize larger firms.
NOTES
1. If the establishment reported that they would be hiring in the near future, a callback was
scheduled for the expected hiring date.
2. Rodgers, Brown, and Duncan (1993) and Bound, Brown, duncan, and Rodgers (1990)
report correlations between log earnings. In the Upjohn data, the correlation between the logs of
the employer- and employee-reported starting earnings is 0.980.
3. The correlation between the logs of the predicted wage after two years as reported by the
employer and employee in the Upjohn data is 0.842.
4. We perform the Wilcoxon sign rank test and the sign test on those pairs in which the
worker©s and firm©s reported disagree.
5. The worker has not asked about the establishment size so the firm-reported establishment
size is used in all of the regressions reported in the paper.
6. Another important difference is that the Upjohn Institute training measure includes off-site
formal training while the SBA training measure excludes off-site formal training. The SBA data
report significantly different effects of off-site training from other types of training in wage and
productivity equations. We find no evidence of different effects of off-site formal training using
the upjohn Institute data and therefore aggregate all types of training into a single measure.
7. The 1993 Survey of Employer-Provided Training is a survey of about 12,000 employers that
attempts to measure only the incidence of formal training programs.

CHAPTER

The Impact of Training
on Wages and Productivity
Economists have long believed that on-the-job training is an impor
tant determinant of the structure of wages. Since the seminal work of
Mincer (1962), economists have attributed the growth in wages associ
ated with increases in the labor market to rising productivity generated
by on-the-job training. Moreover, researchers have nearly always
found that wages increase with a worker©s tenure at the firm. 1 Econo
mists have generally interpreted this return to tenure as evidence of
firm-specific training; as noted in chapter 2, on-the-job training theory
justifies such an interpretation. Consider two workers with the same
years of experience in the labor market, but the first worker has been at
his or her current firm for a year while the second worker has just
started at a new firm. As both workers have the same total labor market
experience, they should have accumulated similar general human capi
tal. If the first worker has accumulated some firm-specific training, the
theory of on-the-job training suggests that he or she should receive
some of the returns to that training.
In the first section of this chapter, we review two theories that chal
lenge the traditional training view of the source of wage growth: the
incentive-based compensation models and the learning/job matching
models first discussed in chapter 2. We note that, while these theories
may contribute to the links between wage growth and work experience,
available evidence indicates that on-the-job training remains an impor
tant determinant of wage growth. However, establishing the predicted
effects of on-the-job training can be difficult at times. The second sec
tion of this chapter illustrates some of the difficulties in testing the pre
diction that on-the-job training reduces a worker©s starting wage. In
contrast, the next two sections reaffirm the predicted impact of training
on wage and productivity growth, although even here questions arise
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because investments in training appear overwhelmingly to be financed
by employers. We then examine the effect of measurement error on the
estimated effects of training wages and productivity. The final section
reviews various modifications to the simple on-the-job theory that may
explain the apparent small impact of training on starting wages.

Alternative Theories of Wage Growth
There have been significant challenges to the traditional interpreta
tion that employee wage growth reflects a return to on-the-job training.
For instance, Lazear (1979, 1981) offers an incentive-based compensa
tion model where wage profiles slope upward to guard against worker
shirking. In essence, the worker posts a bond with the firm by agreeing
to work for a low wage early in his or her career in return for higher
wages later in the career. If workers shirk and the firm fires them, they
lose the high wages or pension payments they would have otherwise
received. Thus, it is possible for wages to increase with tenure without
any on-the-job training. Moreover, Lazear©s theory can explain the
existence of several other features of labor contracts that are difficult to
explain using human capital theory. For instance, firms restrict the
number of hours many employees can work. But, if firms are paying
these workers the value of their marginal products or perhaps less
because the workers and firms share the returns to specific training,
firms should be content to let these employees work more hours. In
contrast, in Lazear©s theory, firms would not want senior employees to
work more hours because they are receiving a wage more than the
value of their marginal products to compensate them for accepting the
low initial wages.
Taking a different approach, Johnson (1978) and Jovanovic (1979a)
have constructed job-matching models that may account for the corre
lation of wages and job tenure. We can capture the essence of the jobmatching model in a simple two-period example. Consider a model
where a worker©s productivity is given by

(6.1) p/ = p + e
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for t = 1,2, where p° is the worker©s expected productivity across firms
and e is a random variable with E(e) = 0. The term 8 is a match-specific
error term that neither the firm nor worker knows before employment.
During the first period, the firm and worker learn the value of e.
Because £ is not initially known, a firm, competing with other firms for
workers, will offer a first period wage equal to the worker©s expected
productivity, or w{= p°. In the second period, however, both the worker
and the firm know the true value of e. If changing jobs costs nothing,
when £ < 0 it is inefficient for the match to continue because the
worker©s expected productivity elsewhere is p° The worker and firm
will agree to terminate the relationship, and the worker will earn the
value of his or her expected productivity, or p°. If £ > 0, it is efficient
for the match to continue and presumably the firm and the worker will
do so. For ease of exposition, let us assume that the firm pays the
worker the value of his or her marginal product, or w2 = p° + £.
In the above example, workers who change employers receive the
wage /? , while workers who remain at their previous period employer
receive the expected wage p° + E(e I £ > 0) > p°. Thus, seniority (ten
ure) and wages are positively correlated. Yet, this in no way reflects a
return to firm-specific training but rather demonstrates that good
matches survive. While we may add many complications to make this
example more realistic, the example does illustrate the essential insight
of the job-matching literature: when good matches survive and bad
matches do not, there may be a return to tenure that is a "statistical arti
fact."2 While both the worker-shirking model and the job-matching
model offer alternative explanations of the correlation between wages
and tenure, neither theory offers a particularly compelling explanation
for the correlation of labor market experience and wages. These mod
els do suggest, however, that special care must be used when trying to
measure the impact of training on wages.
Fortunately, there have been numerous studies that have used direct
measures of on-the-job training to examine the impact of that training
on wages; see Mincer (1989a) for a review. Mincer reports that even
when allowing for a 15 percent depreciation rate, the returns from
training range from 10.5 to 25.6 percent in the five studies that he
reviews. If some of this training is firm-specific and if firms share in
some of the returns to specific training, these rates of return understate
the return to the economy as a whole. 3
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On-the-Job Training Effects on the Starting Wage
While research has typically confirmed the predicted impact of
training on wage growth, the second major prediction of on-the-job
training theory has proven more difficult to confirm. In fact, most pre
vious research has failed to find the negative relationship between
training and the starting wage predicted by this theory. Barren, Black,
and Loewenstein (1989), using the EOPP data, found no statistically
significant relationship between the starting wage and the quantity of
training that a worker receives. As we discuss in more detail below,
they argue that lack of a negative relationship between training and the
starting wage may be the result of productivity differences that are not
observed in the data. If high-ability workers are matched to jobs that
require much training and those high-ability workers command a wage
premium, there may be a spurious correlation between training and the
starting wage.
Difficulties in Testing the Starting Wage Prediction Given
Heterogeneous Labor

To see how heterogeneity across workers introduces difficulties in
testing on-the-job training©s predictions concerning the starting wage,
consider the following wage equation:
(6.2)

ln(w) = X|3 + -yln(r) + a + e

where w is wages, X is a vector of firm and worker characteristics, T is
the quantity of training that the worker receives, a is a measure of the
worker©s ability not captured in the data, 8 are the standard error terms,
and /3 and /are parameters to be estimated. If the labor market matches
workers with large a's to jobs with high levels of required human capi
tal, the coefficient /will be biased upward. This problem is probably
unavoidable in cross-sectional data. For instance, consider a class of
graduating seniors majoring in economics from the same university.
From the standpoint of most standard cross-section data sets, this is a
remarkably homogeneous group. They all have the same level of edu
cation, their college major is the same, and they have graduated from
the same university. Yet, we would hardly expect earning differences
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among this group to be completely random. Employers would have a
wide range of information about these prospective employees that are
generally unavailable to the econometrician. For instance, employers
will have access to certain quantifiable measures such as grade point
average, test scores, and past job earnings. In addition, employers will
have access to subjective information such as workers© appearances,
skills in handling interviewers© questions, personality traits, recom
mendation letters, and other informal sources of information.
Despite the homogeneity of this group, we would not be surprised to
learn that there are substantial earnings differentials among the gradu
ates. If training and worker ability are complements in the production
process so that high-ability workers have larger increases in productiv
ity for a given level of training than do low-ability workers, then we
would expect the "good" economics majors from the university to hold
jobs that have more training than their less able classmates. Although
the more able students receive more training, we still might find that
they are paid a higher starting wage than the less able if the wage pre
mium for their superior abilities exceeds their portion of the training
costs.
To buttress the case that unobserved ability differentials may explain
the lack of a negative correlation between initial wages and training,
chapter 7 documents that firms look at more applicants and spend more
time evaluating applicants when filling jobs that require more training.
While this evidence is consistent with the lack of correlation, others
disagree. Parsons (1989), using the NLS youth cohort, finds that there
is a positive relationship between training and the starting wage, but
the relationship is generally not statistically significant. As the NLS
youth cohort is a panel data set with a much richer collection of worker
characteristics (including their Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery scores) than the SBA and EOPP data, Parsons (1990) argues
that the improved controls suggest that unobserved heterogeneity may
not explain the failure of starting wages to be negatively correlated
with training. Similarly, Lynch (1992), using a sample from the NLSY
data of people who had attended college but did not graduate, reports
that uncompleted spells of training are positively associated with the
higher wages, suggesting that workers are not bearing the costs of
training. While Lynch does find some differences by the level of educa
tion, there is little evidence in her study that training lowers the starting
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wage.4 If the panel data do offer substantially more controls for worker
abilities than do cross-sectional data, the failure of researchers to find a
negative correlation between the starting wage and training represents
a serious challenge to traditional on-the-job training theory.
A slightly more complicated model than equation (6.2) will demon
strate, however, the inherent difficulty in testing this proposition, even
with panel data. Suppose that the wage equation is of the form
(6.3)

ln(w) = X{3 + y ln(7) + a r| + £

where a is again the worker©s unmeasured ability, r\ is a measure of the
total human capital of the job, and the other variables are as before.
The term 77 reflects the intrinsic human capital necessary to do the job,
and, presumably, 77 is highly correlated with the quantity of training
that workers receive. Of course, if we hold 77 fixed, variation in the
workers© experience, schooling, and other forms of human capital will
affect the quantity of training that workers receive, so r\ and training
are not perfectly correlated.
Suppose that workers and firms learn about the true values of a over
time. Thus, workers moving from low-training to high-training jobs (or
more precisely, from low- 77 to high- 77 jobs) are more likely to be highability workers. If the labor market matches high ability workers to
more complex jobs, then, as we discussed in chapter 2, even first "dif
ferencing" the equation does not necessarily remove the bias from the
estimated coefficients for
(6.4)

Aln(w) = AX(3 + y ln(T) + ccAri +Ae

where A preceding the variables reflects the changes in those variables.
We have assumed for convenience that the worker©s previous job
required no on-the-job training. High-ability workers will tend to have
larger changes in 77 than low-ability workers. As unobserved ability is
positively correlated with increases in 77, and training is positively cor
related with increases in 77, then the spurious correlation between train
ing and the wage will not be eliminated unless we have accurate
measures of 77 over the worker©s job history, which to our knowledge
no panel data set contains. Workers will still have to finance their part
of the training costs through accepting lower wages than firms would
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have paid to workers requiring less training, but the matching of highability workers to more complex jobs will hide the negative relation
ship between training and the starting wage.
An Intrafirm Test of the Starting Wage Prediction of On-the-Job
Training

Fortunately, the SBA data allow a direct test of the proposition that
workers finance a part of their training cost through accepting a lower
starting wage. As part of the survey, we asked whether the worker had
more training, less training, or the same training as the typical worker
hired into the position. In addition, we asked if the worker was paid
more than, less than, or the same as the typical worker hired into the
position. Human capital theory predicts that workers receiving more
training than average should receive lower wages than the typical
worker hired into the position, and those workers receiving less train
ing than average should receive higher wages than the typical worker
hired into the position. In table 6.1, we report cross tabulations for the
responses to these two questions. There are several interesting observa
tions. First, 21.8 percent of the sample were paid a wage higher than
the typical wage whereas only 2.6 percent of the sample were paid a
wage lower than the typical wage. Similarly, many more workers
received less training than the typical worker (25.7 percent) than
received more training than the typical worker (6.9 percent). These fig
ures indicate that respondents© determination of the typical worker is
biased; the worker identified as a "typical" worker is actually paid less
and requires more training than the median worker. Of the small seg
ment of the sample who received more training than the typical worker,
more workers (16.5 percent) received wages higher than normal than
received lower wages than normal (7.1 percent). Thus, there appears to
be little evidence in column (1) to support the notion that workers are
paying for their training when they receive more training than the typi
cal worker.
When workers receive less training than the typical worker, which
occurs 25.8 percent of the time, they are much more likely to receive
higher than typical wages; 48.3 percent of these workers receive higher
wages compared to only 12.2 percent of the workers who receive the
typical amount of training. This suggests that while firms are unwilling
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to penalize workers who require more training than the typical new
employee, they are willing to (or must) increase the wages of welltrained workers who need less training than the typical new employee.
Moreover, firms© hiring decisions seem to mirror this form of rent shar
ing. They are much more likely to hire workers who require less train
ing than they are to hire workers who require more training than the
typical new worker. As firms appear reluctant to pass the increased
training costs on to workers by lowering wages, it is not surprising that
they would not hire workers needing more training than the typical
worker.5
Table 6.1 Training and Starting Wage, 1992 SBA Data (percent)
More
Same
Less
training training as training
than typical typical than typical
worker
worker
worker
Higher wage than typical
worker (n=268)
Same wage as typical
worker (n=931)
Lower wage than typical
worker (n=32)
Total3
Sample size

Total

16.5

12.2

48.3

21.8

76.5

85.6

49.2

75.6

7.1
100.0
85

2.2
100.0
829

2.5
100.0
317

2.6
100.0
1231

a. Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

A flaw in the above analysis is that it does not consider interfirm
variation in wages and training. For instance, certain employers hiring
clerks may specialize in hiring workers without much experience in the
field, but they may offer these inexperienced workers a great deal of
training. Other firms may only hire clerks with a great deal of experi
ence who require very little training. While all workers hired at either
firm may be offered the same wage, wages may differ between the
firms, with the firm offering a great deal of training providing a rela
tively low starting wage. This high-training firm will not be able to
attract workers with a great deal of experience because of the low start
ing wage. The low-training firm will offer a relatively high starting
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wage but may not be willing to hire workers without substantial experi
ence. Thus, in the labor market as a whole, the predicted trade-off
between the starting wage and training would exist, but we may not see
this relationship if we look only at relative wages within the firm.
An Interfirm Test of the Starting Wage Prediction of On-the-Job
Training

The prior discussion relied on firms© characterizations of a worker©s
wage and training relative to the "typical" worker to test for the
expected trade-off between training and the starting wage. In this sec
tion, we use the 1992 SB A data set to test whether differences in train
ing across firms explain differences in starting wages. The SB A survey
differs from most other data sets because of its focus on newly hired
workers. To help the reader compare the SB A data with other data sets,
table 6.2 presents estimates of a wage equation without the measures
for training but includes many of the standard controls that economists
use in wage equations: age, age squared, experience, experience
squared, years of education, the logarithm of the size of the establish
ment, hours worked, and hours squared. In addition, we use dummy
variables indicating the worker©s union status and whether the worker
is black or a nonblack female.6 The reader will recall that our measure
of experience is the employer©s estimate of the number of years of rele
vant experience that a worker possesses. The results offer few sur
prises. Experience has a concave relationship, as do age and hours
worked. More highly educated workers earn more, with one additional
year of schooling increasing wages by about 10 percent. Black workers
earn about 23 percent less than nonblack males, and females earn about
17 percent less than nonblack males.
In the appendix to this chapter, we provide a detailed comparison of
estimates from similarly specified wage equations using the 1992 Cur
rent Population Survey (CPS), the 1990 Census, and the SBA data. The
estimates are similar. The largest differences are that the returns to edu
cation are much higher in the SBA data and the gender gap is much
smaller in the SBA data.7 Because workers have no tenure with the firm
in the SBA data, the higher return to education may reflect the fact that
employers use formal education as a signal for the productivity of
newly hired workers more than for a sample of workers as a whole.

124

Table 6.2 Impact of Training Proxies on the Starting Wage,
1992 SBA Data
Independent Variables
Constant
Worker©s age/ 10
Age squared / 1000
Worker©s relevant experience / 10
Experience squared / 1000
Years of education
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is union member
Logarithm of establishment size
Hours worked 710
Hours squared / 1000
R2
N

-0.255
(1.60)
0.342
(3.82)
-0.426
(3.31)
0.476
(7.56)
-0.933
(3.72)
0.100
(15.75)
-0.235
(4.96)
-0.171
(6.22)
0.072
(1.56)
0.040
(5.36)
0.082
(1.88)
-0.982
(1.65)
0.513
796

NOTE: Absolute value of f-statistics given in parentheses. The dependent variable is the loga
rithm of the starting wage. Ordinary Least Squares estimates are reported.
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The smaller gender wage gap is consistent with the recent findings of
Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993). In their study of Michigan Law
School graduates, they found that the gender gap was an increasing
function of the time since graduation. Perhaps the largest difference,
however, is that the SBA sample©s equation has an R2 over 0.51, while
the R2 for the CPS is 0.36. This is not surprising, however, since wages
become more dispersed as workers gain experience, and the SBA sam
ple is limited to newly hired workers.
Our initial approach to estimating the impact of training on the start
ing wage is to estimate equation (6.3). This requires that we not only
use measures of on-the-job training but also of the total human capital
of the job. After some initial experimentation with the specification
using the SBA data, we decided to use two measures of training. The
first measure is the sum of the intensity measures for on-site formal
training, informal management, informal co-worker, and "watching
others," while the second is the intensity measure of off-site formal
training. We justify this separation purely on statistical grounds for we
know of no theoretical reason why we should treat off-site formal
training differently from other forms of training, although this has the
advantage of insuring that EOPP and SBA training measures are simi
larly defined.
For the correct estimation of equation (6.3), however, it is necessary
to exclude measures of previously acquired on-the-job training. To see
why, consider a production function for human capital. The inputs to
the production function are on-the-job training acquired before
employment at the firm (denoted POJT) and on-the-job training that
the firm offers (denoted OJT), or
(6.5)

#=/(POJT,OJT)

where/( ) is a production function with the standard properties. In fig
ure 6.1, we depict two isoquants for production of total human capital,
with the lower level of total human capital depicted by the curve
denoted H° and the higher level of total human capital denoted Hl .
These two isoquants correspond to two jobs with differing total human
capital requirements. Standard human capital models would predict
that a movement from point A to point B should reduce the worker©s
starting wage. If we hold fixed the quantity of previously acquired on-
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the-job training and increase the quantity of current on-the-job train
ing, we then have a movement from point A to point C. If better work
ers are matched to positions that require more training, however, we
would expect the worker at point C to be more able than the worker at
point A. If we could perfectly control for worker ability, we would
expect to find a negative relationship between training and the starting
wage, but it is doubtful that we can achieve such a control. 8 Indeed, we
include the measure of H as a control for the unmeasured ability com
ponent.
Figure 6.1 Human Capital Production Function

POJT

H
OJT

If we include measure of POJT, OJT, and H into an equation simul
taneously, however, we are identifying only random fluctuations in
training. To see why, consider the following parameterization of the
human capital production function, equation (6.5),
(6.6)

In// + YO + y, POJT + y2 OJT + u

where the /s are parameters and u is an error term. The inclusion of
any two of the variables POJT, OJT, and H on the right-hand side of
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equation (6.3) would allow, in principle, the estimation of the trade-off
between training and wages. Including POJT and OJT, one can identify
how, holding fixed the amount of previously acquired human capital,
increases in training affect the starting wage; this is the approach of
Barren, Black, and Loewenstein (1989). If markets match more able
workers to jobs that require the accumulation of more human capital,
however, workers at point C will be more able in observed ways than
workers at point B, which will cause the coefficient on training to be
biased upward.
To control for this ability bias, we propose using our measure of
total human capital, the length of time it takes an untrained worker to
become fully trained and qualified, as a proxy for unmeasured ability.
As equation (6.6) indicates, however, the inclusion of POJT, OJT, and
H into a wage equation creates some difficulty in interpretation. Hold
ing constant POJT and H, movements in OJT require movements in «,
unobserved factors that affect human capital accumulation. Thus, a
regression so specified would not be informative. Our approach is to
consider movements along the human capital isoquant such as move
ments from point A to point B in figure 6.1. One can think of there
being many different workers located on the locus H°. In a labor mar
ket equilibrium, firms should be indifferent, ceteris paribus, between
hiring workers with a lot of experience who command high starting
wages and workers with limited experience who have lower starting
wages.
To consider movements from point A to point B, however, it is nec
essary that we allow for changes in prior on-the-job training to accom
pany changes in the current employer©s on-the-job training. Labor
economists use age (or potential experience, which is age minus the
number of years of schooling minus six) as a substitute for general
human capital, and our relevant experience is also a substitute for labor
market experience. Thus, both are used as measures of prior on-the-job
training. We exclude age and relevant experience from our estimation,
but include our measure of H, which allows us to interpret changes in
current on-the-job training as movements along the human capital iso
quant.
In columns (1) through (3) of table 6.3, we report the wage equation
estimates for the SB A data set using three specifications. (To avoid tak
ing the logarithm of zero, we take the logarithm of one plus the training

Table 6.3 The Impact of Training on the Starting Wage, 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Data
SBA data
SBA data
SBA data EOPP data EOPP data EOPP data
(Da
(2)a
(3)a
(4)b
(6)b
(5)b
Independent variables
Logarithm of job©s human capital
requirement
0.108
0.091
0.077
0.053
0.050
0.041
(8.59)
(7.53)
(6.91)
(7.18)
(7.03)
(5.96)
Logarithm of hours of training in first
three months
-0.046
-0.035
-0.022
-0.017
-0.011
-0.004
(4.29)
(3.39)
(2.22)
(2.91)
(1.90)
(0.81)
Logarithm of off-site training in first
three months
0.024
0.032
0.033
...
(1.91)
(2.64)
(2.82)
Age and square of age added
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
Relevant experience and its square
added
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
R2
0.442
0.500
0.545
0.343
0.3924
0.425
n
796
796
796
1636
1636
1636
NOTE: The absolute values of r-statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variables are logarithms of starting wage. Ordinary Least Squares estimates are
reported.
a. Other control variables are the number of years of schooling, the logarithm of the number of employees in the establishment, hours worked, the square
of hours worked, and dummy variables indicating whether or not the worker is black, a nonblack female, and .a union member.
b. Other control variables include years of education, a dummy variable equal to one if the worker is a female, fraction of the establishment that is union
ized, the natural logarithm of the number of employees at the establishment, hours worked, hours squared, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not
the worker is a temporary or seasonal employee.
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measures and the required human capital measure.) As mentioned ear
lier, we use two measures of training. The first measure is the sum of
the measures for on-site formal training, informal management train
ing, informal co-worker training, and "watching others"; the second is
the measure of off-site formal training.9 In column (1) we present our
preferred estimates, in column 2 we add age and age squared to the
equation, and in column 3 we add relevant experience and its square to
the equation. In column (1), the coefficient for the on-site training is
negative (-0.046) and highly significant. A 10 percent increase in train
ing decreases the starting wage by about 0.5 percent. When we add age
and age squared to the equation, the coefficient on training increases
from -0.046 to -0.035, and when we add relevant experience and its
square, it increases to -0.022, although it remains statistically signifi
cant at the 5-percent level. While the sign of the coefficient for on-site
training is negative and consistent with the theory, the magnitude of the
coefficient is small.
The coefficient for off-site formal training, however, is positive
(0.024) and significant at the 10-percent confidence level. When we
add age and its square, the coefficient increases to 0.032 and becomes
significant at the five percent level, and remains significant when we
add experience and its square to the equation. We tried numerous spec
ification checks to see if we could eliminate the positive sign for offsite training, but none were successful. 10
In columns (4) through (6) of table 6.3, we report the estimates for
the EOPP data. In column (4) our preferred specification the coeffi
cient on the logarithm of training is -0.017 with a ^-statistic of -2.91. 11
Again, while highly significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is
quite small. A 10 percent increase in training decreases the starting
wage only 0.2 percent. If we add age and its square to the equation, the
coefficient increases to -0.011, and if we add relevant experience and
its square to the equation, the coefficient increases to -0.004 and ceases
to be statistically significant even at the 10-percent confidence level.
For our preferred specification columns (1) and (4) the empirical
tests provide mixed support for the human capital model. For both data
sets, the coefficients for on-site training are negative and significant,
confirming the predictions of the theory. Yet, the magnitudes of the
coefficients are small, with estimated elasticities of less than -0.05.
Indeed, for the SBA data, a 10 percent increase in training an
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increase of about 17 hours when evaluated at the mean results in a
reduction in the wage of $0.04. In addition, for the SBA data, the coef
ficient on off-site training is positive and significant, directly contra
dicting the theory.
Some alternative measures of training provide somewhat larger esti
mated elasticities. Mincer (1974), in his derivation of the earnings
equations, emphasizes that the appropriate measures of training should
be "the fraction of time (or ©time equivalent© if the investment costs
include direct outlays as well as time costs) the worker devotes to
improving his earning power" (p. 19). This suggests that the appropri
ate measure of training is the intensity of training rather than the total
number of hours of training received. For the SBA data, we know both
the number of weeks of training and the hours per week of training that
the worker receives, so we may construct a measure of the intensity of
training. This allows us to construct an on-site training intensity mea
sure as the total number of hours per week of on-site training and an
off-site training measure as the number of hours of off-site training.
Unfortunately, we cannot replicate the measure for the EOPP data set
because it does not contain a measure of weekly hours of training. For
the SBA data, the coefficient for on-site training intensity is -0.056
with a r-statistic of -4.05. For off-site training intensity, however, the
coefficient is 0.039 with a ^-statistic of 2.33. 12

Contrasting On-the-job Training Impact on Wages
Versus Productivity
While the results above support the contention that on-the-job train
ing and the starting wage are negatively correlated, the magnitude of
the starting wage adjustment is small. This may be due in part, how
ever, to our inability to control fully for worker heterogeneity. In this
section, we present a second test of human capital theory that involves
a comparison of the effects of training on productivity and wage
growth, a test that under certain assumptions controls for worker heter
ogeneity. To see why, consider the following simple representation of
the on-the-job training model developed in chapter 2.
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Assume that workers hired into the same position have similar
unobserved abilities. Recall from chapter 2 that on-the-job training the
ory predicts that, if training is general and competition exists across
employers, then the starting wage and the wage paid to a fully trained
worker will adjust such that for each position, the worker bears all the
costs and reaps the entire return to such training. That is, the beginning
wage, wb, and the wage after training, wa, are such that:
(6.7)

wa =fb =p(E, a, 0, 0) - c(E, a, Tg, 0)

(6.8)

wb =fa

where fb is the productivity net of training costs of a worker with initial
human capital E and ability a who receives general training Tg and
zero specific training, while fa is the productivity of this worker after
training.
Equation (6.7) highlights the key claim of human capital theory that
an increase in training T will lower the starting wage given dc/dT > 0.
If positions with increased training are filled with more able individu
als (i.e., dcddT > 0), and we cannot fully control for this matching of
more able workers to positions with greater training, then our estimate
of the negative effect of training on the starting wage will be biased
upward.
Equations (6.7) and (6.8) suggest, however, an alternative test for
the prediction that workers will bear the entire costs of general train
ing. Specifically, dividing (6.8) by (6.7) and differentiating this expres
sion with respect to a change in training, we obtain the following
expression:
(6.9)

d(fa /fb)/dT=d(wa /wb)/dT.

Equation (6.9) implies that the effect of general training on an index
measuring productivity growth, fa/fb, and an index measuring wage
growth, w/wfo, should be identical. That is, it is predicted that d (/*a//b) /
dT = d(wc/wb) I dT > 0. Thus, we can restate the prediction as follows:
an increase in training should result in identical increases in the growth
rates of productivity and wages.
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Unfortunately, the SBA and EOPP data sets do not have measures of
the worker©s posttraining wage. Both data sets do, however, contain
measures of the wage paid to the typical worker in the same job two
years after beginning employment. While there may be some jobs in
which the worker is not fully trained at the end of two years, we think
the wage after that time period is a good proxy for the posttraining
wage. By taking the log difference of the wage paid to a typical worker
in the same job after two years and the worker©s starting wage, we con
struct an index of wage growth.
Table 6.4 reports the regression for the wage index. Ideally for this
regression, we would like to have all the training that the worker
receives in the first two years of employment, but both the EOPP and
the SBA data contain only the training that the worker receives in the
first three months. In column (1) we report the estimates for the SBA
data. A 10 percent increase in the quantity of on-site training increases
the wage growth only 0.2 percent. A 10 percent increase in off-site
training decreases the wage growth 0.05 percent, although the coeffi
cient is not significant. In column (3) of table 6.4, we report estimates
using the EOPP data. A 10 percent increase in training increases wage
growth by 0.3 percent as well. Thus, both of these coefficients suggest
that increases in the quantity of training increase wage growth, and
both give quantitatively similar estimates of the magnitude.
The magnitude of the trade-off, however, is not large. One would
expect that a 10 percent increase in training would reduce the worker©s
initial productivity by much more than 0.2 percent. Fortunately, both
the EOPP and SBA data contain measures of the worker©s productivity
so that we may compare the change in wages to the change in produc
tivity. In the EOPP data, respondents were asked the following ques
tion:
Please rate your employee on a productivity scale of zero to 100,
where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your
employees [in this] position can attain and zero is absolutely no
productivity by your employee. What is the productivity of [the
last worker hired] during (his/her) first two weeks of employ
ment?

We asked a slightly different version of this question to the SBA
respondents. They were asked:

Table 6.4 Wage and Productivity Growth Index, 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Data
Wage index
Productivity index
Wage index
SBAb
SBAa
EOPP3
(2)
(3)
(1)
Independent Variables
0.028
0.283
0.020
Logarithm of training
(8.98)
(10.01)
(4.20)
0.045
-0.005
Logarithm of off-site training
...
(1.23)
(0.76)
102.82
Chi-squared statistic
0.046
—
0.020
R2

Productivity index
EOPPb
(4)
0.230
(14.49)

200.02

N________________________860_________860_________1683_________1683_____

NOTE: Absolute value of t-statistics is given in the parentheses.
a. The dependent variable is the difference between the logarithm of the wage paid to the typical worker after two years and the logarithm of the starting
wage of the last worker hired. Ordinary Least Squares estimates are reported.
b. The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the index of the productivity of the fully trained worker relative to the productivity of the last worker
hired. Tobit estimates are reported.
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Please rate (name of last worker hired) on a productivity scale of
zero to 100, where 100 equals (name©s) productivity when (he/
she) is fully trained and zero is absolutely no productivity by
(name). . . . What was (name©s) productivity on this scale during
his/her first two weeks of employment?

Because the reciprocals of the productivity indices are estimates of
productivity growth, we may see if the impact of training on worker
productivity growth is similar to the impact of training on wage
growth.
In column (2) and (4) of table 6.4, we report estimates for the pro
ductivity growth in the SBA and EOPP data, respectively. Because the
productivity index is bounded by zero and 100, we use a tobit to esti
mate the coefficients. A 10 percent increase in training in the first three
months of employment decreases initial productivity by 2.3 percent in
the SBA data and 1.9 percent in the EOPP data. 13 A comparison of the
impact of training on starting wage indices and on the productivity
indices reveals that training lowers the initial productivity of workers
11 times more for the SBA and eight times more for the EOPP data
than do the starting wage indices. This suggests that workers pay for
only a small portion of their training.
Indeed, in our view, it is too small a portion to be consistent with the
prevailing theories of on-the-job training. While the elasticities of
wage growth with respect to training are 0.02 for both data sets, the
elasticities of productivity growth with respect to training are about
0.23 and 0.19 for the SBA and EOPP data. In addition, the use of a pro
ductivity measure to calculate the cost of training understates the true
cost of that training. Such a variable fails to account for the reduction
in productivity of managers and co-workers who spend time away
from their duties to train newly hired workers.
An obvious objection to this comparison questions the validity of
the productivity measures. One could argue that employers are not very
good about rating employees on a productivity scale. It could be that
employers exaggerate the swings in productivity that new employees
experience when using the productivity index. While this may be true,
the underlying index values do not appear unreasonable. In table 6.5,
we compare the distributions of the productivity index and a wage
index for the SBA and EOPP data. The mean value of the productivity
index is 51.39 percent for the SBA data and 51.01 percent for the
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EOPP data. The 25th percentile is 30 percent for both data sets, the
median is 50 percent for both data sets, and the 75th percentile is 75
percent for both data sets. 14 In our view, these values do not seem an
implausible description of the productivity of newly hired workers in
the first two weeks of their employment compared to the productivity
of workers who are fully trained and qualified. In contrast, the fluctua
tion of wages is much smaller. For the sake of comparison, we define
the wage index to be the ratio of the starting wage to the wage paid to a
worker after two years, and multiply by 100 to scale the index. 15 The
mean of this index is 86.88 percent for the SBA data and 87.85 percent
for the EOPP data. The 25 percentiles are 80.91 percent for the SBA
and 78.27 percent for the EOPP data, the medians are 88.50 percent for
the SBA and 88.78 percent for the EOPP data, and the 75 percentiles
are 94.13 percent for the SBA and 98.09 percent for the EOPP data.
Thus, the underlying distribution of the wage index is much more com
pressed than that of the productivity index.
Table 6.5 A Comparison of Productivity and Wage Index, 1992 SBA Data
and 1982 EOPP Data
EOPP data
SBA data
productivity SBA data productivity EOPP data
wage index
index
wage index
index
102
106
30
25th percentile
30
113
50
113
50th percentile
50
128
75
124
75th percentile
75
87.85
51.01
Mean
86.88
51.39
Standard
deviation
1683
1683
N
860
860

Further Evidence on Wage and Productivity Growth
The SBA data allow another test to determine if productivity growth
greatly exceeds wage growth. This test is based completely on the
experiences of the newly hired worker instead of relying on the experi-
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ences of the typical worker. For the SBA data, we asked about the
worker©s productivity after three months of employment as well as the
worker©s productivity relative to a fully trained worker. In table 6.6, we
report the regression estimates for wage and productivity growth. For
independent variables, we include the two measures of training: total
off-site training in the first three months and total hours of other forms
of training.
In columns (1) and (2) of table 6.6, we report the estimates for the
wage and productivity growth equation. Interestingly, training is posi
tively correlated with wage growth with an elasticity of 0.011, but offsite training is negatively associated with wage growth. Training is also
positively associated with productivity growth with an elasticity of
0.190. Off-site training has no significant relationship with productiv
ity growth in the first three months of employment. Thus, again, the
growth in productivity greatly exceeds the growth in wages.
Table 6.6 Wage and Productivity Growth in the First 3 Months of
Employment, 1992 SBA Data

Independent
variables
Logarithm of training
Logarithm of off-site
training
R2
N

Wage
growth
SBAa
(1)
0.011
(3.78)
-0.010
(2.58)
0.019
929

Productivity
growth SBAb
(2)
0.190
(9.00)
-0.005
(0.16)
0.082
929

Wage
growth
SBAa
(3)
0.026
(3.30)
-0.018
(1.59)
0.039
326

Productivity
growth SBAb
(4)
0.241
(6.11)
0.002
(0.38)
0.105
326

NOTE: Absolute value of r-statistics is given in the parentheses. Ordinary Least Squares estimates
are reported.
a. The dependent variable is the difference between the logarithm of the wage of the last worker
hired after three months of employment and the logarithm of the starting wage of the last worker
hired.
b. The dependent variable is the difference of logarithm of the productivity index of the last
worker hired at the end of three months of employment and the logarithm of the productivity
index of the last worker hired in the first two weeks of employment.

An objection to this test is that firms may find it costly to adjust
wages continuously because of what the macroeconomics literature

On-the-Job Training

137

refers to as "menu costs." The essential idea of menu costs is that price
changes, or in this case wage changes, are costly to the firm. For
instance, we might imagine that the decision to give a worker a raise
may require the worker©s manager to meet with him or her. In addition,
the worker©s manager may not have the authority to give the worker a
raise and may need approval from other individuals within the firm. In
addition, in many jobs workers and firms sign formal contracts that
may cover a period longer than three months. For instance, each of the
authors of this monograph has an annual contract that specifies his
wages for a year in advance, and while none of us would object to our
employers renegotiating our contract to give us a raise, we do note,
sadly, that such renegotiations have not been common. 16
To guard against a bias created by any costs to changing the wage, in
columns (3) and (4) we reestimate the equation on the sample of work
ers who have received wage increases in that period. While the wagetraining elasticity increases to 0.026, the productivity-training elastic
ity increases to 0.241 and remains over nine times as great at the wagetraining elasticity. Thus, again, productivity growth is much larger than
wage growth. 17 Moreover, while menu costs may account for some of
the lack of responsiveness of wages to productivity changes, they do
not explain the whole story. Indeed, given that firms have incurred any
menu costs associated with an increase in wages, we would expect this
group to be free of this form of bias. If those workers who receive gen
eral training are more likely to receive a raise in the first three months
of employment, this group may well yield a coefficient on training that
is biased upward.

The Effect of Measurement Error on the Estimated Effect
of Training on Wages and Productivity?
If there is measurement error in training, the effects of training on
wages and productivity are biased toward zero. One way to correct for
the effects of measurement error is through the use of instrumental
variables (Greene 1993). A variable must be found that is correlated
with the variable that is measured with error but not correlated with the
measurement error. If we assume that firm estimates of training fulfill
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this condition for worker-reported training and worker estimates of
training do the same for firm-reported training, then we can apply
instrumental variables to correct for the effects of measurement error. 18
This is similar to the approach of Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), who
use one twin©s estimate of the other twin©s schooling as an instrument
for estimating the return to schooling for the other twin.
The first step in the estimation of the instrumental variables model
involves estimating the variable measured with error as a function of
the instrument or instruments. In this case, we use only a single instru
ment the other party©s reported total hours of training. We use the
training instrument for starting wage equations, wage index, and pro
ductivity regressions similar to those estimated earlier in this chapter.
The wage growth regressions explain the growth in starting wage to the
wage of a typical worker in the same position after two years. The pro
ductivity growth is the inverse of a productivity index of the new hire
measured relative to the fully trained worker on a scale from 0 to 100.
The productivity regressions indicate how much training increases the
productivity of the new worker relative to a fully trained worker. The
first stage equations for training in the first four weeks of employment
are:
log(worker-reported training) = 2.09 + .414 log(firm-reported training)
R2 =.156 n=179
log(firm-reported training) = 2.64 + .376 log(worker-reported training)
R2 =.156 n=179
Table 6.7 shows ordinary least squares and instrumental variable
estimates for starting wage, wage growth, and productivity growth
regressions using the Upjohn Institute, SBA, and EOPP data sets.
Using the Upjohn Institute data, the instrumental variable training esti
mates are greater in absolute value than the ordinary least squares esti
mates in four out of six cases. Correcting for measurement error does
not appear to have a dramatic effect on the estimated training effects in
the Upjohn Institute data. The estimated training effect in the firmreported wage growth regression, however, is significant after correct
ing for measurement error.

Table 6.7 Estimates of the Impact of Training on Starting Wages, and Wage and Productivity Growth
Ordinary least squares
Upjohn Institute data
Parameter
t
n
log (worker-reported starting wage)3
0.143
0.0031
180
log (worker-reported wage growth)b
1.11
0.0113
171
log (worker-reported productivity growth)c
0.1490
4.38
222
log (firm-reported starting wage)a
0.0173
0.634
158
log (firm-reported wage growth)13
0.87
150
0.0100
log (firm-reported productivity growth)0
4.98
0.1557
197
SBA data
log (starting wage)3
-0.046
4.26
796
log(wage growth)5
4.20
0.020
860
log(productivity growth)0
10.01
0.283
860
EOPP data
log (starting wage)d
2.96
-0.019
1,386
log(wage growth)5
8.98
0.027
1,683
log(productivity growth)6
14.47
0.230
1,683

Instrumental variables©
Parameter
t
n
146
0.0476
0.760
0.0074
0.223
138
0.2259
2.48
181
-0.0134
172
0.206
0.1286
3.02
159
0.1854
2.18
207
-0.122
0.053
0.753

4.26
4.20
10.01

796
860
860

-0.051
0.072
0.612

2.96
8.98
14.47

1,386
1,683
1,683

a. The other independent variables used with the Upjohn Institute and SBA starting wage regressions are years of schooling; dummies for black male,
black female, other male, other female, white female, and collective bargaining coverage; log of establishment size, hours of work, hours of work squared;
and log of job complexity. Training is measured by the log of total hours of training plus one in the first four weeks in the Upjohn Institute regressions, and
the log of total hours in the first three months plus one in the SBA regressions. The SBA regressions include off-site training as a separate variable,
b. Wage growth is growth in the log of the starting wage calculated using the wage of the typical worker in the same position after two years
(continued)

c. Productivity growth is the inverse of the log of the productivity in the first two weeks of employment relative to the productivity of a fully trained worker
in the same position on a scale of 0 to 100.
d. The other independent variables used in the EOPP starting wage regressions are years of schooling, a female dummy variable, percent of the firm©s labor
force covered by collective bargaining, log of establishment size, hours worked, hours worked squared, and log of job complexity., Training is measured
by log of total hours of training plus one in the first three months (excluding off-site formal training).
e. Productivity growth in the EOPP data in the inverse of the log of productivity in the first two weeks of employment relative to maximum possible pro
ductivity on a scale of 0 to 100.
f. Firm reported training is the instrument in the worker-reported regressions, and worker-reported training is used as the instrument in the firm-reported
regressions. The Upjohn Institute worker-reported training regression estimates are combined with firm-reported training data from the SBA and EOPP
data.
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The bottom half of table 6.7 uses the estimated regression of
worker-reported training on firm-reported training from the Upjohn
Institute data and the actual firm-reported training from the SBA and
EOPP data to illustrate the effects of measurement error in those data
sets. 19 The estimated training effects increase by almost a factor of
three in absolute value in each case over the estimates reported in
Barron, Berger, and Black (1993a), illustrating the effect of the
measurement error on the estimated effects of training on wages and
productivity.

Why is the Impact of Training on the Starting Wage so Small?
Gary Becker, in his 1992 lecture accepting the Nobel Prize for Eco
nomics (1993), said, "A close relation between theory and empirical
testing helps prevent both the theoretical analysis and the empirical
research from becoming sterile. Empirically oriented theories encour
age the development of new sources and types of data, the way human
capital theory stimulated the use of survey data, especially panels. At
the same time, puzzling empirical results force changes in theory" (p.
403). For both the SBA and EOPP data, we find a small impact of
training on the starting wage, and an impact of training on productivity
growth that is several times bigger than the impact of training on wage
growth.
Are these findings consistent with theory? To be consistent, virtually
all of the training must be specific and firms must bear an overwhelm
ing share of the cost of training, or the returns to training must be
deferred past our two year horizon by long term contracts. Fortunately,
the EOPP survey asked directly about how specific their training was.
The survey asked:
"How many of the skills learned by employees in this job are use
ful outside of this company?
1. Almost all
2. Most
3. Some
4. Or almost none
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We report the responses in table 6.8. Nearly 60 percent of the sample
report that the training is almost all general human capital. Only about
8 percent report that almost none of the skills are of value outside the
company. Thus it appears that employees pay only a fraction of the
training costs and employers feel much of that training is general train
ing. We think that our findings represent one of the puzzling empirical
results of which Decker speaks that need further explanation.
Currently, there are four interesting and somewhat interrelated
explanations for such a finding. Parsons (1989) proposes that work
ers may be unable to fund their training costs because of financing
constraints. We can find some evidence for this hypothesis in the
SBA data. We broke up our sample into four groups: those without a
high school degree (n = 65), those whose highest grade completed
was 12 (n = 313), those who attended college but did not complete
four years (n = 212), and those who completed at least four years of
college (n = 206). If financial constraints are important, we would
expect that the coefficient on the training measure should be monotonically increasing in education because more highly educated work
ers earn more money and, hence, should be better able to finance
their training. The SBA data support this hypothesis. For high school
dropouts, the coefficient on training is 0.038 with a /-statistic of 1.2;
for high school graduates, the coefficient on training is -0.023 with a
/-statistic of -1.6; for those with some college, the coefficient on train
ing is -0.058 with a /-statistic of -2.5; and for college graduates, the
coefficient on training is -0.107 with a /-statistic of -4.2.
Table 6.8 The Degree to Which Skills are General, 1982 EOPP Data
How many skills are general
Fraction
almost all
59.59%
mostly
13.11
some
19.25
almost none
8.05
N = 2707_________________________100.0
____

Unfortunately, other data are not so kind to this hypothesis. For
instance, using the same four groups, we see no clear pattern in the
EOPP data. For high school dropouts, the coefficient on the stock of
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training is -0.03 with a r-statistic of -2.0 (n = 192); for high school
graduates, the coefficient on the stock of training is -0.021 with a r-statistic of -2.9 (n = 960); for those with some college, the coefficient on
the stock of training is -0.013 with a f-statistic of -2.1 (n = 331); for
college graduates, the coefficient on the stock of training is -0.002 with
a ^-statistic of -0.1 (n = 153). Lynch (1992), using data from the NLSY,
divides her sample into three groups: high school dropouts, high school
graduates, and those who attended but did not graduate college. She
finds that the coefficient on current training spells is monotonically
increasing in education, which directly contradicts the hypothesis.
Indeed, of her three groups, only the coefficient for high school dropouts is negative.
A second potential reason for the small impact of training on the
starting wage focuses on the informational problem that workers and
firms face. Firms have specialized in the production of their product,
and presumably, they have learned a great deal about the market in
which they operate. As such, these firms may know that the training
they offer is general training, but convincing workers of that fact may
be very difficult. Clearly, learning to use a word-processing program
on a computer is general training, although many forms of training are
less obvious. For instance, learning to operate a medium precisionmeasuring machine may facilitate learning about other pieces of elec
tronic equipment. In addition, workers may find it difficult to signal
their training to alternative employers. In other words, workers may
believe that they are being provided with general training, but they are
not convinced that they will be able to signal alternative employers of
their skills.
Moreover, the extent of the market and the willingness of workers to
relocate also affect the generality of training. For instance, in Scott
County, Kentucky, the Toyota Motor Company has a large manufactur
ing plant. Suppose that all the training that Toyota offers to their work
ers is general training in the sense that it makes the workforce more
productive at other automobile plants. Unfortunately for Toyota©s
workers, the present worldwide excess capacity in automobile produc
tion currently lessens the value of such training in the automobile mar
ketplace. Should there be an increase in demand for experienced
automobile workers, however, the training would be of use only to
those workers who were willing to leave Scott County because there is
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only one automobile plant in Scott County. Thus, by forcing workers to
bear the cost of training, Toyota may dissuade from applying those
workers who wish to stay in Scott County for the rest of their lives. On
the other hand, these may be the very workers Toyota wishes to attract.
A third possible explanation for the weak relationship between
training and the starting wages focuses on the nature of labor contracts.
This small literature includes Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1993),
Black and Loewenstein (1990), and Kuhn (1993). 20 Each of these
papers focuses on a prevalent feature of labor contracts: they seldom
specify wages for long periods into the future. Apparently, workers and
firms find it efficient not to specify the wage too far into the future
because of the underlying uncertainty inherent in the economy. Rather,
firms and workers rely on implicit agreements, or what Okun referred
to as the "invisible handshake." Such contracts allow firms and workers
to respond to the changing economic climate. The flexibility associated
with such contracts, however, is not without costs. Because the agree
ment is implicit, it is not enforceable by third parties, and contracting
parties may renege on these implicit agreements. 21
One solution to this "hold-up" problem is for contracts to be selfenforcing; that is, neither party would have any incentive to break the
underlying contract once it is signed. For instance, in Barron, Black,
and Loewenstein (1993) and Black and Loewenstein (1990), firms are
given the right to make "take-it-or-leave-it" offers. In return for giving
the firm this monopsony power, workers receive a large starting wage.
In Kuhn©s paper, workers and firms play a Nash-Rubinstein bargaining
game to divide the surplus. In Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1993)
and Kuhn (1993), workers who receive more specific training may
receive a higher starting wage. In these models, the reason for this pre
mium is that these workers have lower turnover probabilities and,
hence, are more valuable to the firm. Rather than offering the workers
higher initial wages, firms would ideally prefer to "backload" by offer
ing to pay the workers high wages later in their career, but workers
would not find such a promise credible.
Our fourth proposed explanation focuses on a broad class of models
that economists call "efficiency wage" models. While this class of
models is quite broad, the thread that relates these models is the notion
that employers, for one reason or another, find it optimal to pay wages
in excess of the market clearing wage (see Weiss 1990 for an excellent
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introduction to the various forms of efficiency wage models). To sim
plify, we divide these models into five broad classes: effort-inducing,
adverse selection, turnover-reducing, nutritional-based, and gift
exchange.
In the effort-inducing efficiency wage models, with the classic refer
ence being Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), firms pay higher than market
clearing wages to induce employees to work hard. If workers should
choose to shirk work and risk being fired, they also risk losing the
quasi-rents associated with the employment at high-wage firms. In the
adverse selection version of efficiency wage models (e.g., Weiss 1980),
firms offer higher wages to attract the most talented workers. If work
ers know their abilities while firms imperfectly observe the abilities of
workers and lower the wages paid, high-ability workers will no longer
apply, but relatively low-ability workers will. Hence, reducing wages
may lower worker quality. The turnover-reducing efficiency wage
models (e.g., Stiglitz 1975) emphasize that firms with differing turn
over costs may offer similar workers differing wages because highturnover-cost firms will want to reduce turnover by offering relatively
high wages. The nutritional-based efficiency model deals with the
nutritional needs of workers and is better suited for the developing
world than the ILS. economy. The last form of efficiency wages the
gift exchange takes a more sociological or psychological approach.
Akerlof (1982) provides the classic paper in which he argues that
employees will work harder when firms provide them a "gift" of higher
wages.
Efficiency wage models remain controversial; the exchange between
Carmichael (1990) and Lang and Kahn (1990) offers an interesting dis
cussion of the controversies. The appeal of efficiency wage models is
that they provide a cogent explanation of why labor markets may not
clear in the sense that the quantity of labor demanded at a given wage
is not equal to the quantity of labor supplied. In our context, if labor
markets do not clear, there may be no requirement that training lower
the starting wage. Unfortunately, as Carmichael (1990) emphasizes,
efficiency wage models have not generated a rich set of predictions that
economists have subjected to rigorous empirical tests. Indeed, many of
the current forms of the efficiency wage models appear inconsistent
with the observed patterns of wage profiles. For instance, the shirking
explanation of efficiency wages fails to explain the covariance of wage
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premiums across firms. While workers in positions that are difficult to
monitor should receive wage premiums, workers in jobs that are easily
monitored should not receive the premiums. The existing empirical
work (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988), however, suggests that wage
premiums are highly correlated across occupations within industries,
which suggests that monitoring costs are not driving these wage premi
ums.
NOTES
1. Ransom (1993) is the exception. In his study of academic salaries, he finds that there is a
negative relationship between a professor©s time at a university and the professor©s salary.
2. See Garen (1988) for a detailed review of the matching literature. The term "statistical arti
fact" is from Mortensen©s (1984) working paper.
3. Altonji and Spletzer (1991); Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989, 1993); Booth (1993);
Brown (1989); Duncan and Hoffman (1978); Lillard and Tan (1992); Loewenstein and Spletzer
(1993); Lynch (1992); Mincer (1988); Parsons (1989); and Pergamit and Shack-Marquez (1987)
all find that training is associated with wage growth. To our knowledge, only Veum (1993) has
failed to find a positive correlation between training and wage growth.
4. In particular, Lynch finds that for high school dropouts, uncompleted spells of training are
negatively correlated with wages, with a significant level of 11.6 percent two-tailed. For those
with a high school degree, there is a positive correlation between uncompleted spells of training
and wages, with a significance level of about 5.5 percent. For those with some college but no col
lege degree, there is also a positive correlation between uncompleted spells of training and wages,
which is significant at a 3.2-percent level.
5. Unfortunately, the EOPP data do not contain the same questions, so we cannot replicate
these findings for that set.
6. We initially used separate gender-race controls for black, white, and other racial groups, but
we could not reject the hypothesis that we could use the more parsimonious specification. See
Barron, Berger, and Black (1993a) for results that use the more general specification. We also ini
tially used the logarithm of the number of employees at other sites, a variable we used in our spec
ification of the training equations, and we could not reject the hypothesis that its coefficient was
zero.
7. Our analysis of the matched employer-employee Upjohn Institute data suggested that there
may be substantial measurement error in the amount of education or workers. The SBA uses
employer reports of worker education. If there is more measurement error in employer reports
than in worker reports, the true gap between the SBA and the Census and CPS estimates is even
wider.
8. We use ability here in a very general sense. For instance, workers with a lower turnover pro
pensity would be considered "more able."
9. We tested to see if we could combine the four measures of training; the /-"-statistic was 1.11
with a p-value of 0.35. In contrast, if we try to aggregate all five measures of training, the /©©-statis
tics is 7.01 with ap-value of 0.001.
10. We used specifications that included one-digit industry and occupation controls, a dummy
variable indicating multiple sites, the logarithm of the number of sites, and the logarithm of the
number of employees at other sites. In addition, we estimated the various permutations that arise
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from these three controls. Finally, we estimated the equation using the three other site controls
and the one-digit industry and occupation controls. In all specifications, the coefficient was posi
tive.
11. For the same of comparison with the EOPP data, we also estimated an equation using the
SBA data without the measure of off-site training. The coefficient for on-site training was -0.044
with a f-statistic of -4.06.
12. A potential weakness of this measure of on-site training intensity is that it assumes all
types of training are acquired simultaneously. For instance, it is possible that the workers may
have types of training that begin at different times. Perhaps for the first two weeks, workers are
sent to a formal training program, but for. weeks three and four, they receive informal training
from their managers and co-workers. To guard against this potential bias, we define an alternative
measure of training intensity as the maximum hours of any single component of training, which
precludes any double counting but may understate the intensity of training. Using this alternative
measure of training, the coefficient on the logarithm of training is -0.063 with a f-statistic of-4.03,
while the other coefficients remain virtually unchanged. Thus, a 10 percent increase in training
decreases starting wages by 0.63 percent. As another test of the robustness of the result, we define
a third measure of training intensity to be the sum of the hours of all four types of training if that
sum is less than or equal to the number of hours of work and equal to the number of hours of work
otherwise, which may overstate the intensity of training. When we use this measure of training,
the coefficient on training is -0.079 with a r-statistic of -4.49, while again the remaining coeffi
cients hardly change.Using this estimate, a 10 percent increase in training lowers the starting
wage by about 0.79 percent. Using these last two measures of on-site training intensity left the
coefficient for off-site training virtually unchanged positive and significant at the 5-percent con
fidence level.
13. One cannot interpret the coefficients from a tobit equation as derivatives. Evaluated at the
means of the two samples, the derivatives are 0.8074 x P for the SBA data and 0.8238 x (3 for the
EOPP data.
14. Both productivity distributions are centered at the 50th percentile and are the 75th percentile of both distributions are is at an index value of 75. These scores occurred without norming the
productivity indices. That the medians occur exactly at 50 is probably due to the fact that employ
ers are likely to pick round numbers when reporting the indices.
15. Because the literature has traditionally used the log difference in wages as an approxima
tion for wage growth, we used the log difference in the starting wage and the wage after two years
as an approximation of the wage index in our regression analysis. None of the results change
much, however, if we use this real wage index.
16. Of course, many firms may have a probationary period and wage built into their wage pay
ment structure over a fixed period of time, say three months, so wages may remain constant for
other reasons than menu costs. Thus for either menu cost of account period reasons, firms may not
adjust wages at the same time and rate they observe productivity growth.
17. We also estimated the wage growth equation using a tobit procedure, which resulted in a
smaller coefficient on training than did restricting the sample to those with wage changes. We also
ran a probit equation with the dependent variable equal to one if there was a wage change and zero
otherwise. For independent variables we used the worker©s experience, logarithm of training,
logarithm of off-site training, and years of education. In addition, we used the number of hours
worker per week, the logarithm of the number of employees at the establishment, and a dummy
variable indicating if the job was covered by a union contract. The worker©s education is negatively
related to receiving a wage change in the first three months, the worker©s experience is negatively
related to receiving a wage change, and each of these coefficients is significant at the 5-percent
level. In addition, the coefficient on establishment size is negative with a f-statistic of -1.66. The
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coefficient on the logarithm of training in the first three months is positive (0.088) and statistically
significant (^-statistic of 2.38). In contrast, the coefficient on the logarithm of off-site training is
negative (-0.080) but has a /-statistic of only -1.70.
18. We are not assuming that the firm©s or worker©s reported training are measured without
error. Rather, we are assuming that one party©s report can be used as a valid instrument for the
other party©s report.
19. The SBA and EOPP data sets only asked firms about the training of the last worker hired
and did not interview workers. Therefore, it is not possible to construct instruments directly from
the SBA and EOPP data. Rather, one must rely on the estimates obtained from the Upjohn data.
The estimated fs and standard errors remain the same because we are simply substituting a linear
combination of the old variable back into the regression. Thus, these estimates are intended only
to illustrate the effects of measurement error on estimated training effects. In addition, the training
measures used in the SBA and EOPP data sets do not include off-site formal training. Therefore,
another set of Upjohn instrumental regressions are estimated for use with the SBA and EOPP data
that do not include off-site formal training.
20. Parsons (1990) also mentions problems associated with the lack of formal contracts, but he
does not offer a formal model.
21. Indeed, it is often difficult to determine what that agreement actually is. For instance, IBM
had a company "practice," as opposed to a "policy," of not laying off its employees. Recently, of
course, IBM has fallen on hard times and has laid off some employees. Did IBM violate its
implicit agreement with its employees? We conjecture that recently laid-off workers would be
much more likely to say yes than the current stockholders. (That still doesn©t mean IBM violated
a contract, since it was only "implicit" and not enforceable by law.)

Appendix to Chapter 6
In this appendix, we compare wage equation estimates from the SBA data
with those from two commonly used micro data sets: the 1990 Census and the
March 1992 Current Population Survey (CPS). For both the Census and the
CPS, we limit our sample to wage and salary workers who are between 16 and
64 years of age and not full-time students. In columns (1) and (2) of table A.6.1,
we report wage equation estimates where the dependent variable is the hourly
wage calculated from yearly earnings for the previous year (1991 for the CPS
and 1989 for the Census), the number of weeks worked, and number of hours
worked per week. Both data sets contain a large number of observations, nearly
65,000 for the CPS and over 950,000 for the Census. For the independent vari
ables, we include potential experience (age minus years of education minus
six) and its square, years of education, a dummy variable indicating that the
worker is black, a dummy variable indicating that the worker is a nonblack fe
male, and hours worked per week and its square. The coefficients in columns
(1) and (2) are similar except for the hours profiles, which are relatively impre
cisely estimated. For comparison, we include a wage equation using similar
specification with the SBA data. Several differences are apparent. First, the co
efficient on education is much larger in the SBA data than in the Census or the
CPS. Given that the SBA is a sample of newly hired workers, however, it is
perhaps not surprising that employers reward newly hired workers more for
their education than workers with some experience at the firm. Education is a
readily available signal to employers that is observable at the time of hire. After
employers have the opportunity to observe workers, wages may depend less on
the workers© education and more on their on-the-job performance. In fact, the
true magnitude of the difference may be larger than it appears if there are more
problems with measurement error in employer-reported education than with
worker-reported education.
There is also a dramatic difference in the coefficient on the dummy variable
indicating that the worker is a nonblack female. For the SBA data, nonblack fe
males earn about 19 percent less than nonblack males, while the corresponding
figure for the CPS is 32 percent and is nearly 38 percent for the Census. We
think this difference arises for two reasons. First, to the extent that women have
higher turnover rates than men, we would expect women to have shorter tenure
than men and hence the gender wage gap should be larger in a cross section of
all workers than in a sample of newly hired workers. 1 Second, women are more
likely to be temporary or seasonal employees than men, and temporary and
part-year employees earn substantially less than permanent employees. Thus,
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by using a sample of all workers rather than permanent workers, the CPS and
Census will yield lower wages for women than the SB A data, which is a sample
of permanent workers.
In column (4), we report a wage equation for the outgoing rotation of the
March 1992 CPS. The outgoing rotation, which comprises about a quarter of
the March 1992 CPS, was asked questions about their February earnings and
union status. Thus, only workers who were employed in February are included
in this sample. As a result, the sample size is only about 22 percent of the sam
ple in column (1). By focusing on only those employed in February, we elimi
nate not only the 75 percent of the sample not in the outgoing rotation but also
an additional 3 percent of the sample who are not currently employed. In addi
tion to using a current wage variable, this specification also includes as controls
current measures of union status and firm size. Restricting our sample to these
workers has a dramatic effect on the coefficient on the nonblack female vari
able. The coefficient now indicates that nonblack women are paid about 22 per
cent less than nonblack men. If we remove the firm size and union variables,
the difference rises to 23 percent. Thus, the change in the sample is responsible
for most of the change in the coefficient. Also, the coefficient on education
falls, which is again consistent with the notion that education matters less for
more experienced workers.
In column (5), we report the same specification of the wage equation for the
SB A data. While the inclusion of the firm size and union status variables low
ers the coefficient on education somewhat, it is about 50 percent higher in the
SB A data than the CPS data. Similarly, for the SB A the coefficient on nonblack
females is about 80 percent the magnitude of the coefficient for the CPS data.
The other coefficients are reasonably similar, although the hours profile is very
imprecise in the SB A data. Taken as a whole, we think this represents a reason
ably similar set of estimates, especially given the differences in the samples.

NOTE
1. See Ureta (1992) for a description of the gender difference in tenure in the CPS.

Table A.6.1 Wage Equation Estimates (Ordinary Least Squares) Using the 1992 March Current Population Survey
and the 1990 Census
Independent variables
Constant
Potential experience 710
Potential experience squared / 1000
Years of education
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female

CPS
(1)
0.667
(49.70)
0.399
(57.57)
-0.605
(38.82)
0.098
(113.37)
-0.292
(34.97)
-0.319
(65.10)

Census
(2)
0.607
(112.55)
0.362
(194.47)
-0.499
(122.01)
0.093
(406.98)
-0.301
(134.25)
-0.375
(270.31)

SBA
(3)
-0.104
(0.86)
0.311
(7.61)
-0.563
(4.58)
0.133
(20.80)
-0.257
(5.16)
-0.186
(6.36)

0.125
(70.67)

0.103
(2.29)

Worker is union member
Logarithm of firm size
Hours worked / 10

0.010
(1.93)

CPS
(4)
0.217
(6.33)
0.282
(24.50)
-0.419
(16.05)
0.085
(59.04)
-0.279
(19.60)
-0.224
(27.22)
0.137
(13.64)
0.039
(19.88)
0.238
(19.07)

SBA
(5)
-0.069
(0.58)
0.316
(7.86)
-0.571
(4.71)
0.128
(19.84)
-0.278
(6.16)
-0.178
(6.16)
0.070
(1.45)
0.035
(4.34)
0.057
(1.26)
(continued)

Table A.6.1 (continued)
Independent variables
Hours squared / 1000
R2
N

CPS
(1)
0.004
(0.31)
0.261
64,942

Census
(2)
-0.189
(99.97)
0.254
950,360

SBA
(3)
-0.099
(1.61)
0.444
796

CPS
(4)
-0.246
(16.41)
0.360
14,244

SBA
(5)
-0.046
(0.75)
0.461
796

NOTE: Absolute values of f-statistics are given in the parentheses. The dependent variables are the logarithms of wages. Ordinary Least Squares estimates
are reported.

CHAPTER

7

Training and Firm Recruiting
Strategies
The job-matching literature stresses that workers are not equally
well suited for all positions. Rather, as noted by Topel (1986), a "heter
ogeneity of talents and technologies generates job specific differences
in productivity" (p. 200). Given complementarity between worker abil
ity and training in production, we assumed in previous chapters that
higher-ability workers are matched to positions requiring greater onthe-job training. As we have seen, because higher-ability workers com
mand higher wages, the training variable in the starting wage regres
sion is thus biased upward to the extent that we cannot control
perfectly for ability differences among workers.
We have yet to explore the way in which high-ability workers are
matched to positions with substantial training. A likely mechanism for
achieving such matching is the recruiting and screening activity of
employers. Employers do engage in considerable search for new work
ers. For instance, using data from the second wave of the EOPP Sur
vey, Barron and Bishop (1985) report that employers, on average,
screen more than nine applicants before extending an offer. Moreover,
Barron and Bishop (1985) document that, on average, employers spend
a considerable amount of time evaluating applicants, but there is much
variation in the time spent. They report that the mean time spent evalu
ating applicants is about 10 hours, with a standard deviation of nearly
17.2 hours.
The issue we address in this chapter is whether the recruiting activ
ity of employers, or what we refer to as employer search, is the mecha
nism through which high-ability workers are matched to positions with
substantial training. To examine this issue, the first section develops a
model of employer search behavior in which employers obtain a noisy
signal about the quality of an applicant. Considering this signal, an
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employer determines whether to extend an applicant an offer or reject
the applicant and continue searching. In the model, employers deter
mine both their hiring standards and the accuracy of the signal that
they obtain. For a fixed accuracy of a signal, the higher that employers
set their hiring standards, or the greater their "reservation signal," the
greater the expected ability of the worker. Higher reservation signals,
however, increase the expected length of search, or require a more
extensive search. For a fixed reservation signal, the greater the
resources that employers devote to evaluating each applicant the
greater the accuracy of the information they obtain from their search.
Thus, firms face a choice of both extensive and intensive search.
The model of employer search allows us to examine how training
and other characteristics of the position or applicants will affect
employer search. Given that ability and on-the-job training are comple
ments in production, we show that employers will adopt higher ability
standards for positions requiring more training, which means that on
the average they will screen more job applicants. Employers intent on
matching high-ability workers to positions with more training can also
raise the expected ability of a new hire by screening each applicant
more intensively. By screening more intensively, an employer can raise
the precision of the signals he or she obtains concerning applicants©
abilities, and thus reduce the likelihood of hiring an unsuitable appli
cant. Employers filling positions involving more training can therefore
be expected to try to increase the ability of the new hire not only by
examining more job applicants but also by engaging in more intensive,
and more costly, screening of each applicant.
Predictions of the effect of training on employer search are tested
using data from four national data sets: the 1980 first-wave EOPP sur
vey, the 1982 second-wave EOPP survey, the 1992 SB A survey, and
the 1993 Upjohn Institute survey. We find strong evidence that employ
ers search more, both extensively and intensively, for positions that
require substantial training. There is strong circumstantial evidence
that higher-ability workers are indeed matched to positions with more
training. We then consider the effect of training, as well as other vari
ables, on the duration of a vacancy.
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Employer Optimal Search Strategy
Search by an employer to fill a vacancy can be viewed in the follow
ing fashion. In each period there is the probability 8 that an applicant
contacts the employer. 1 Then 1/8 denotes the expected number of peri
ods between applicants.2 The per period cost of the vacancy will be the
sum of direct on-going recruiting cost as well as indirect costs reflect
ing the loss of a vacancy remaining unfilled. Recall from chapter 2 that
when an applicant contacts the employer, pb(E, a, 0) denotes the pro
ductivity of the applicant in the absence of any training, where E
denotes general human capital, a is a measure of the individuals ability
level, and 0 denotes the zero vector of total acquired training, both gen
eral and specific. Employers offering training during the first or begin
ning period of employment incur costs c(T) reflecting the loss in
productivity of the worker during training, the loss in productivity of
co-workers who provide the training, and other training expenses.
Thus, the net productivity of a "beginning" worker during the training
period is given by:
(7.1) fb =pb(E,a,0)-c(T).
Recall from chapter 2 that if a trained worker remains with the firm,
his or her productivity during the second period of employment is
enhanced by the training received. That is, the productivity of a worker
with ability a and education level E "after" receiving training T is
given by:
(7.2) fa = Pa(E,a,T)
where 3paldT > 0 and dpjda > 0. We assume that increased ability a
not only increases worker productivity, but also affects the return to
training. In particular, it is assumed that oPpJdTda > 0. In words, the
return to increased training is greater for more able workers (workers
with a higher a).3
To introduce a rationale for employer search, we follow Jovanovic
(1979b) and assume that the ability of an applicant, denoted by a, can
be viewed as a random variable. We assume that the employer does not
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know oc at the time of hire. The employer, however, incurs screening
and interview costs to obtain a signal concerning the ability a of the
applicant. While the signal acquired for each applicant is directly cor
related with the applicant©s true ability, the signal is not perfect. Thus,
some mistakes will be made in hiring. Such errors in hiring will be dis
covered after a period of employment. Unfortunately, this type of
learning is expensive because the employer will have already made the
investment in firm-specific training.
In the above setting, the employer optimal search strategy can be
viewed as making two decisions. One is to determine the minimal or
"reservation signal" for acceptable applicants. An employer searches
until finding an applicant with an ability signal equal to or greater than
this reservation signal. Such an applicant will be offered employment.
To keep our focus on employer search, we assume that any applicant
who is offered employment accepts. An employer can reduce hiring
mistakes by raising the reservation signal, but the cost of doing so is an
increase in the expected number of applicants seen before an accept
able one is found. The extent of an employer©s extensive search is
reflected by this expected number of applicants seen prior to an
employment offer.
The second decision of an employer©s optimal search strategy is to
determine the precision of the productivity signal obtained for each
applicant. By spending more time screening and interviewing each
applicant, the employer can obtain a better measure of the true ability
of the applicant, and thus make fewer hiring mistakes. An increase in
such intensive search, however, will raise the employer©s direct search
costs per applicant. Casual empiricism suggests that some employers
spend a great deal of resources in trying to evaluate potential appli
cants. For instance, each year corporate recruiters come to campuses
across the country to interview potential employees. Generally, the
recruiters ask some of the students to make a visit to the company©s
plant, where more interviews are conducted. The expense of such
recruiting can be quite high. Yet, employers are attempting to avoid the
costs associated with hiring an ill-matched worker.
Of course, not all jobs have such a heavy investment in information
before the match has begun. Fast-food restaurants do not require their
employees to undergo such a rigorous selection process. Why the dif
ference? Apparently, fast-food employers are more willing to wait for
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the information to be revealed after the employment relationship has
begun. The next section considers more formally four specific factors
that can help explain differences in the extent of extensive and inten
sive search.
Measures of Intensive and Extensive Search

To test our theory of employer search, and in particular the effect of
training on employer search, we begin by obtaining explicit measures
of an employer©s intensive and extensive search choices from actual
events surrounding the hiring of a new worker. Two related measures
of the amount of intensive search can be constructed from the time the
employer spent screening and recruiting applicants, one being the time
spent per applicant and the second being the time spent per applicant
interviewed. Two related measures of the amount of extensive search
are also constructed. One is the number of applicants screened per
employment offer, and the other is the number of applicants inter
viewed per offer. Below we suggest four propositions concerning fac
tors that are likely to influence these measures of intensive and
extensive search.
Four Propositions Concerning Employer Search

The following four factors can affect an employer©s choice of inten
sive and extensive search: the level of training (I), the dispersion in the
ability distribution across applicants, the rate at which applicants arrive
at the employer (<5), and the implicit cost of vacancy. Our data allow us
to identify variables to proxy each of these four factors.
One key factor that influences employer search choices is the extent
of training. Positions with higher training will impose larger losses on
employers during the first period of employment but provide offsetting
greater gains to the employment of trained workers in subsequent peri
ods. The model predicts that for positions that require higher training,
employers will typically increase expenditures on screening and inter
viewing each applicant (greater intensive search) as well as increase
the reservation signal level, leading to an increase in the expected num
ber of applicants (greater extensive search). The reason is straightfor
ward. Positions that require greater training offer a greater gain to
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making fewer hiring mistakes, and both intensive and extensive search
may reduce the number of mistakes. Thus, we have:
Proposition 1: Employers filling positions that require greater training
will engage in greater extensive or intensive search.
Note that the reason why an increase in training may not increase both
extensive and intensive search is the potential for substitution between
the two types of search. For instance, an increase in training can lead to
an increase in intensive search, which in turn may lower the gain to
extensive search sufficiently such that the optimal level of extensive
search falls. This substitution possibility is the reason for ambiguity
not only here but in the next three propositions.
Naturally, factors other than training can influence employer search.
A second factor that affects employer search is the inherent dispersion
in the ability of workers. Leaving the mean unchanged, an increase in
the dispersion of the ability distribution induces a gain to a more strin
gent reservation signal. To see why, note that increased dispersion can
be interpreted as an increase in the likelihood of visits by applicants
with very high ability signals. Focusing first on extensive search, it fol
lows that the employer faces a greater gain to continued search for such
high-productivity applicants. To promote continued search, the
employer raises his or her reservation ability signal. Thus, as predicted
by standard search theory, the result is an increase in extensive search.
As employer search occurs at both the extensive and intensive margins;
however, employers have two ways of detecting the high-ability work
ers. One way, just discussed, is for employers to increase the reserva
tion signal level, which results in an increase in the expected number of
applicants seen prior to hiring. But to better discover the high-ability
applicants, the employer can also search more intensively, increasing
the information content of the signal. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2: Employers filling positions for which the dispersion in
ability is larger will engage in greater extensive or intensive search.
A third factor that affects employer search is the rate at which appli
cants arrive at the employer (8). As an increase in the rate of flow of
applicants reduces the costs of additional search, employers filling
positions that have a greater applicant flow will raise the reservation
productivity level, increasing the expected number of applicants. At the
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same time, such employers may reduce expenditures on screening and
interviewing applicants, as increased extensive search substitutes for
such expenditures. We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Employers filling positions where the applicant flow is
greater will engage in either more extensive search or less intensive
search.
A fourth factor that affects employer search is the implicit cost of hav
ing a vacant position. Let us assume that sometimes an employer
receives advanced notice of a vacancy. We interpret the existence of
advance notice as a reduction in the cost of search to the employer
because the employer can undertake the search while the current
employee is still working. Such a reduction in per-period search costs
increases the optimal reservation signal because the employer does not
forgo the production associated with a vacant position. On the other
hand, there is no clear prediction concerning the effect of such a
change on intensive search. Formally, we have:
Proposition 4: When employers receive advance notice of an opening,
they search more extensively, but the effect on intensive search is
ambiguous.
Empirical Specification of Employer Search Equations

The above four propositions suggest five factors that affect extensive
and intensive search. One is a measure of the total amount of initial
training. From Proposition 1, we expect this measure of training to be
directly correlated with both extensive search and intensive search, as
employers increase efforts devoted to search in response to the greater
loss from hiring mistakes in positions that involved greater amounts of
initial training.
Proposition 2 indicates that increased productivity variation will
lead to increased employer search, intensive and/or extensive. The pro
ductivity of a randomly chosen applicant is a function of two factors:
the applicant©s general level of human capital and his or her innate abil
ity to perform the tasks required by the position of a particular
employer. For workers with the same level of general human capital,
the dispersion in the productivity distribution then depends on the
underlying dispersion in innate abilities as well as the interaction of
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ability and general human capital in determining productivity. If gen
eral human capital and ability are complementary inputs in determin
ing productivity, which is what we assume, then a given distribution of
abilities will generate a more dispersed distribution of productivity
among individuals with a higher level of general human capital. One
measure of general human capital is formal education. This leads us to
expect greater productivity variation among workers with higher levels
of formal education. Thus from Proposition 2 we expect that employer
search will be greater for positions that are filled by more highly edu
cated individuals. A second measure of general human capital is labor
force experience. Our data contain measures of whether the worker
who was hired had any relevant experience for the position. We use this
as a proxy for the level of general human capital gained through expe
rience, and expect that the dispersion of productivity among workers
with no prior experience will be less because they have less general
human capital. From Proposition 2, we thus expect employer search
will be less for positions hiring workers with no experience.
Another factor affecting employer search is establishment size. We
take the establishment size of the employer as one measure of the rate
of flow of applicants 8. In particular, we expect larger employers to
experience economies of scale in generating applicants for vacant posi
tions.4 Thus from Proposition 3 we expect that larger employers will
engage in either more extensive or less intensive search.
Finally, from Proposition 4 we expect that when an employer has
advanced notice of a vacancy, the employer will see more applicants
prior to an employment offer (greater extensive search).
To summarize, the model provides the following two equations to be
estimated with regard to the determinants of employers© intensive
search and extensive search to fill a position:
(7.3) IS = a0 + a, TRAIN + «2 EDUC + a3 ZEROEXP + a4 SIZE
+ as ADVNOTICE + a6 X + e
(7.4) ES = b0 + b{ TRAIN + b2 EDUC + b, ZEROEXP + b4 SIZE
+ b5 ADVNOTICE + b6 X +e
where IS is the log of the intensive search measure (time spent per
applicant or time spent per interview), ES is the extensive search mea-

On-the-Job Training

161

sure (number who applied or the number interviewed), TRAIN is the
log of the measure of total training, EDUC is the log of the number of
years of education required, ZEROEXP indicates that the worker had
no prior experience in a similar position, SIZE is the log of establish
ment size, ADVNOTICE indicates that the employer had advance
notice of the vacancy, and X is a vector of two control variables that
indicate whether the position was associated with a union and the loga
rithm of the number of hours the position required per week. As dis
cussed above, Propositions 1 through 4 imply the following signs for
the coefficients: a\ > 0 and b { > 0; a2 > 0 and b2 > 0, with strict inequal
ity for at least one of the two coefficients; a3 < 0 and b3 < 0 with strict
inequality for at least one of the two coefficients; a4 > 0 and b4 < 0 with
strict inequality for at least one of the two coefficients; and as > 0 and
no predicted sign for b5 .

The Evidence on Employer Search Behavior
To test the predictions of the model as summarized by equations
(7.3) and (7.4), we employ four data sets: the 1980 EOPP employer
survey, the 1982 EOPP follow-up employer survey, a 1992 survey of
employers financed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), and
a 1993 employer survey financed by the W. E. Upjohn Institute. Except
for search variables, the contents of the first surveys have been
described in detail in earlier chapters. The Upjohn Institute Survey is
described in detail in chapter 7. The four surveys asked employers a
number of common questions about their search activities during the
period prior to their most recent hire. In particular, all four surveys
contained questions regarding the number of applicants interviewed for
the position filled, the number of individuals who turned the employer
down, if any, and the total number of hours spent by company person
nel recruiting, screening, and interviewing all applicants. We obtain a
measure of intensive search by dividing the total number of hours spent
recruiting, screening, and interviewing applicants by the total number
of applicants interviewed.5 We obtain a measure of extensive search by
dividing the total number of applicants interviewed by the total number
of offers made.6 Dividing the total number of offers made by the total
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number hired provides us with a measure of the number of offers made
prior to an offer being accepted. In our discussions in the previous sec
tion, we assumed this variable equaled one. Multiplying intensive
search, extensive search, and the number of offers made per hire pro
vides an overall measure of the total number of hours spent recruiting,
screening, and interviewing applicants per hire.
Columns 1, 3, and 5 in table 7.1 report the means of these various
"interview-based" measures of employer search for the four data sets.
To illustrate the differences in sampling strategies across surveys, table
7.1 breaks down the magnitude of these search measures by employer
size. As the table indicates, there is a substantially larger proportion of
smaller employers in the two EOPP surveys relative to the SBA and
Upjohn Institute surveys. After controlling for size, however, the mag
nitudes of the various measures of employer search are quite similar
across the four surveys, with one key exception. The total hours spent
recruiting, screening, and interviewing applicants is much lower for the
1980 EOPP survey than for the other three surveys. The reason for this
may be the way in which this question was framed. Unlike the other
three surveys, the 1980 EOPP survey asked employers only about the
number of job applicants interviewed for the position, not the total
number of applicants. Thus, the answers may reflect hours involved in
the interviewing process alone, not the total hours devoted to all phases
of hiring for the position.
Except for the 1980 EOPP survey, the surveys also obtained infor
mation on the total number of applicants for these positions. This per
mits alternative measures of both intensive search and extensive
search. The alternative extensive search measure is the total number of
applicants seen prior to an offer, rather than the number of applicants
interviewed prior to an offer. The alternative intensive search measure
is the number of hours spent recruiting, screening, and interviewing
applicants per applicant, rather than the number of hours spent search
ing per applicant interviewed. Columns 2 and 4 of table 7.1 report
means of these two variables where available.
The surveys asked employers to provide information concerning onthe-job training, although the surveys differ in the measures of training
provided. The 1980 EOPP survey asked two training questions:
In the first month of employment, approximately how many hours
did employees other than personnel and supervisory staff spend

Table 7.1 Employer Search, Vacancy Duration, and Training Variables by Size, 1980 EOPP; 1982 EOPP; 1992 SBA;
1993 Upjohn Institute Surveys

Employer
Size
EOPP, 1980
1-99
100-299
300+
EOPP, 1982
1-99
100-299
300+
SBA, 1992
1-99
100-299
300+
UPJOHN, 1993
1-99
100-299
300+

Total
Number of Number of
Number number of Number of Duration of Total
hours spent hours spent Number
Number
per
of interviews of applicants hours spent offers made vacancy in training
per
(hours) of observations
days
per hire
per offer
per offer
per offer
interview applicant
(9)
(8)
(7)
(6)
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
2994
33.71
13.39
1.02
5.69
NA
5.69
NA
.83
2552
32.91
13.46
1.02
5.38
NA
5.38
NA
.80
300
37.87
12.02
1.00
7.02
NA
7.02
NA
.96
142
39.33
15.13
1.02
10.75
NA
8.79
NA
.97
1270
136.15
17.21
1.08
10.41
9.87
5.91
2.17
2.12
1083
131.99
16.66
1.07
9.36
8.85
5.79
2.14
1.97
118
123.30
22.52
1.08
16.53
11.24
6.94
2.18
2.78
69
223.33
16.67
1.16
16.50
23.42
5.94
2.67
3.33
859
168.43
NA
1.14
14.03
14.08
5.58
2.11
2.73
428
152.72
NA
1.13
10.14
9.72
5.32
1.88
2.04
102
161.35
NA
1.16
16.26
13.48
5.96
2.06
2.68
329
191.07
NA
1.14
18.40
19.93
5.81
2.43
3.63
210
83.42
30.35
1.16
18.79
22.94
6.02
1.61
3.21
30
81.1
19.23
1.46
11.75
15.68
8.39
1.08
1.52
58
78.40
29.67
1.21
18.82
18.82
5.66
1.76
3.18
122
86.38
33.41
1.06
20.51
27.17
5.64
1.68
3.65

NOTE: For comparability across the four surveys, the sample from each survey is restricted to only those who had been hired within the last two years of
the survey. The 1982 EOPP, 1992 SBA, and 1993 Upjohn Institute surveys are for the last permanent new employee hired. Information on whether the new
hire was temporary, seasonal, or permanent was not available for the 1980 EOPP survey.
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away from their normal work routines orienting and training the
new hire?
In the first month of employment, approximately how many
hours did personnel and advisory staff spend orienting and train
ing the new hire?

The sum of these two measures provides a direct measure of the
total amount of on-the-job training, TRAIN, received by a new worker
during the first month. 7 Column 8 of table 7.1 reports averages of this
measure of training for the 1980 EOPP sample.
The other three surveys contained a common set of four questions
concerning various types of on-the-job training, although the period of
time over which training was measured differed among the three sur
veys. The 1982 EOPP survey and the 1992 SB A survey asked for the
total number of hours typically spent during the first three months of
employment (a) by specially trained personnel providing formal train
ing to the most recently hired worker, (b) by line supervisors and man
agement personnel providing the new worker with informal
individualized training and extra supervision, (c) by co-workers away
from other tasks in providing the new worker with informal individual
ized training and extra supervision, and (d) by the worker watching
others perform tasks. The average total time spent on these four train
ing activities, reported in column 8 of table 7.1, is 136.14 hours for the
1982 EOPP data and 168.43 hours for the SB A data. These sums pro
vide direct measures of the total amount of on-the-job training,
TRAIN, received by a new worker for the 1982 EOPP and 1992 SB A
surveys, respectively. 8 For the 1993 Upjohn Institute survey, the train
ing measure is obtained from questions almost identical to those of the
1982 EOPP and 1992 SBA surveys, with the important difference
being that the training questions concern only the first month, not the
first three months, of employment. That explains why the average level
of training for this survey, reported in column 8 of table 7.1 as 83.42
hours, is substantially below the mean for the other two surveys.
With few exceptions, measures of the other variables included in
equations (7.3) and (7.4) as determinants of employer search are avail
able in all four data sets. In all four surveys, the employer provided
information on the education level of the individual hired and whether
the individual hired had any experience in jobs that had some applica
tion to the position. We use responses to these two questions to infer
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the required education level of the position (EDUC) and if the
employer did not require any prior experience (ZEROEXP). All four
surveys also report the size of the establishment (SIZE). Three of the
four surveys, the exception being the 1980 EOPP survey, contain a
measure of the number of hours that the newly hired employee typi
cally works. Each of the four surveys has a measure of the collective
bargaining or union status of the position filled. For the two EOPP data
sets, this union variable is the proportion of all positions at the estab
lishment that are represented by a collective bargaining agreement. For
the SBA and Upjohn data sets, this union variable is more specific; the
employer identified whether the particular position filled was a union
position. We control for union status because Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (1991), using the EOPP data, argue that queues may exist for union
jobs. Only the 1982 EOPP and the 1993 Upjohn Institute surveys asked
employers whether they knew in advance of the existence of the open
ing.
Tables 7.2 through 7.5 report estimates of equations (7.3) and (7.4)
for the 1980 EOPP data, 1982 EOPP data, the 1992 SBA data, and the
1993 Upjohn Institute data, respectively. For the intensive search equa
tions (both the number of hours per applicant interviewed measure and,
for the most recent three data sets, the number of hours per applicant
measure), we report the standard ordinary least squares estimates with
results corrected for heteroskedasticity. These results appear in col
umns 1 and 2 of tables 7.2 through 7.5. Because our measure of exten
sive search involves sampling from a stationary distribution with a time
invariant stopping rule, the theory suggests that the average number of
applicants seen per acceptable offer is exponentially distributed. 9
Therefore, the results reported in columns 3 and 4 of tables 7.2 through
7.5 reflect the estimation of a maximum-likelihood exponential distri
bution (number of applicants) model using individual-level data. 10
The results reported in tables 7.2 through 7.5 provide robust evi
dence supporting the employer search model we developed. Using four
data sets collected over a fifteen-year period, we find strong support
that employer search varies systematically by the type of position
filled. Our results, summarized in table 7.6, indicate that all four data
sets support the prediction that employers will search more for posi
tions that require greater training, with three of the four indicating sig
nificantly greater search at both the intensive and extensive margins.

Table 7.2 Determinants of Employer Search, 1980 EOPP Survey

Variable
Constant
Log of total training, 1st month
Log number of years education
No prior experience in position
Log of employer size
Advanced notice of opening

Intensive search (IS)
Log of
Log of
number of
number of
hours spent hours spent
per interview per applicant
OLS
OLS
White (Huber) White (Huber)
correction
correction
Coefficient
Coefficient
Mean (/-statistic)
(/-statistic)
-.757
NA
(3.95)
2.81
.044
NA
(5.63)
2.48
.272
NA
(3.55)
.267
-.077
NA
(3.17)
2.97
-.004
NA
(0.48)
NA
NA
NA

Extensive serach (ES)
Number of
interviews
per offer

Number of
applicants
per offer

Number of
offers made
per hire

Exponential
distribution
Coefficient
(/-statistic)
-1.40
(4.05)
.161
(11.76)
.975
(7.04)
-.216
(5.11)
.096
(7.46)
NA

Exponential
distribution
Coefficient
(/-statistic)
NA

Exponential
distribution
Coefficient
(/-statistic)
-.051
(0.15)
.002
(0.13)
.039
(0.29)
-.012
(0.28)
-.009
(0.67)
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

Proportion of firm unionized

. 1 05

Log number of hours per week
Mean, dependent variable
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared or Chi-square

NA

.035
(0.85)
NA
.013
2,994
.02

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

-.131
(1.89)
NA
5.69
2,994
317.41

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

-.007
(0.10)
NA
1.02
2,994
.74

Table 7.3 Determinants of Employer Search, 1982 EOPP Survey

Variable
Constant
Log of total training, 1st three
months
Log number of years education
No prior experience in position
Log of employer size
Advanced notice of opening

Intensive search (IS)
Log of number Log of number
of hours spent of hours spent
per interview per applicant
OLS
OLS
White
White
(Huber)
(Huber)
correction
correction
Coefficient
Coefficient
Mean (^-statistic)
(^-statistic)
-2.98
-3.11
(4.00)
(3.72)
4.13
.117
.087
(7.48)
(4.34)
2.52
.716
.731
(2.52)
(2.37)
.339
-.166
-.117
(3.41)
(1.91)
3.03
.072
-.031
(4.06)
(1.35)
.60
.133
-.019
(2.80)
(0.33)

Extensive search (ES)
Number of
Number of
Number of
interviews per applicants per offers made
offer
offer
per hire

Exponential
Distribution
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
-.422
(0.69)
.057
(2.92)
.472
(2.28)
-.062
(1.03)
.053
(2.53)
.180
(3.09)

Exponential
Distribution
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
.779
(1.19)
.097
(5.07)
.302
(1.40)
-.031
(0.52)
.211
(10.02)
.335
(5.72)

Exponential
Distribution
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
-.042
(0.07)
.005
(0.26)
.023
(0.11)
.044
(0.73)
.007
(0.33)
-.014
(0.24)

Proportion of firm unionized
Log number of hours per week
Mean, depend, variable
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared or Chi-square

.098
3.60

.005
(0.05)
.239
(3.12)
.409
1,294
.11

-.268
(2.01)
.393
(3.58)
.341
1,294
.05

-.180
(1.64)
.146
(1.34)
5.91
1,270
43.12

.119
(1.06)
-.160
(1.46)
9.86
1,270
213.68

-.067
(0.61)
.005
(0.05)
1.08
1,270
1.15

Table 7.4 Determinants of Employer Search, 1992 SBA Survey

Variable

Mean

Constant
Log of total training, 1st three
months
Log number of years education

4.41

No prior experience in position

.280

Log of employer size

4.90

Advanced notice of opening
Union position

NA
.090

2.59

Intensive search (IS)
Extensive search (ES)
Log of number Log of number Number of
Number of
of hours spent of hours spent interviews
applicants
per interview per applicant
per offer
per offer
OLS
OLS
White (Huber) White (Huber) Exponential Exponential
distribution distribution
correction
correction
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
(z-statistic)
(^-statistic)
(z-statistic)
-4.30
-1.63
-1.13
-4.33
(6.77)
(2.12)
(1.75)
(7.18)
.122
.018
.061
.077
(5.18)
(2.31)
(0.69)
(2.15)
1.22
.777
.600
1.59
(2.31)
(3.37)
(5.72)
(7.39)
-.140
-.250
-.077
-.360
(1.92)
(3.17)
(4.60)
(0.86)
.043
-.024
.015
.123
(3.41)
(1.62)
(1.09)
(8.62)
NA
NA
NA
NA
.022
.127
-.122
-.040
(1.00)
(0.20)
(0.88)
(0.33)

Number of
offers made
per hire
Exponential
distribution
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
.248
(0.39)
.017
(0.63)
-.040
(0.18)
.021
(0.27)
.003
(0.22)
NA
.061
(0.51)

3.54
Mean, dependent variable
Number of observations
R-square or Chi-square

.272
(2.79)
.545
859
.14

.034
(0.33)
.248
859
.02

.209
(2.18)
5.58
859
42.53

.545
(5.79)
14.08
859
267.58

-.033
(0.36)
1.14
859
1.01

Table 7.5 Determinants of Employer Search, 1993 Upjohn Institute Survey

Dependent variable:

Model estimated
Variable

Mean

Constant
Log of total training, 1st month

4.05

Log number of years education

2.61

No prior experience in position

.148

Log of employer size

6.14

Advanced notice of opening

.743

Union position

.100

Intensive search (IS)
Extensive search (ES)
Log of
Log of
number of
number of
Number
Number
Number
hours spent hours spent per of interviews of applicants of offers made
per interview
per offer
applicant
per hire
per offer
OLS
OLS
White (Huber) White (Huber) Exponential Exponential Exponential
correction
correction
distribution distribution
distribution
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
(z-statistic)
(^-statistic)
(z-statistic)
(z-statistic)
-5.91
-0.99
-6.47
-2.98
.651
(4.68)
(2.02)
(0.72)
(4.35)
(0.47)
.135
.108
.044
.132
-.022
(1.79)
(1.93)
(0.58)
(1.87)
(0.30)
1.86
1.30
.607
1.96
-.254
(4.14)
(2.54)
(1.29)
(3.86)
(0.52)
-.391
-.207
.129
-.834
-.067
(1.94)
(1.37)
(0.61)
(3.86)
(0.34)
.045
-.077
-.009
.037
-.043
(1.19)
(1.83)
(0.18)
(0.85)
(0.95)
.029
-.119
.197
.618
.006
(0.23)
(0.61)
(1.21)
(3.75)
(0.03)
-.052
-.114
-.459
.292
.009
(0.22)
(0.59)
(1.85)
(1.99)
(0.04)

Log number of hours per week
Mean, depend, variable
Number of observations
R-squared or Chi-square

3.57

.312
(2.11)
.733
210
.17

-.119
(0.61)
.000
210
.04

.283
(1.29)
6.02
210
17.81

.890
(4.02)
22.94
210
79.59

.145
(0.68)
1.16
210
1.96

Table 7.6 Summary of Findings Concerning Determinants of Employer Search and Vacancy Duration
Across Four Surveys
1992 SBA
1993 Upjohn
1980 EOPP
1982 EOPP
Predicted
Interview signs for
Hours
Hours
Hours
Hours
extensive
based
Duration
per
Duration Interviews
Duration Interviews
per
per
Duration Interviews
employer search (ES) Interviews per
of a
per offer interview
of a
of a
per offer interview
per offer interview
search and intensive per offer interview of a
vacancy
vacancy
vacancy
(IS)
(ES)
(IS)
(ES)
vacancy
measures search (S)
(IS)
(IS)
(ES)
(ES)
+*
+*
+*
+*
NA
+*
+
+*
+*
+*
+*
+*
ES+; IS+
Total
training Duration: sign
ofES
+*
+*
+*
+*
+*
+
NA
+*
+*
+*
+*
+*
Years of ES or IS+
education Duration: sign
ofES
.*
.*
.
.*
.*
.*
.*
.*
-*
.*
NA
No prior ES or IS+
experience Duration: sign
ofES
.*
+*
-*
NA
+*
+
+*
+
-*
+*
+
Employer ES+ or ISDuration: ?
size
NA
+
+
+
+*
+*
NA
+*
NA
NA
NA
Advanced ES+; IS?
NA
notice of Duration: sign
opening of ES

Applicant
based
employer
Applicants Hours
Applicants
Applicants
Applicants
per
per offer Hours per
per offer Hours per
search
per offer
per offer Hours per
measures
applicant
(ES)
applicant
(ES)
applicant
(ES)
(ES)
applicant
+*
+*
+*
+*
Total
ES+; IS+
NA
NA
+*
+*
training Duration: sign
ofES
+*
+*
+*
Years of ES or IS+
+*
NA
+*
+
NA
education Duration: sign
ofES
.*
.*
_*
No prior ES or IS+
NA
NA
experience Duration: sign
ofES
+*
+*
_*
Employer ES+ or ISNA
NA
+
size
Duration: ?
+*
+*
.
NA
NA
Advanced ES+; IS ?
NA
NA
notice of Duration: sign
opening of ES
NOTE: An asterisk indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .10 significance level. Pluses and minuses indicate the sign of the coefficient.
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There is similarly strong support for the prediction that employers
search more extensively for positions that require greater levels of edu
cation. 11 Further, all four data sets provide at least partial support for
the contention that employers search less on the extensive margin for
positions that do not require prior experience, and three of the four data
sets support the contention that larger employers search more at the
extensive margin. On the other hand, there is no strong evidence that
larger employers search less intensively. Estimates of equations (7.3)
and (7.4) that include the advance notice variable for the 1982 EOPP
and 1993 Upjohn Institute data sets indicate, as expected, that while
advance notice has an indeterminate sign with respect to intensive
search, the advance notice of a vacancy does lead to an increase in
extensive search.
There is an additional finding from the four surveys that is of inter
est. Column 5 in tables 7.2 through 7.5 reports the estimation of a sur
vival model for the number of offers made per hire. All four surveys
indicate that it is uncommon for applicants to reject wage offers (see
column 6 of table 7.1): in all four data sets, workers accept at least 85
percent of all job offers. Further, there is no systematic pattern to the
rejection of wage offers across positions.

The Evidence on Vacancy Duration

The analysis in the previous section provides not only a framework
for the analysis of factors affecting employer intensive and extensive
search, but also suggests determinants of the duration of a vacancy. The
model specifies that the duration of a vacancy is an exponentially dis
tributed random variable with expected value 1 /(8(l - H(sr)), where 8
is the per-period probability that an applicant will contact the employer
seeking to hire and (l-H(sr)) is the probability that an applicant is
acceptable given the distribution of ability signals //( ) and reservation
signal sr Thus, the expected duration of a vacancy is an increasing
function of the employer©s reservation ability signal choice, sn and a
decreasing function of the probability that an applicant contacts the
employer, 8.
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This implies the hazard rate function for vacancy duration is time
independent. 12 In this case, letting D denote the log of the duration time
for a vacancy, the model we estimate is given by:
(7.5)

D = c0 + c, TRAIN + c2 EDUC + c3 ZEROEXP + c4 SIZE
+ cs ADVNOTICE + c6 X + e

where the predicted signs for the coefficients in equation (7.3) are the
same as those for the extensive search equation (7.4), with one excep
tion. The exception is the employer size variable. Recall that while
larger employers are predicted to search more extensively (higher sr),
the rationale for this is that larger employers have a greater probability
of an applicant contact each period (a higher 8). These two changes
(higher sr and higher 8) have offsetting effects on the duration of a
vacancy. Thus, the effect of size on the duration of a vacancy is ambig
uous. Given that we have found that extensive search increases with
training, education, and advance notice, and decreases in positions that
require no prior experience, then these variables should have similar
effects on the duration of a vacancy.
Because the data are measured in days and the number of observa
tions in our data sets are relatively large, we treat the data as discrete. 13
While our theory implies that the hazard function should be time
invariant, van Ours (1988) and Renes (1989) report evidence of dura
tion dependence. To check this result for U.S. data, we estimate the
vacancy duration model using a discrete hazard model that Kalbfleisch
and Prentice (1973) suggest. Meyer (1990) recently applied this model
to unemployment spells. Let the duration time have a discrete distribu
tion with mass points at 0 < z\ < Z2 • • •• Then the Kalbfleisch and Pren
tice model implies the hazard at zt for covariate x is:
(7.6)

l-(l-yt)exPt-* c i

where yt and the coefficient vector C are parameters estimated using
maximum likelihood techniques. 14 The discrete, time-invariant hazard
function is 1 - ( 1 - ^)exp[-*c]? wm"ch is simply a special case of equa
tion (7.6). We estimated both models for each of the three data sets that
contain information on the duration of the vacancy and overwhelm-
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ingly reject the constant hazard function specification for each of the
three data sets.
For the 1982 EOPP and 1993 Upjohn data sets, the duration of a
vacancy is measured by the number of days "between the time (the
employer) started looking for someone to fill the opening and the time
(a new employee) started to work." For the 1980 EOPP, the term
"recruit for the job" was used instead of "looking for someone to fill
the opening." 15 Columns 1 through 3 of table 7.7 report the results of
this estimation of the vacancy duration equation. The estimated hazard
rates for the three separate data sets are plotted in figure 7.1. There is
some evidence of time dependence. For instance, one pattern indicated
by figure 7.1 is that the probability of filling a vacancy rises at the end
of the first week. It appears that a common event is for an employer to
fill a vacancy after a week of search. A second pattern, apparent in the
Figure 7.1 Vacancy Duration Hazard Rates (duration in days)

•EOPP 1982 — - — - Upjohn 1993\

two EOPP data sets, is a relatively high likelihood of a vacancy being
immediately filled. These are positions for which the employer either
indicated that there were no days between the time he or she started to
look for someone to fill the opening and the time that the new
employee started to work or that he or she did not have to look for
someone to fill the position. One reason that the immediate filling of
vacancies does not occur in the Upjohn Institute data set is that firms
who fill positions immediately tend to be smaller employers, and

Table 7.7 Vacancy Duration Models

Variable
Log of total training 1 st three months
(1st month for EOPP 1980)
Log number of years education
No prior experience in position
Log of employer size
Advanced notice of opening
Proportion of firm unionized (union
position for Upjohn 1993)
Log number of hours per week
Median of dependent variable (in
days)
Number of observations
Log likelihood

1980
EOPP
Coefficient
(z-statistic)

1982
EOPP
Coefficient
(z-statistic)

1993
Upjohn
Coefficient
(z-statistic)

.112
(8.33)
.574
(4.32)
-.201
(4.71)
.004
(0.34)
NA

.108
(5.32)
.886
(4.88)
-.111
(1.79)
-0.16
(0.79)
.259
(4.38)

.141
(1.78)
2.432
(4.50)
-0.888
(4.01)
.003
(0.68)
.281
(1.59)

-.206
(1.81)
.490
(4.77)

.429
(1.65)
.491
(2.26)

-.015
(0.22)
NA

14
2,994
-6400.09

14
1,270
-2794.35

22
210
-394.94

a. We calculate hazard rates using the mean value of the covariates for each sample.

Duation
(in days)

1980
1982
1993
EOPP
EOPP
Upjohn
Estimated
Estimated
Estimated
hazard rates3 hazard rates3 hazard rates3

0

0.2706

0.1243

...

1

0.1005

0.0528

0.0039

2

0.0829

0.0551

0.0120

3

0.0662

0.0700

0.0163

0.0235

0.0324

0.0125

5-7

0.1054

0.1013

0.0261

8-14

0.0685

0.0691

0.0179

15-21
22-30
31-60
61-90

0.0353
0.0494
0.0134
0.0107

0.0384
0.0512
0.0172
0.0110

0.0405
0.0380
0.0247
0.0213

4
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smaller employers were specifically excluded from the Upjohn Insti
tute sample. Our findings generally support the presumption that
changes in variables that lead to more extensive search are the same
changes that lead to an increase in the duration of a vacancy. The one
exception, employer size, supports our conjecture that it should have
different effects on extensive search and vacancy duration. While
larger employers do search more extensively, the expected duration of
a vacancy is equal to or less than that of smaller employers.
Recently, van Ours (1988) and Renes (1989), using Dutch data,
explored the determinants of vacancy duration. They found that
vacancy duration was higher at positions with high education, experi
ence, and skill requirements. Our findings for the United States across
three data sets are consistent with these findings: we find that vacancy
duration is significantly greater in positions requiring more training,
more highly educated workers, and individuals with some prior experi
ence. Our findings, however, indicate a much shorter duration of a
vacancy than that found in the Dutch data. From table 7.1, mean
vacancy duration is under a month, while the average vacancy duration
for the Dutch data was about six months. Some of this difference may
be explained by the fact that the Dutch data was drawn by sampling
vacancies, then resampling the employers later to determine the time
taken to fill that particular vacancy. Such a sampling strategy overrepresents positions that have long vacancy durations. More in line with
our data are Scottish data reported by Beaumont (1978), who found an
average vacancy duration of between 10 and 15 days during the 19731975 period.

Conclusions

While much has been written concerning job search, researchers
have placed less attention on employer search. This appears odd given
our results, which confirm that systematic patterns to employer search
do exist and that employer search is an important component of the
matching of workers to positions. Table 7.8 indicates that the median
duration of unemployment is substantially higher for workers in mana
gerial and professional occupations, occupations that typically require
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higher levels of education and more training than service occupations.
Our finding that employers search more extensively for positions that
require greater formal education and training may help explain this dif
ference in unemployment duration. More extensive search by employ
ers means that workers must on average locate more vacancies per job
offer. Our results on extensive search by employers are also consistent
with Holzer©s (1994) finding that positions involving greater job skill
requirements generally have higher vacancy rates. That we find that
employers search more extensively to fill such positions (with a result
ing longer duration of a vacancy at these positions) implies higher
vacancy rates, other things equal.
Table 7.8 Employer Search and Unemployment Duration

Occupation
Service
Operators, fabricators, and laborers
Technical, sales, arid
administrative support
Precision production, craft, and repair
Managerial and professional

Median duration Mean number of
(weeks) of
applicants per
unemployment3
offer (SBA)
7.3
7.7
9.0
12.9
10.1
12.2
12.6

14.8
14.5
18.7

a. As the duration of unemployment data is censored, we report the median rather than the mean
of the interrupted duration spells as it is likely to provide a better measure of the underlying mean
duration of completed spells of unemployment. Employer extensive search is measured by the
mean number of applicants seen per offer reported by the Spring 1992 SBA survey. The median
duration of unemployment is taken from the June 1992 issue of Employment and Earnings and for
the month of May 1992.

One important extension of our analysis would be to consider fur
ther the interplay between employer search decisions and worker job
search. For instance, as Montgomery (1991) emphasizes, if workers
know the search behavior of employers, then employers who make rel
atively few offers per applicant will have to pay higher wages to com
pensate applicants engaged in costly job search for the reduced
likelihood of receiving a job offer. Another issue that warrants further
examination is the implication of employer search for the sharing of
on-the-job training costs and returns. We assumed for simplicity that
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employers bear all the costs and reap all the returns to training. In a
more general setting, however, the employer©s share of training cost
should be endogenously determined, with the employer bearing a
larger portion of training costs and returns at positions requiring sub
stantial training in order to induce a more careful matching of workers
and positions (e.g., to induce the appropriate investment in employer
search). This provides an additional rationale for the findings in chap
ter 5 of a weak relationship between starting wages and training.
NOTES
1. In modeling employer search, there are several options available. The simplest approach,
which is the one we adopt, assumes a sequential strategy. This is standard in the literature that
examines search from the worker©s point of view. There are, however, situations in which the opti
mal search strategy combines elements of the fixed-sample-size approach with the sequential
approach. The optimality of a search strategy that includes a. fixed-sample-size element is demon
strated by Morgan and Manning (1985). For instance if there is a delay between the interviewing
of an additional worker and the decision to hire, the fixed-sample-size element of search increases
the speed at which the vacancy can be filled. Naturally, offsetting this gain is the potential of a
fixed-sample-size strategy to result in an overinvestment in information. Bull, Ornati, and Tedeschi (1987) provide an illustration of an employer who chooses a combined fixed-sample-size/
sequential search strategy. Employers do, in fact, often engage in search strategies that combine
fixed-sample-size properties with sequential strategy. The added complexity of such a model of
employer search, however, is not required to illustrate the interplay between belated information
and employer search and to identify how factors such as the extent of on-the-job training influence
employer search.
2. For simplicity, we assume the length of a period is sufficiently short such that the probabil
ity that two or more applicants contact the employer in the same period is approximately zero. We
also choose not to complicate the model by having the employer choose the extent of (costly)
advertising that would affect the speed at which applicants visit the employer. As noted by van
Ours and Ridder (1992), such advertising can be the source of a pool of applicants.
3. We could also assume that higher-ability workers have lower costs of training. In other
words, we could assume that 32c/3T8cc < 0, such that the reduction in output during the first
period that results from an increase in training is less for higher-ability workers. The results to
follow would not be affected by adding this feature to the model.
4. These economies of scale may arise in part due to the existence of personnel departments
that increase the flow of applicants per vacant position, van Ours and Ridder (1992) do find that
". . . establishments with a personnel department. . . have more applicants" (p. 149).
5. Recall that the extent of intensive search excludes the indirect costs of a vacancy remaining
unfilled. As this intensive search measure is computed by dividing the total time spent searching
by the number interviewed, we add one to the number interviewed as reported by the employer in
order that all employers, including those who reported interviewing zero individuals prior to hir
ing, are included in the analysis. Except for the 1980 EOPP data, the number reporting no inter
views was under 10 percent. For the 1980 EOPP data set, approximately 30 percent of employers
reported no one was interviewed. This large number may be due in part to the absence of a preced
ing framing question concerning the number of applicants for the position.
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6. Given that we add one to the reported measures of the number interviewed to compute the
intensive search measure, we add one to the number interviewed in computing the extensive
search measure, such that the product of these intensive and extensive measures equals total
search. Estimation of a survival model for extensive search also requires that the lower bound for
the number interviewed must be above zero.
7. This training measure is clearly truncated as the training refers only to the first month of
employment. The substantially greater estimates of training over the first three months of employ
ment reported below for the 1982 EOPP and the 1992 SB A illustrate this point.
8. The fourth measure of training was in response to the question concerning the total hours
spent by the worker "in training activities in which he or she is watching other people do the job
rather than doing it himself (EOPP data set) or "observing co-workers in order to learn skills
required for the position" (SBA data set). One might omit this variable from our total training
measures on the presumption that it introduces some double-counting given our other three train
ing measures. The deletion of this fourth training variable, however, does not alter any of the find
ings reported below.
9. Thus, our measure of extensive search has features similar to duration data.
10. The significance of the reported results are robust to alternative estimation procedures. For
instance, estimation of the model using Davidon, Fletcher, and Powell (DFP) algorithm provides
identical coefficients and similar estimates of the standard errors. We also used robust confidence
standard errors of Huber (1967) and White (1980) in the exponential models and our findings
largely unchanged.
11. van Ours and Ridder (1992) have a similar empirical finding that employers see more
applicants prior to hire at positions requiring higher educational levels.
12. In general, the vacancy duration hazard rate function ht is the probability that a vacancy is
filled at any given instant /. Time (duration) independence means that dX, Idt = 0 for all t, and
occurs if the distribution of vacancy duration is exponential.
13. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) for a good discussion of the estimation of discrete
hazard models.
14. We follow Kalbfleisch and Prentice©s (1980) suggestion and use the Kaplan-Meier esti
mates of the empirical hazard functions for the starting values of the y©s and C = 0. When C = 0,
the method of Kalbfleisch and Prentice yields Kaplan-Meier estimates for the hazard function.
Cox also proposes a discrete hazard model; if we adopt his approach, the parameter estimates for
the C©s and the estimates of the hazard function are very similar to the estimates produced by the
method of Kalbfleisch and Prentice.
15. Holzer (1993a, 1994) and Holzer and Montgomery (1993) analyze the 1980 and 1982
EOPP data on firm vacancy rates, but do not examine the data on the duration of vacancy for the
last worker hired by these firms. Holzer©s (1994) finding concerning the factors that affect vacancy
rates complements our findings concerning factors affecting employer extensive search and thus
the duration of a vacancy.
16. By other things equal, we mean the following. Let P, denote the number of positions of
type / and let £, denote the number employed in type i positions, such that the number of vacan
cies is Pj - EJ and the vacancy rate for type / positions is given by v(- = (/*,- - £,)/£,. Assume a con
stant exit rate q from the employed ranks that is the same across all types of positions. Then for
type i positions, qEt denotes new vacancies created each period. In the steady state, the number of
vacancies for positions of type i that are filled equals qEj, the likelihood that a vacancy is filled is
qEj/(Pj - EJ), and the expected duration of a vacancy for a type i position is given by £>, = !%£,-/
(Pi - £,-)) = Vj/q. Thus, the steady-state vacancy rate for positions of type i equals the common rate
at which employed positions are vacated times the expected duration of a vacancy for positions of
type i.
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Conclusions
What have we learned about training from the EOPP, SBA, and
Upjohn Institute data sets? First, all the data sets agree that nearly all
newly hired workers undergo on-the-job training. Moreover, in the first
three months of employment, both the EOPP and SBA data suggest
that newly hired workers, their co-workers, and their supervisors spend
the equivalent of nearly four 40-hour weeks in training. Several other
surveys, however, demonstrate much lower incidence rates of training,
even if the sample is restricted to newly hired workers. But, when
newly hired employees and their employers are asked a similar set of
questions about training, both groups agree that training is nearly uni
versal. This correspondence suggests that researchers must carefully
design surveys to capture fully the types and quantities of training that
workers receive.
The data also indicate that college-educated workers and workers
employed in large establishments receive more training than other
workers. College-educated workers have shown a proficiency for accu
mulating human capital during schooling, and this proficiency appar
ently extends to the workplace. Presumably, large establishments find
training less costly than smaller establishments. Large firms can spread
any fixed costs associated with training over their larger number of new
hires, and they are more able to have co-workers provide the training
without experiencing significant productivity losses.
The EOPP, SBA, and Upjohn Institute data sets also show that train
ing generates productivity growth. In the absence of explicit measures
of productivity, we relied on a subjective measure in which the
employer rates the new employee against a fully trained employee. The
productivity index demonstrates that training results in substantial pro
ductivity growth: a 10 percent increase in training raises productivity 2
percent during the first three months of employment.
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On-the-job training also increases wage growth. Whether looking at
wage growth in the first three months or first two years of employment,
the data indicate significant increases in wages associated with train
ing. These findings confirm the predicted effects of on-the-job training
on wage and productivity growth. The magnitude of the wage growth
effect, however, suggests that current theories of on-the-job training
are not satisfactory. A 10 percent increase in training results in only
about a 0.2 percent growth in wages, or about one-tenth the magnitude
of the impact of training on productivity growth. Such a differential
could, with some difficulty, be justified if all training were firm-spe
cific, but the impact of previous experience on wages makes it difficult
to accept this proposition.
Further problems arise when trying to confirm the prediction that
on-the-job training decreases the starting wage because workers bear at
least some of the costs of training. We do find some evidence that train
ing lowers the starting wage; a 10 percent increase in training in the
first three months of employment lowers the starting wage between 0.5 and -0.2 percent. Workers appear to bear little of the training costs
while firms bear most of the costs. Moreover, whether we infer the
fraction of the training that is general training indirectly from the
observed effect of previous experience on wages or directly from
responses to survey questions, most of this training appears to be gen
eral training. The notion of firms bearing the costs of general training is
inconsistent with any equilibrium model of labor markets of which we
are aware.
If firms do bear a large portion of training costs, hiring the wrong
worker for a job requiring a significant amount of training is a very
costly mistake. Firms should be willing, therefore, to expend resources
to avoid these mistakes by improving their recruiting when hiring for
such positions. As we demonstrated in chapter 7, firms recruit more
intensively (they spend more time with each applicant) and more
extensively (they see more applicants per position) when recruiting for
positions with more training. To the extent that this increased effort
results in higher-quality workers, the firm matches higher-quality
workers to positions that require more training. As higher-quality
workers command higher wages, this finding helps explain why posi
tions with substantial training do not have significantly lower starting
wages.
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Perhaps our most important findings come through the use of the
Upjohn Institute survey that matched responses of employer and
employees to a set of identical questions. We found significant differ
ences in employer and employee reports across human capital mea
sures, including both schooling and training measures. Training
measures had correlation coefficients between employer and employee
reports of only 0.2 to 0.4 for the individual measures and only about
0.5 for the aggregate measure. For education, the correlations are
somewhat higher, especially at the higher levels of educational attain
ment, but there are substantial differences in employer and employee
reports. Future research, therefore, must be concerned with the quality
of the data used in attempting to measure the impact of human capital
on wages.
For many years now, the wages of the least-educated Americans
have declined while the wages of the most-educated Americans have
increased. For instance, Katz and Murphy (1992) report that the earn
ings of high school dropouts between 1979 and 1987 declined 6.6 per
cent, while the earnings of college graduates increased 7.7 percent in
the same period. 1 At least in part, these changes have created renewed
interest in "investing in people" and mobilized policy makers to act on
the perceived lack of investment in human capital. (So pervasive is this
view that James Heckman (1993) refers to it as the "new consensus.")
What insights do our findings provide concerning the forthcoming
debates over how to increase the human capital of lower-income work
ers?
First, for policy makers who wish to argue that the market underprovides training opportunities for workers, our results offer some evi
dence for this view. Firms appear to finance a large amount of general
training. While there may be other distortions that counterbalance the
incentive to under-provide training, it seems unlikely, in our view, that
such counterbalances would ever result in firms providing too much
training. Thus, government may have an additional role to play in the
human capital market.
Government already provides massive subsidies to education, and
we may have too much schooling relative to job training in our human
capital production. If policy makers wish to pursue policies that
increase job training, our results also provide some insights into which
policies may be effective. Most important, our results indicate that pol-
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icy makers should not overlook the importance of informal training in
the acquisition of job skills. By far the majority of employee training
for all sizes of establishments, and especially for smaller establish
ments, is informal. Because workers and firms agree to provide this
training voluntarily, we believe they do so because they find it efficient.
Informal training is a less costly way of imparting human capital than
formal training programs for the acquisitions of many types of skills.
Because human capital should be produced as efficiently as possible,
we should not encourage more expensive methods of imparting human
capital through policies that emphasize formal training. Policies should
not ignore the role of informal training.
For instance, suppose that you were concerned about the dismal
level of training among academic economists. You mandate that uni
versities and colleges spend 5 percent of the wage bill of their econom
ics departments for training of economists. We predict you would soon
find that there would be large training conferences in Honolulu in the
middle of winter. Among the expensive flights, the expensive hotels,
luaus, and mai tais, some useful training will occur, but this "training"
is clearly less efficient than the economists going into their offices on a
Saturday and, informally, learning some additional economics. (If this
scenario sounds fanciful, examine how medical doctors meet their con
tinuing education requirements, or where other professions have their
trade meetings.)
Inducing substitution from inexpensive to expensive methods of
producing human capital, either through tax credits, price subsidies, or
mandates, is nobody©s prescription for fixing our human capital sys
tem. Yet, this is precisely what programs that seek to encourage formal
training programs would accomplish. While some of the programs may
induce additional accumulation of human capital, there seems to be lit
tle doubt that much of the increase in formal training programs would
simply be replacement for existing informal training. Thus, any policy
initiative to encourage expenditures on training will probably succeed:
it will increase expenditures on training. What should concern policy
makers is whether or not the training programs succeed in raising the
wages of the target groups and whether that increase represents an
acceptable rate of return on investment.
One reason often given for the policy makers© preference for formal
training programs is that informal training is difficult to measure.
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While it is undoubtedly easier for firms to document expenditures on
formal training than provision of informal training, it is not at all clear
that the returns to the worker are higher for formal training than for
informal training. Further, there is no guarantee that workers would
even perceive such investments in formal training. When we asked
identical questions to employers and employees within a month of the
beginning of employment about formal training programs, we received
significantly different responses about the quantity and incidence of
training.
In our view, private sector training provides little insight into the
design of a government training program to stimulate investment in
human capital. For the most part, training experiences that we exam
ined are the result of the interaction of profit-maximizing firms and
utility-maximizing workers who jointly agree to an investment in train
ing. Policy makers are interested presumably in stimulating investment
in human capital beyond what the market is providing. To us, this sug
gests that policy makers would learn more about the efficacy of their
plans by examining past training programs governments have initiated.
A voluminous literature exists on government training programs, many
implemented in partnership with the private sector. Available estimates
indicate that the investment necessary to reverse the decline in wages
of high school dropouts and those with only a high school degree will
be immense. Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1994) estimate that if
training investments will provide a 10 percent rate of return, it would
have required over $212 billion (in 1989 dollars) to return 1989 high
school graduates to 1979 wage levels, and it would have required
another $214 billion to return 1989 male high school dropouts to 1979
wage levels. While there are some notable successes in these programs,
most of this literature indicates that the cost estimates of Heckman,
Roselius, and Smith are quite conservative.
What advice, if any, can we provide to policy makers who wish to
encourage the provision of on-the-job training in the private sector?
First, given scarce resources, it seems obvious to us that any program
should be targeted. While it may be true that well-paid lawyers, soft
ware engineers, accountants, and economists for that matter, may also
suffer from the under-provision of on-the-job training as well as disadvantaged youth, it seems perverse to expend public resources to correct
this distortion. As a society, we may wish to use resources to aid disad-
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vantaged youth, single mothers, poor families, and perhaps dislocated
workers, but we probably do not want subsidies to the highly paid.
Second, government should avoid specifying how firms choose to
train these targeted workers. Firms know best how to provide training
to their workforce; government should not attempt to micro manage
the employment relationship. How then should we guarantee that the
targeted population receives training? Our answer is simple. If
employed, workers receive training; if not employed, these individuals
will not accumulate human capital. Evidence from the Upjohn Institute
data is unambiguous: While workers and firms may disagree on the
type of training and the quantity of the component parts of training,
both firms and workers agree that there is much training in the initial
period of employment. Thus, if you want to raise the earnings of the
economically disadvantaged, you should pursue policies that insure
they are employed. Policies to encourage the labor supply of the disad
vantaged such as the earned income tax credit or policies to
increase the demand for disadvantage workers such as explicit wage
subsidies or tax credits for hiring the disadvantaged would seem the
most obvious, direct route of insuring their employment.
Finally, we note that for policy purposes the measurement of train
ing is largely irrelevant. While it is true that the human capital accumu
lated through on-the-job training is difficult to measure, it is also
largely irrelevant if we are concerned with increasing the earnings of
the poor. While not measured with complete accuracy, wages are easier
to measure than on-the-job training.
NOTE
1. Katz and Murphy (1992, table 1, p. 40). Percentages are approximated from the log of aver
age real weekly wage.
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